Narrative:

According to ATIS; the runways in use were arriving 4R ILS and departures 4L. We prepared; programmed and briefed accordingly for [runway] 4L. After push from gate; I remember being informed of 20-minute taxi times by ramp; and therewith elected for single-engine taxi; as is customary to save fuel resources. Upon contacting ground at [taxiway] a; we were instructed to taxi B; hold at [taxiway] north. Approaching [taxiway] north; we heard the aircraft in front receiving clearances and so started engine 1 in anticipation of a greatly truncated taxi time; it seemed we had been under way for maybe 3 minutes at this point. We were shortly after instructed to taxi via B; hold short [runway] 4L at C. Aircraft had been departing from [runway] 4L; so I was then confused as to which runway we were using. I asked the first officer to query ground. There was no response and a certain period of radio silence broken by other aircraft instructions. We were at that time approaching [runway] 4L at C; running the after start check and transmitted a second time the question of which runway to expect. Ground abruptly told us he would tell us in 15 seconds; after which there was again a period of silence and some other aircraft instructions. We then were instructed to cross [runway] 4L and hold short of north on P; still without a runway to expect; but we were instinctively preparing for [runaway] 4R. (I thought there was a chance we would take [runway] 4L from the east). Being unfamiliar with the procedure of departing from the northbound outboard runway at kewr and being acutely aware of preventing an incursion on unfamiliar; complicated taxiways in inclement weather at night; I taxied slowly and tried to keep the first officer included eyes outside while juggling the runway change procedure and checklist. Ground urged us to contact tower; we complied. Tower told us to continue on P and line up/wait [runway] 4R. I was not comfortable with this clearance; still resolving the runway change with my first officer and in my own mind while paying attention to taxiing in unfamiliar territory. I asked the first officer to request 2 minutes delay to finalize our performance data and double; triple and quadruple check that we were absent error; omission or confusion on a procedure that could bring incursion; improper configuration or otherwise. The tower asked us if this a 'legit' timeframe to which I responded; 'yes it takes time to program our FMS.' tower then informed us there was an 'obstacle free zone' in that area and could not accept our timeframe (I have seen no indication of this on the 10-9 airport diagram; 19-03; 10-7 or others; unless I overlooked something; so must take him at his word). Tower instructed us to cross [runway] 4L at V; left at D; hold at cc. I assumed we would switch back to [runway] 4L and we began reprogramming for the same upon setting the brake on taxiway D. Mindful of our fuel with both engines running; after a period of time; I asked tower what the plan was. Tower informed me he was waiting for us. I told him we were ready; again assuming [runway] 4L departure. Tower instead instructed a double right PA to V; hold short [runway] 4L. We again ran the runway change checklist; for the 3rd time; still nebulous of the runway assignment. Later; after crossing [runway] 4L we were instructed to taxi via P; cleared to depart [runway] 4R. Again confusion ensued as there is no P entry to runway [runway] 4R but P1. We then departed without further incident worthy of mention. There was no incursion or misconfiguration of the aircraft to my knowledge. Important to note; in my mind; is a total breakdown of CRM and the basic elements of communication between the tower and flight deck. Please let me say up front that I have high regard for kewr controllers and normally share good rapport; it is thereby bewildering why our flight encountered stonewalling to simple requests for normal information and incomplete phraseology. I am quite curious aboutthis. To the committee I wish to assert that airmanship dictates we communicate in a way that overcomes barriers rather than contribute thereto. I appreciate your tolerance in considering the following: requesting the departure runway during what was seemingly a fluid ATC situation; in inclement weather; at night; operating on unfamiliar taxi routes at an extremely busy airport while starting an engine and running checklists is little to ask; especially when it takes as much time to tell us what runway to expect as it does; 'I'll tell you in 15 seconds.' there is significant potential for human error in such high workload environments and I would hope in the future we are greeted with the same level of respect and consideration as a 777 bound for points far-flung and unknown.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB First Officer reported EWR ATC issuing complicated taxi instructions and hesitance to provide expected departure runway led to confusion and distraction in the flight deck.

