Narrative:

Second leg of the night; to ZZZ. The captain was on his 6th day of working on reserve. I was on my second day of reserve flying. We had deadheaded [from coast to coast] and then flown the red eye to ZZZ the previous night/morning. We had slept at the hotel during the day and flown ZZZ to ZZZ1 that evening; and we were on our way back to ZZZ; for a scheduled [before-sunrise] arrival. I was pm (pilot monitoring) on the leg with the captain flying. We discussed our fatigue level but both decided that although we were tired; we were [fit] to fly to ZZZ. Taxi; takeoff; cruise were uneventful. The planned arrival was the [STAR]; but that serves west operations; and ATIS was calling for ILS xxl [eastbound runway]. With a 100 plus knot tailwind; we were given direct ZZZ and then a descent from cruise to be 40 miles west of ZZZ at 15000. With approach we were given direct the IAF on ILS xxl. 25 miles out; we put the gear down because we were 4500 feet high on glide path. We were able to get to 2000 feet above the VNAV glide path; but the tailwind was still 80 plus knots at 7000 feet. We were slowing and configuring to attempt to increase the descent rate; but it was not going to be possible. At the IAF; and well above the path; ATC gave us a vector to the north with a descent to 4000 or 5000 feet (I can't remember). We raised the flaps to 15 (I think) and kept the gear down. We did not execute a standard go-around because we were actually still descending to a safe vectoring altitude. We asked ATC if he wanted a speed; and he said 180 knots would be fine. We were vectored for a downwind and base leg. On base leg; we still had a 40-50 knot crosswind (which would become a tailwind when we rolled out on final). I asked about configuring to final configuration of flaps 40 and the captain noted we were still 10 miles out. I concurred and said we could wait longer. We intercepted final and switched to tower. The tailwind was extremely strong and we were in the weather and I found the strobe lights to be distracting. The aircraft was not slowing to flaps 40 configuration speed due to the wind starting an abrupt shift from a tailwind as the power was coming in. I noticed that we were going to go above the ILS glide path. I called out 1/2 dot above; 1 dot above; and stated that we weren't going to be able to safely intercept the glide path. The captain concurred. I think we were finally able to get to flaps 40. The captain now had a handful of airplane as the wind was shifting and the airspeed was starting to jump around. At 1000 feet; I stated 'unstable; go-around.' the captain declared go around. I do not know if he said flaps 15. I'm not entirely sure why; but my attention was pulled away from the flaps and I started to focus on the engine N1 as he was pushing up the power. I don't remember seeing toga in my pfd; and I think I may have moved the flaps from 40 to only 30 or 25. The captain said 'I'm having a hard time here; help me out' and I again became focused on the position of the power levers and what the engines were doing. I was a little confused and thought he was trying to tell me the engines weren't performing. At some point; I did get the gear handle up. We then heard the gear warning handle and at that point the captain called for flaps 15; 5; then 1. We informed ATC we went around; and we were vectored to the north again. The captain then said he was feeling behind the airplane and asked me to fly the approach. I said that I could do that. We configured earlier this time; expecting the huge wind shift we had just experienced on final. The airspeed was moving around a lot as we descended on glide path. I do not recall seeing an overspeed; but it was close. As the wind abruptly stopped from a tailwind; the autothrottles were trying to catch the proper airspeed. As we continued down; it was apparent that the weather was not 4 miles visibility. We broke out at CAT I minimums and I landed the airplane uneventfully. We exited the active and taxied to the gate. I think fatigue definitely played a part in this event. We were both tired after the previous nights red eye to ZZZ. The captain had mentioned several times that he couldn't believe he was on his 6th day of flying on reserve and doing essentially a double red eye. In addition; I don't think we adequately took into account the tailwind and the apparent wind shift that was below 2000 AGL. I had never seen a wind shift like that; that low to the ground and that abrupt. We made the right decision to discontinue the approach when we were high on the first attempt. The tailwind and subsequent airspeed jumps in trying to slow down to properly configure kept us high on the second attempt at the approach. I think due to having just done a non-standard go around on the previous approach; combined with the strobes in the weather; and apparent confusion on my part as to what issue the captain was having on the go-around; I failed to ensure the go-around procedure was properly completed. It wasn't until later that night (after sleeping at the hotel; and then deadheading to [the next airport] for the next part of