Narrative:

We were on approach to mry. There was broken cloud cover; winds out of the west; I believe 10 sm visibility on the field. We set up and briefed the RNAV GPS Y approach; to be done as a canpa (continuous angle of descent) approach. We were on the approach and given 5;000 feet. Then tower told us to turn 90 degrees north for another aircraft to enter ahead of us on approach. Then they gave us 180 degree turn back to the south. Then we were vectored onto the approach course and maintain 5;000 till established; cleared for the approach. We rejoined the course tracking in; fully configured at approach speed. We were outside of a fix and I saw that we were high for the crossing; I pulled the power all the way back and descended as fast as I could at approach speed. At this point we got a descent rate message. I added a little power back in and my first officer said we should 'go-around.' we were out of the clouds; I had the field in sight; and I was almost back on the snowflake. I told him that I had this and we were continuing. By 1;000 feet we were on course; on speed; and at the normal descent rate. I continued the approach to a normal landing.the nonsense with the tower controller; and all his turns back and forth in the middle of an approach were ridiculous. Looking back I should have taken vectors back out and started the whole approach again. I still believe the tower controller was at fault for keeping us that high; that long; that close. The approach changed and I did not rebrief my first officer on what my plan was. Obviously the canpa approach was off the table. I should have rebriefed him that it was my intent to descend faster than normal to get back on the snowflake and crossing restrictions. He heard the descent rate and immediately called for a go-around which was the right thing to do. With the field in sight I should have told him that it was my intent to have the plane stable at the 1;000 foot mark; or my plan was to go-around at that point. I never told him that. Without re-briefing him; I should have just gone around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported they should have initiated a go-around; but continued their approach and landed successfully.

Narrative: We were on approach to MRY. There was broken cloud cover; winds out of the west; I believe 10 sm visibility on the field. We set up and briefed the RNAV GPS Y approach; to be done as a CANPA (Continuous angle of descent) approach. We were on the approach and given 5;000 feet. Then tower told us to turn 90 degrees north for another aircraft to enter ahead of us on approach. Then they gave us 180 degree turn back to the South. Then we were vectored onto the approach course and maintain 5;000 till established; cleared for the approach. We rejoined the course tracking in; fully configured at approach speed. We were outside of a fix and I saw that we were high for the crossing; I pulled the power all the way back and descended as fast as I could at approach speed. At this point we got a descent rate message. I added a little power back in and my First Officer said we should 'go-around.' We were out of the clouds; I had the field in sight; and I was almost back on the snowflake. I told him that I had this and we were continuing. By 1;000 feet we were on course; on speed; and at the normal descent rate. I continued the approach to a normal landing.The nonsense with the Tower controller; and all his turns back and forth in the middle of an approach were ridiculous. Looking back I should have taken vectors back out and started the whole approach again. I still believe the Tower Controller was at fault for keeping us that high; that long; that close. The approach changed and I did not rebrief my First Officer on what my plan was. Obviously the CANPA approach was off the table. I should have rebriefed him that it was my intent to descend faster than normal to get back on the snowflake and crossing restrictions. He heard the descent rate and immediately called for a go-around which was the right thing to do. With the field in sight I should have told him that it was my intent to have the plane stable at the 1;000 foot mark; or my plan was to go-around at that point. I never told him that. Without re-briefing him; I should have just gone around.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.