Narrative:

Aircraft X was IFR arriving from the southwest level at 7;000 feet requesting an RNAV approach. The controller working the radar enabled the request to due to the approach course being within 3 nm of an active MOA. The controller advised pilot the VOR-B approach was available and the pilot accepted requesting to execute the procedure turn at [fix] and that it would take him a couple minutes to setup the approach since they were expecting the VOR-B approach. The controller issued a vector to heading 340 and to expect direct [fix]. This vector took the aircraft 10 nm west of [fix] and the cpc then cleared aircraft X for the approach and the pilot does not reply. A position relief briefing begins. The pilot during the briefing requests joining approach at [fix] and the relieving controller cancels the clearance and begins to vector for the [fix]. Then aircraft Y questions the descent profile of the arrival. The oncoming controller forgets about aircraft X who is now north of the approach course and issued a 030 heading and then a right turn towards the active MOA. I suggested a left turn away from the MOA and the controller corrected to the left turn. The pilot delayed the turn and entered the 8;000 foot minimum vectoring altitude at 7;000 feet. The controller issued a climb to 9;200 feet but was too late.in this scenario we have an instance where we had a newly certified controller relieving a fairly inexperienced controller and both got distracted by other aircraft and aircraft X got away combined with a pilot on a training flight executing an approach they were not expecting or I believed planned for since they first wanted the RNAV approach. I believed up until the time the aircraft was past [fix] that the situation was under control but we must still be vigilant as I knew at that point the new controller was going to need assistance to resolve the sequence of events. Had I been working aircraft X I would have waited to turn him until he was 5 west of the VORTAC and cleared him direct. We also need to be checking for compliance with our instructions and taking care of higher priority tasks versus distraction leading us down the wrong path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JCF TRACON Controller reported observing another Controller vector an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Narrative: Aircraft X was IFR arriving from the southwest level at 7;000 feet requesting an RNAV Approach. The Controller working the radar enabled the request to due to the approach course being within 3 nm of an active MOA. The Controller advised pilot the VOR-B approach was available and the pilot accepted requesting to execute the procedure turn at [fix] and that it would take him a couple minutes to setup the approach since they were expecting the VOR-B Approach. The Controller issued a vector to heading 340 and to expect direct [fix]. This vector took the aircraft 10 nm west of [fix] and the CPC then cleared Aircraft X for the approach and the pilot does not reply. A position relief briefing begins. The Pilot during the briefing requests joining approach at [fix] and the relieving Controller cancels the clearance and begins to vector for the [fix]. Then Aircraft Y questions the descent profile of the arrival. The oncoming Controller forgets about Aircraft X who is now north of the approach course and issued a 030 heading and then a right turn towards the active MOA. I suggested a left turn away from the MOA and the Controller corrected to the left turn. The pilot delayed the turn and entered the 8;000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude at 7;000 feet. The Controller issued a climb to 9;200 feet but was too late.In this scenario we have an instance where we had a newly certified Controller relieving a fairly inexperienced Controller and both got distracted by other aircraft and Aircraft X got away combined with a pilot on a training flight executing an approach they were not expecting or I believed planned for since they first wanted the RNAV approach. I believed up until the time the aircraft was past [fix] that the situation was under control but we must still be vigilant as I knew at that point the new Controller was going to need assistance to resolve the sequence of events. Had I been working Aircraft X I would have waited to turn him until he was 5 west of the VORTAC and cleared him direct. We also need to be checking for compliance with our instructions and taking care of higher priority tasks versus distraction leading us down the wrong path.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.