the sequence) that I realized I might have applied the incorrect procedural steps. In addition; this was the first time I had been in a go-around in the actual aircraft. Due to something the captain said; I became focused on trying to ensure that he had the power levers up and that we had good engines; rather than ensuring the flaps were at 15; we had a positive rate; and then getting the gear. I knew that we were climbing away from the ground and lost track of where those flaps were.I think recognizing that even though we felt fit for duty; fatigue level should have been more adequately discussed between the two of us. In addition; we should have better prepared for descent and what to expect during the wind shift. I will be expecting that in the future on every approach. I would have expected the field to have been landing the opposite direction with tailwinds like we had so low to the ground; but the winds did indeed die off to be a slight quartering headwind that favored landing xxl. ATC seemed to be unaware of the strong; opposite direction winds below 2000 AGL as well. We reported our winds to the tower at 3 miles and we heard that they had to tell the aircraft behind us when they asked for a wind check. On landing; the weather was also lower than previously reported on the ATIS; and next time I will get have an updated weather report while being vectored around for the next approach. The biggest takeaway for me is that I needed to be laser focused on the go-around procedure and I wasn't. As we were leveling in an attempt to slow for final configuration; I knew and correctly called out that we were going to be high on glideslope. We followed the proper stability criteria and called for the go-around. However; when the time came for the go-around; I was immediately distracted and didn't focus on the proper placement of the flaps. I knew the captain had a handful of airplane; but I couldn't ascertain what he was exactly asking for when he said he needed help; which led me to only move the flaps a little bit before looking at the engine stack and throttle position. I have always trained to expect a go-around at any given moment; and I will continue to do that; with an extra emphasis on ensuring the procedure is completed; whether or not the verbiage I'm expecting to hear is actually said or not. I will not allow myself to be distracted and I can attend to any additional issues after the procedure has been appropriately completed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported flight crew fatigue resulted in multiple procedural errors during pre-dawn IFR approaches.

Narrative: Second leg of the night; to ZZZ. The captain was on his 6th day of working on reserve. I was on my second day of reserve flying. We had deadheaded [from coast to coast] and then flown the red eye to ZZZ the previous night/morning. We had slept at the hotel during the day and flown ZZZ to ZZZ1 that evening; and we were on our way back to ZZZ; for a scheduled [before-sunrise] arrival. I was PM (Pilot Monitoring) on the leg with the Captain flying. We discussed our fatigue level but both decided that although we were tired; we were [fit] to fly to ZZZ. Taxi; takeoff; cruise were uneventful. The planned arrival was the [STAR]; but that serves west operations; and ATIS was calling for ILS XXL [eastbound runway]. With a 100 plus knot tailwind; we were given direct ZZZ and then a descent from cruise to be 40 miles west of ZZZ at 15000. With approach we were given direct the IAF on ILS XXL. 25 miles out; we put the gear down because we were 4500 feet high on glide path. We were able to get to 2000 feet above the VNAV glide path; but the tailwind was still 80 plus knots at 7000 feet. We were slowing and configuring to attempt to increase the descent rate; but it was not going to be possible. At the IAF; and well above the path; ATC gave us a vector to the north with a descent to 4000 or 5000 feet (I can't remember). We raised the flaps to 15 (I think) and kept the gear down. We did not execute a standard go-around because we were actually still descending to a safe vectoring altitude. We asked ATC if he wanted a speed; and he said 180 knots would be fine. We were vectored for a downwind and base leg. On base leg; we still had a 40-50 knot crosswind (which would become a tailwind when we rolled out on final). I asked about configuring to final configuration of flaps 40 and the Captain noted we were still 10 miles out. I concurred and said we could wait longer. We intercepted final and switched to tower. The tailwind was extremely strong and we were in the weather and I found the strobe lights to be distracting. The aircraft was not slowing to flaps 40 configuration speed due to the wind starting an abrupt shift from a tailwind as the power was coming in. I noticed that we were going to go above the ILS glide path. I called out 1/2 dot above; 1 dot above; and stated that we weren't going to be able to safely intercept the glide path. The Captain concurred. I think we were finally able to get to flaps 40. The Captain now had a handful of airplane as the wind was shifting and the airspeed