Narrative: According to ATIS; the runways in use were Arriving 4R ILS and Departures 4L. We prepared; programmed and briefed accordingly for [Runway] 4L. After push from gate; I remember being informed of 20-minute taxi times by RAMP; and therewith elected for single-engine taxi; as is customary to save fuel resources. Upon contacting GROUND at [Taxiway] A; we were instructed to taxi B; hold at [Taxiway] N. Approaching [Taxiway] N; we heard the aircraft in front receiving clearances and so started Engine 1 in anticipation of a greatly truncated taxi time; it seemed we had been under way for maybe 3 minutes at this point. We were shortly after instructed to taxi via B; hold short [Runway] 4L at C. Aircraft had been departing from [Runway] 4L; so I was then confused as to which runway we were using. I asked the First Officer to query GROUND. There was no response and a certain period of radio silence broken by other aircraft instructions. We were at that time approaching [Runway] 4L at C; running the AFTER START check and transmitted a second time the question of which runway to expect. GROUND abruptly told us he would tell us in 15 seconds; after which there was again a period of silence and some other aircraft instructions. We then were instructed to cross [Runway] 4L and hold short of N on P; still without a runway to expect; but we were instinctively preparing for [Runaway] 4R. (I thought there was a chance we would take [Runway] 4L from the EAST). Being unfamiliar with the procedure of departing from the northbound outboard runway at KEWR and being acutely aware of preventing an incursion on unfamiliar; complicated taxiways in inclement weather at night; I taxied slowly and tried to keep the First Officer included eyes outside while juggling the runway change procedure and checklist. GROUND urged us to contact Tower; we complied. TOWER told us to continue on P and line up/wait [Runway] 4R. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THIS CLEARANCE; still resolving the runway change with my First Officer and in my own mind while paying attention to taxiing in unfamiliar territory. I asked the First Officer to request 2 minutes delay to finalize our performance data and double; triple and quadruple check that we were absent error; omission or confusion on a procedure that could bring incursion; improper configuration or otherwise. The Tower asked us if this a 'legit' timeframe to which I responded; 'Yes it takes time to program our FMS.' Tower then informed us there was an 'obstacle free zone' in that area and could not accept our timeframe (I have seen no indication of this on the 10-9 airport diagram; 19-03; 10-7 or others; unless I overlooked something; so must take him at his word). TOWER instructed us to cross [Runway] 4L at V; left at D; hold at CC. I assumed we would switch back to [Runway] 4L and we began reprogramming for the same upon setting the brake on taxiway D. Mindful of our fuel with both engines running; after a period of time; I asked TOWER what the plan was. TOWER informed me he was waiting for us. I told him we were ready; again assuming [Runway] 4L departure. TOWER instead instructed a double right PA to V; hold short [Runway] 4L. We again ran the Runway Change Checklist; for the 3rd time; still nebulous of the runway assignment. Later; after crossing [Runway] 4L we were instructed to taxi via P; cleared to depart [Runway] 4R. Again confusion ensued as there is no P entry to runway [Runway] 4R but P1. We then departed without further incident worthy of mention. There was no incursion or misconfiguration of the aircraft to my knowledge. Important to note; in my mind; is a total breakdown of CRM and the basic elements of communication between the TOWER and flight deck. Please let me say up front that I have high regard for KEWR controllers and normally share good rapport; it is thereby bewildering why our flight encountered stonewalling to simple requests for normal information and incomplete phraseology. I am quite curious aboutthis. To the committee I wish to assert that airmanship dictates we communicate in a way that overcomes barriers rather than contribute thereto. I appreciate your tolerance in considering the following: requesting the departure runway during what was seemingly a fluid ATC situation; in inclement weather; at night; operating on unfamiliar taxi routes at an extremely busy airport while starting an engine and running checklists is little to ask; especially when it takes as much time to tell us what runway to expect as it does; 'I'll tell you in 15 seconds.' There is significant potential for human error in such high workload environments and I would hope in the future we are greeted with the same level of respect and consideration as a 777 bound for points far-flung and unknown.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.