Narrative:

Pack 2 had been problematic starting about halfway through the flight; with the flight attendant having complained about the freezing cabin. The pack was operating in manual/1 o'clock; but not improving the temperature when it must have failed; un-annunciated. With about 30 minutes remaining and cleared direct to destination at FL370; the 'cabin' aural warning sounded with the cabin altitude indicating 10;000 [feet] and increasing at about 100ft/30 seconds. We both donned O2 masks and established communications. My mic initially worked; but quickly stopped working as I was unable to call ATC for an immediate descent and then talk to the first officer. I used the handheld mic alternately with the mask as I was not concerned with becoming hypoxic once we initiated the descent and cabin altitude trended back downwards. Due to the limited excursion (the maximum cabin altitude attained was 11;400 [feet]) the emergency descent maneuver was not required to reverse the trend and quickly get the cabin back below 10;000 [feet]; at which point I was able to switch back to the headset and communicate with the flight attendant to verify everyone was okay and whether the masks had deployed.given the safe cabin altitude; proximity to destination; consultation with dispatch; and that the masks had not deployed and passengers were verified safe/unperturbed; we elected to continue to [destination] and landed.our reactions and decisions were textbook with the exception being the mask mic failure which led to some unscripted actions on my part. Instantly assessing the trend and risk of the cabin altitude as well as the inability to call the flight attendant promptly; I decided to initiate a regular descent and acquire the clearance rather than try to get through the memory items without communications having been reliably established. Ideally I would have transferred controls so the first officer could have more effectively communicated with ATC and the flight attendant with his mask; but at the time I was more concerned with getting the descent going as soon as possible rather than trying to communicate such by yelling in the loud cockpit. This seemed perfectly reasonable at the time and worked out as such. I really don't know--this was another good example of two unrelated systems failures having a synergistic effect in terms of unraveling the efficacy of sops.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 Captain reported continuing to destination after loss of cabin pressure related to pack failure. Captain also reported his O2 mask microphone failed during the descent.

Narrative: Pack 2 had been problematic starting about halfway through the flight; with the FA having complained about the freezing cabin. The pack was operating in Manual/1 o'clock; but not improving the temperature when it must have failed; un-annunciated. With about 30 minutes remaining and cleared direct to destination at FL370; the 'CABIN' aural warning sounded with the Cabin Altitude indicating 10;000 [feet] and increasing at about 100ft/30 seconds. We both donned O2 masks and established communications. My mic initially worked; but quickly stopped working as I was unable to call ATC for an immediate descent and then talk to the First Officer. I used the handheld mic alternately with the mask as I was not concerned with becoming hypoxic once we initiated the descent and cabin altitude trended back downwards. Due to the limited excursion (the maximum cabin altitude attained was 11;400 [feet]) the emergency descent maneuver was not required to reverse the trend and quickly get the cabin back below 10;000 [feet]; at which point I was able to switch back to the headset and communicate with the Flight Attendant to verify everyone was okay and whether the masks had deployed.Given the safe cabin altitude; proximity to destination; consultation with Dispatch; and that the masks had not deployed and passengers were verified safe/unperturbed; we elected to continue to [destination] and landed.Our reactions and decisions were textbook with the exception being the mask mic failure which led to some unscripted actions on my part. Instantly assessing the trend and risk of the cabin altitude as well as the inability to call the Flight Attendant promptly; I decided to initiate a regular descent and acquire the clearance rather than try to get through the memory items without communications having been reliably established. Ideally I would have transferred controls so the First Officer could have more effectively communicated with ATC and the Flight Attendant with his mask; but at the time I was more concerned with getting the descent going ASAP rather than trying to communicate such by yelling in the loud cockpit. This seemed perfectly reasonable at the time and worked out as such. I really don't know--this was another good example of two unrelated systems failures having a synergistic effect in terms of unraveling the efficacy of SOPs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.