was starting to jump around. At 1000 feet; I stated 'unstable; go-around.' The Captain declared go around. I do not know if he said flaps 15. I'm not entirely sure why; but my attention was pulled away from the flaps and I started to focus on the engine N1 as he was pushing up the power. I don't remember seeing TOGA in my PFD; and I think I may have moved the flaps from 40 to only 30 or 25. The Captain said 'I'm having a hard time here; help me out' and I again became focused on the position of the power levers and what the engines were doing. I was a little confused and thought he was trying to tell me the engines weren't performing. At some point; I did get the gear handle up. We then heard the gear warning handle and at that point the Captain called for flaps 15; 5; then 1. We informed ATC we went around; and we were vectored to the north again. The Captain then said he was feeling behind the airplane and asked me to fly the approach. I said that I could do that. We configured earlier this time; expecting the huge wind shift we had just experienced on final. The airspeed was moving around a lot as we descended on glide path. I do not recall seeing an overspeed; but it was close. As the wind abruptly stopped from a tailwind; the autothrottles were trying to catch the proper airspeed. As we continued down; it was apparent that the weather was not 4 miles visibility. We broke out at CAT I minimums and I landed the airplane uneventfully. We exited the active and taxied to the gate. I think fatigue definitely played a part in this event. We were both tired after the previous nights red eye to ZZZ. The Captain had mentioned several times that he couldn't believe he was on his 6th day of flying on reserve and doing essentially a double red eye. In addition; I don't think we adequately took into account the tailwind and the apparent wind shift that was below 2000 AGL. I had never seen a wind shift like that; that low to the ground and that abrupt. We made the right decision to discontinue the approach when we were high on the first attempt. The tailwind and subsequent airspeed jumps in trying to slow down to properly configure kept us high on the second attempt at the approach. I think due to having just done a non-standard go around on the previous approach; combined with the strobes in the weather; and apparent confusion on my part as to what issue the captain was having on the go-around; I failed to ensure the go-around procedure was properly completed. It wasn't until later that night (after sleeping at the hotel; and then deadheading to [the next airport] for the next part of the sequence) that I realized I might have applied the incorrect procedural steps. In addition; this was the first time I had been in a go-around in the actual aircraft. Due to something the Captain said; I became focused on trying to ensure that he had the power levers up and that we had good engines; rather than ensuring the flaps were at 15; we had a positive rate; and then getting the gear. I knew that we were climbing away from the ground and lost track of where those flaps were.I think recognizing that even though we felt fit for duty; fatigue level should have been more adequately discussed between the two of us. In addition; we should have better prepared for descent and what to expect during the wind shift. I will be expecting that in the future on every approach. I would have expected the field to have been landing the opposite direction with tailwinds like we had so low to the ground; but the winds did indeed die off to be a slight quartering headwind that favored landing XXL. ATC seemed to be unaware of the strong; opposite direction winds below 2000 AGL as well. We reported our winds to the tower at 3 miles and we heard that they had to tell the aircraft behind us when they asked for a wind check. On landing; the weather was also lower than previously reported on the ATIS; and next time I will get have an updated weather report while being vectored around for the next approach. The biggest takeaway for me is that I needed to be laser focused on the go-around procedure and I wasn't. As we were leveling in an attempt to slow for final configuration; I knew and correctly called out that we were going to be high on glideslope. We followed the proper stability criteria and called for the go-around. However; when the time came for the go-around; I was immediately distracted and didn't focus on the proper placement of the flaps. I knew the Captain had a handful of airplane; but I couldn't ascertain what he was exactly asking for when he said he needed help; which led me to only move the flaps a little bit before looking at the engine stack and throttle position. I have always trained to expect a go-around at any given moment; and I will continue to do that; with an extra emphasis on ensuring the procedure is completed; whether or not the verbiage I'm expecting to hear is actually said or not. I will not allow myself to be distracted and I can attend to any additional issues after the procedure has been appropriately completed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.