Narrative:

Flaps were up when power was applied for takeoff. Takeoff initiation was discontinued prior to 15 KTS. Due to the obvious omission of an important checklist item, we requested and received permission to exit runway. Once clear of runway the flaps were confirmed properly set at 15 degrees, followed by a thorough taxi and before takeoff checklist. The takeoff was then accomplished from full length of runway 28 with remainder of flight uneventful. This was a major deviation from prescribed procedure due to poor checklist discipline. Contributing factors were fatigue and confusion. Fatigue occurred due to a very stressful 4 day trip. This flight was the last leg. The trip was unusual in that it had several delays, one in-flight emergency requiring an engine shutdown, and operations at an airport with adverse winter WX conditions. The delays resulted in crew rest being cut to the minimum 8 hours the preceding night. Also, the taxi checklist was interrupted by confusion with complex taxi instructions. As copilot I devoted too much time to the taxi route clarification because it was night, confusing and involved crossing an active runway. Once the route was verified, a time crunch was felt in getting the remaining engine started, cabin notified for takeoff and the remainder of checklist accomplished. It became obvious the remainder of checklist was not properly accomplished. A valuable lesson was learned, although I would rather have not blundered. I thought I had very strong checklist discipline, however I allowed fatigue and distraction to change my priorities. Fatigue and distraction now means slow down and do the job right.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC FAILED TO SET THE FLAPS AS PER THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THE FLC ABORTED AT PROMPTING OF THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING. THE CREW DID A SINGLE ENG TAXI OUT AND WAS DISTRACTED BY TRYING TO START THE OTHER ENG WHILE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLY WITH THE COMPLICATED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AT NIGHT.

Narrative: FLAPS WERE UP WHEN PWR WAS APPLIED FOR TKOF. TKOF INITIATION WAS DISCONTINUED PRIOR TO 15 KTS. DUE TO THE OBVIOUS OMISSION OF AN IMPORTANT CHKLIST ITEM, WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO EXIT RWY. ONCE CLR OF RWY THE FLAPS WERE CONFIRMED PROPERLY SET AT 15 DEGS, FOLLOWED BY A THOROUGH TAXI AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THE TKOF WAS THEN ACCOMPLISHED FROM FULL LENGTH OF RWY 28 WITH REMAINDER OF FLT UNEVENTFUL. THIS WAS A MAJOR DEV FROM PRESCRIBED PROC DUE TO POOR CHKLIST DISCIPLINE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE FATIGUE AND CONFUSION. FATIGUE OCCURRED DUE TO A VERY STRESSFUL 4 DAY TRIP. THIS FLT WAS THE LAST LEG. THE TRIP WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT HAD SEVERAL DELAYS, ONE INFLT EMER REQUIRING AN ENG SHUTDOWN, AND OPS AT AN ARPT WITH ADVERSE WINTER WX CONDITIONS. THE DELAYS RESULTED IN CREW REST BEING CUT TO THE MINIMUM 8 HRS THE PRECEDING NIGHT. ALSO, THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS INTERRUPTED BY CONFUSION WITH COMPLEX TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. AS COPLT I DEVOTED TOO MUCH TIME TO THE TAXI RTE CLARIFICATION BECAUSE IT WAS NIGHT, CONFUSING AND INVOLVED XING AN ACTIVE RWY. ONCE THE RTE WAS VERIFIED, A TIME CRUNCH WAS FELT IN GETTING THE REMAINING ENG STARTED, CABIN NOTIFIED FOR TKOF AND THE REMAINDER OF CHKLIST ACCOMPLISHED. IT BECAME OBVIOUS THE REMAINDER OF CHKLIST WAS NOT PROPERLY ACCOMPLISHED. A VALUABLE LESSON WAS LEARNED, ALTHOUGH I WOULD RATHER HAVE NOT BLUNDERED. I THOUGHT I HAD VERY STRONG CHKLIST DISCIPLINE, HOWEVER I ALLOWED FATIGUE AND DISTR TO CHANGE MY PRIORITIES. FATIGUE AND DISTR NOW MEANS SLOW DOWN AND DO THE JOB RIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.