Narrative:

I was working my center sector. The adjacent sector was working parachute jumping aircraft with multiple other aircraft. Approach called to request approval to issue aircraft X direct somewhere. They were the classic departure; they were not RNAV capable. At the time; an atcaa was active to the east; but approach had some options to go out of their airspace on a heading as long as I got them back on the departure. I told the controller that they either go north of restricted airspace 10000 feet and below on a heading to the east and I would get them back on course or they could go on the RNAV departure and then a 100 heading from there. This misses the arrival and the jump aircraft. Approach said they would go south of the restricted area.subsequently; approach apparently forgot to turn the aircraft; and called me in something of a panic telling me that aircraft X was in a turn to a 090 heading and expediting through 16000 feet to get above the jump aircraft which was releasing jumpers; so keeping them underneath was not an option. The controller on the sector sitting next to me called the traffic for the jump aircraft (I had a point out); the jump aircraft had them in sight. Aircraft X topped him by about 2 1/2 miles or so. The supervisor was standing behind me at the time and said something about aircraft Y on the arrival. I turned them 20 degrees left and stopped them at 13000 feet and called the traffic on aircraft X; but there was no way for me to avoid losing separation because of the late turn on the aircraft X (nor was I actually talking to aircraft X). I lost separation for two hits; about 4.3 miles and 0 feet and 3.4 miles and 400 feet; according to what the operations manager told me.I had few choices in this situation. The supervisor initially yelled at me while I was on position and said I should have stopped aircraft X underneath aircraft Y; but that would have meant putting them literally through the jumpers and we all know how that would have turned out. When I told him that; he understood why I took the action I did. The operations manager said much the same thing; not realizing the jump aircraft was actually the problem. Once he went back and looked at that and considered the situation; it also made sense to him too. I was not about to try to save IFR separation when aircraft X and aircraft Y were in no danger of getting that close just to create a dangerous situation by putting them into a jump zone with jumpers away. I knew I would have more than 3 miles and they wouldn't even get an RA. I could have perhaps kept them low and turned them back to the southeast; but they were already in the hard left turn and climbing and topping everybody so that would have been just as bad; plus it would have put them into the jump zones both of which were active at the time I believe. I chose the best and safest action I could do; which was what I did. I could have turned aircraft Y a few seconds earlier; but it wouldn't have saved separation; and I wasn't worried about aircraft Y since they were in absolutely no danger whatsoever. Keeping separation was more of a technical issue at the time.had approach complied with the coordination as I told them to do; we wouldn't be talking about this. Compounding this problem is the large amount of jumping we've had going on of late. Multiple simultaneous jump zones (6 alone in this sector). Further exacerbating this issue is the large volume of VFR flight training; our low staffing; and six day work weeks which has everyone fatigued. Part of the problem with approach is they don't have a lot of room for departures over this route because of the multiple aerobatic and flight training areas they have; but putting them over a different fix creates additional risk through their airspace and multiple confliction points in my airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB Center Controller reported an airspace violation and loss of separation when an off course aircraft approached an active parachute jump area.

Narrative: I was working my Center sector. The adjacent sector was working parachute jumping aircraft with multiple other aircraft. Approach called to request approval to issue Aircraft X direct somewhere. They were the classic departure; they were not RNAV capable. At the time; an ATCAA was active to the east; but Approach had some options to go out of their airspace on a heading as long as I got them back on the departure. I told the controller that they either go north of Restricted Airspace 10000 feet and below on a heading to the east and I would get them back on course or they could go on the RNAV departure and then a 100 heading from there. This misses the arrival and the jump aircraft. Approach said they would go south of the restricted area.Subsequently; Approach apparently forgot to turn the aircraft; and called me in something of a panic telling me that Aircraft X was in a turn to a 090 heading and expediting through 16000 feet to get above the jump aircraft which was releasing jumpers; so keeping them underneath was not an option. The controller on the sector sitting next to me called the traffic for the jump aircraft (I had a point out); the jump aircraft had them in sight. Aircraft X topped him by about 2 1/2 miles or so. The Supervisor was standing behind me at the time and said something about Aircraft Y on the arrival. I turned them 20 degrees left and stopped them at 13000 feet and called the traffic on Aircraft X; but there was no way for me to avoid losing separation because of the late turn on the Aircraft X (nor was I actually talking to Aircraft X). I lost separation for two hits; about 4.3 miles and 0 feet and 3.4 miles and 400 feet; according to what the Operations Manager told me.I had few choices in this situation. The Supervisor initially yelled at me while I was on position and said I should have stopped Aircraft X underneath Aircraft Y; but that would have meant putting them literally through the jumpers and we all know how that would have turned out. When I told him that; he understood why I took the action I did. The Operations Manager said much the same thing; not realizing the jump aircraft was actually the problem. Once he went back and looked at that and considered the situation; it also made sense to him too. I was not about to try to save IFR separation when Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were in no danger of getting that close just to create a dangerous situation by putting them into a jump zone with jumpers away. I knew I would have more than 3 miles and they wouldn't even get an RA. I could have perhaps kept them low and turned them back to the southeast; but they were already in the hard left turn and climbing and topping everybody so that would have been just as bad; plus it would have put them into the jump zones both of which were active at the time I believe. I chose the best and safest action I could do; which was what I did. I could have turned Aircraft Y a few seconds earlier; but it wouldn't have saved separation; and I wasn't worried about Aircraft Y since they were in absolutely no danger whatsoever. Keeping separation was more of a technical issue at the time.Had Approach complied with the coordination as I told them to do; we wouldn't be talking about this. Compounding this problem is the large amount of jumping we've had going on of late. Multiple simultaneous jump zones (6 alone in this sector). Further exacerbating this issue is the large volume of VFR flight training; our low staffing; and six day work weeks which has everyone fatigued. Part of the problem with Approach is they don't have a lot of room for departures over this route because of the multiple aerobatic and flight training areas they have; but putting them over a different fix creates additional risk through their airspace and multiple confliction points in my airspace.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.