Narrative:

All operations were normal and ca (captain) and first officer were in the green. A/C (aircraft) was planned to be heavyweight and ca/first officer operational discussions while at the gate passenger boarding included emphasis on maximum taxi weight awareness and [takeoff performance] numbers with further highlights of environmental conditions (weather); taxi routing; and runway use. These items were further reviewed during the 'departure briefing'. Aircraft pushback began with pushback clearance from ground initially stating (from memory) 'cleared to push; push into the alley; hold short of taxiway [X]' and was quickly updated to 'cleared to push onto taxiway [X]; tail west.' once the a/C was in the pushback 'drop off' position (on [X]; tail west); first officer was completing engine start. First officer heard the ca tell the tug driver 'thank you for the pushback; have a great day' and the tug driver acknowledged. First officer heard the ca call 'I have a salute' and the ground crew (marshaller and wing walker) were observed to no longer be in front of the aircraft and had cleared the area (not in sight/returned to terminal area). First officer completed 'after start flow' and set flaps to '1' per the [takeoff performance] for xxr. 'Flaps 1 taxi' call was made and first officer called ground for taxi and ground replies 'taxi to xxr; [via taxi route.]' both ca and first officer are 'heads up' and clearing ahead and the anticipated turn. Ca carefully applied (we are aware that we are pretty heavy) taxi thrust (aircraft and almost immediately a noise was heard from the vicinity of the nose wheel. Ca immediately chopped thrust to idle. Ca and first officer think/say 'that was odd.' additional clearing of the area was accomplished. Ca and first officer discuss likely possibilities and conclude nose wheel area noise was result of a taxiway anomaly/depression. Ca carefully applied taxi thrust (heavyweight awareness) and ca and first officer both observe the tug driver/tug pulling away backwards at what appears to be an unusually high speed and directly to a tug-parking area at the terminal (by gate.) simultaneously upon first flash of the orange tug (entered field of view); ca chopped thrust to idle. A/C brakes are set; a/C position is not moved; ATC-ground is notified that we will hold our position on taxiway [X] for a maintenance inspection and post that inspection; will taxi back to gate. Appropriate procedures; coordination; and paperwork were accomplished with operations; dispatch; ATC; ramp; and maintenance to resume the planned flight with delayed generated by this incident. Both the ca and the first officer; having completed the thorough follow-up actions; coordination; and paperwork; felt solidly in the green and were confident with their decision to continue with [the flight.]from the information I have available; it appears that the marshaller and wing walker (ground crew) gave the all clear signal and completely vacated their position in front of the a/C prematurely. The marshaller/wing walker vacated their position in front of the a/C prior to the tug/tug driver vacating his position from below the nose of the a/C. The tug appeared to be the 'new' style of tug with low profile and the 'lobster/clamp' style of appendage to 'grab' the nose wheel (i.e. Not the 'tow-bar' style). Of note; it was/is completely impossible to see any portion of this tug from either the ca or first officer positions; which is common for several tug types and serves to further emphasize the criticality of the marshaller/wing walker not giving the all clear signal and not vacating their position in front of the aircraft. In summary; it appears that non-standard/improper procedures were executed by the marshaller/wing walker/tug driver and ca/first officer had no way of knowing the tug/tug driver were still below the nose of the a/C.we can all - always - learn from every unusual/abnormal incident any one of us may experience during operations. It appears there was likely a breakdown in procedures of the ground crew (marshaller/wing walker/tug driver). For this incident; I humbly submit that I; as the first officer (even though flows/procedures/timing/engine starts may have me in a 'heads down' mode) can better back up the 'ca+first officer team effort' (i.e. Operations safety) by being more consistently deliberate in monitoring the 3 parties of the standard pushback (marshaller; wing walker; tug driver) to ensure that all three have vacating the vicinity of the a/C.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew reported starting to taxi after pushback and salute with the tug near the nose gear.

