37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 160309 |
Time | |
Date | 199010 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : stl |
State Reference | MO |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1300 msl bound upper : 5000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : stl tower : stl |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial descent other landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 520 |
ASRS Report | 160309 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency none taken : unable other |
Consequence | other Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
On takeoff we had a tail compartment high temperature light. We went through the procedure to no avail. We requested to return to stl and received priority handling for landing. On approach the flight service manager reported smoke in aft left lav. We had already requested ground equipment. Then on tower frequency a voice (a pilot waiting for takeoff) advised that the left engine was smoking a great deal and recommended an evacuate/evacuation on runway. About 700' above ground a left reverser low accumulator light came on. We evacked passenger on runway. It turned out to be a clamp had separated between a high pressure augmentation valve and the fuselage. Chafing of left gen feeder cables created a hole in the hydraulic line. I felt fortunate that a fellow pilot mentioned the smoke and gave his opinion. The tower people did not mention smoke. My concern is that perhaps they assumed we knew of smoke because of our request for priority landing and ground equipment. This additional important bit of information added immensely to the other facts we were confronted with at the time. My suggestion is to encourage observers to report what they observe. With all the legal ramifications of sticking one's nose in, I can understand silence. And perhaps there is even a policy to do the job but don't offer suggestions or information beyond what is asked about in order to avoid complications. In this case, the pilot who did speak up contacted us later and recounted for us what he saw, and he filed a debrief for us. In summary, don't assume a pilot in a smoking plane knows he is in a smoking plane. The old assume proverb surfaced again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR FLT CREW EXPERIENCES HIGH TEMPERATURE LIGHT AT TKOF. RETURN TO LAND. ACFT EVACUATED.
Narrative: ON TKOF WE HAD A TAIL COMPARTMENT HIGH TEMP LIGHT. WE WENT THROUGH THE PROC TO NO AVAIL. WE REQUESTED TO RETURN TO STL AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING FOR LNDG. ON APCH THE FLT SVC MGR RPTED SMOKE IN AFT LEFT LAV. WE HAD ALREADY REQUESTED GND EQUIP. THEN ON TWR FREQ A VOICE (A PLT WAITING FOR TKOF) ADVISED THAT THE LEFT ENG WAS SMOKING A GREAT DEAL AND RECOMMENDED AN EVAC ON RWY. ABOUT 700' ABOVE GND A LEFT REVERSER LOW ACCUMULATOR LIGHT CAME ON. WE EVACKED PAX ON RWY. IT TURNED OUT TO BE A CLAMP HAD SEPARATED BTWN A HIGH PRESSURE AUGMENTATION VALVE AND THE FUSELAGE. CHAFING OF LEFT GEN FEEDER CABLES CREATED A HOLE IN THE HYD LINE. I FELT FORTUNATE THAT A FELLOW PLT MENTIONED THE SMOKE AND GAVE HIS OPINION. THE TWR PEOPLE DID NOT MENTION SMOKE. MY CONCERN IS THAT PERHAPS THEY ASSUMED WE KNEW OF SMOKE BECAUSE OF OUR REQUEST FOR PRIORITY LNDG AND GND EQUIP. THIS ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT BIT OF INFO ADDED IMMENSELY TO THE OTHER FACTS WE WERE CONFRONTED WITH AT THE TIME. MY SUGGESTION IS TO ENCOURAGE OBSERVERS TO RPT WHAT THEY OBSERVE. WITH ALL THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF STICKING ONE'S NOSE IN, I CAN UNDERSTAND SILENCE. AND PERHAPS THERE IS EVEN A POLICY TO DO THE JOB BUT DON'T OFFER SUGGESTIONS OR INFO BEYOND WHAT IS ASKED ABOUT IN ORDER TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE PLT WHO DID SPEAK UP CONTACTED US LATER AND RECOUNTED FOR US WHAT HE SAW, AND HE FILED A DEBRIEF FOR US. IN SUMMARY, DON'T ASSUME A PLT IN A SMOKING PLANE KNOWS HE IS IN A SMOKING PLANE. THE OLD ASSUME PROVERB SURFACED AGAIN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.