Narrative: All operations were normal and CA (Captain) and FO were in the green. A/C (aircraft) was planned to be heavyweight and CA/FO operational discussions while at the gate passenger boarding included emphasis on maximum taxi weight awareness and [takeoff performance] numbers with further highlights of environmental conditions (weather); taxi routing; and runway use. These items were further reviewed during the 'departure briefing'. Aircraft pushback began with pushback clearance from ground initially stating (from memory) 'cleared to push; push into the alley; hold short of taxiway [X]' and was quickly updated to 'cleared to push onto taxiway [X]; tail west.' Once the A/C was in the pushback 'drop off' position (on [X]; tail west); FO was completing engine start. FO heard the CA tell the Tug Driver 'Thank you for the pushback; have a great day' and the Tug Driver acknowledged. FO heard the CA call 'I have a salute' and the ground crew (Marshaller and Wing Walker) were observed to no longer be in front of the aircraft and had cleared the area (not in sight/returned to terminal area). FO completed 'After Start Flow' and set flaps to '1' per the [takeoff performance] for XXR. 'Flaps 1 Taxi' call was made and FO called ground for taxi and ground replies 'Taxi to XXR; [via taxi route.]' Both CA and FO are 'heads up' and clearing ahead and the anticipated turn. CA carefully applied (we are aware that we are pretty heavy) taxi thrust (aircraft and almost immediately a noise was heard from the vicinity of the nose wheel. CA immediately chopped thrust to idle. CA and FO think/say 'That was odd.' Additional clearing of the area was accomplished. CA and FO discuss likely possibilities and conclude nose wheel area noise was result of a taxiway anomaly/depression. CA carefully applied taxi thrust (heavyweight awareness) and CA and FO both observe the Tug Driver/Tug pulling away backwards at what appears to be an unusually high speed and directly to a tug-parking area at the terminal (by gate.) Simultaneously upon first flash of the orange Tug (entered field of view); CA chopped thrust to idle. A/C brakes are set; A/C position is NOT moved; ATC-Ground is notified that we will hold our position on taxiway [X] for a maintenance inspection and post that inspection; will taxi back to gate. Appropriate procedures; coordination; and paperwork were accomplished with Operations; Dispatch; ATC; Ramp; and Maintenance to resume the planned flight with delayed generated by this incident. Both the CA and the FO; having completed the thorough follow-up actions; coordination; and paperwork; felt solidly in the green and were confident with their decision to continue with [the flight.]From the information I have available; it appears that the Marshaller and Wing Walker (ground crew) gave the all clear signal and completely vacated their position in front of the A/C prematurely. The Marshaller/Wing walker vacated their position in front of the A/C prior to the Tug/Tug Driver vacating his position from below the nose of the A/C. The tug appeared to be the 'new' style of tug with low profile and the 'lobster/clamp' style of appendage to 'grab' the nose wheel (i.e. not the 'tow-bar' style). Of note; it was/is completely impossible to see any portion of this tug from either the CA or FO positions; which is common for several tug types and serves to further emphasize the criticality of the Marshaller/Wing Walker NOT giving the all clear signal and NOT vacating their position in front of the aircraft. In summary; it appears that non-standard/improper procedures were executed by the Marshaller/Wing Walker/Tug Driver and CA/FO had no way of knowing the Tug/Tug Driver were still below the nose of the A/C.We can all - always - learn from every unusual/abnormal incident any one of us may experience during operations. It appears there was likely a breakdown in procedures of the ground crew (Marshaller/Wing Walker/Tug Driver). For this incident; I humbly submit that I; as the FO (even though flows/procedures/timing/engine starts may have me in a 'heads down' mode) can better back up the 'CA+FO Team Effort' (i.e. operations safety) by being more consistently deliberate in monitoring the 3 parties of the standard pushback (Marshaller; Wing Walker; Tug Driver) to ensure that all three have vacating the vicinity of the A/C.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.