Narrative:

While enroute [to] ord; we utilized auto-updates for ATIS through ACARS as to elevate our situational awareness of the changing conditions at our destination where it was actively snowing. During holding on the arrival; we briefed the arrival; anticipated runways; A320 land app; expected taxi route; and threats. The ATIS had provided information that braking action advisories were in effect while the reported braking action for runway 28C 5;5;3 and all other runways 5;5;5. While computing our minimum landing distance; we computed the worst case minimum landing friction needed for both runways in use. At our weight and configuration; [runway] 27L needed a minimum 4 medium to good braking for us to accept that runway. [Runway] 28C needed a minimum 2 poor or better braking action to accept that runway. Once released from the hold and continuing on the arrival; I selected Com2 to the tower frequency for our anticipated planned runway 27L. We were approximately 15-20 minutes from landing. While monitoring the frequency; I heard the tower controller give unconventional instructions. They were telling pilots; 'cleared to land; plan to exit alpha one; braking action reported good till alpha one and poor beyond alpha one within the last 20 minutes.' I could hear pilots question the controller about the braking action. To which the controller responded; 'the braking action is good till alpha one; everyone else is making alpha one you are cleared to land.'I immediately informed the captain of the situation and contradicting information being provided on the ATIS that we have been monitoring for the past few hours through multiple normal and special updates. We tried to calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one on [runway] 27L realizing that the planned exit leaves 20 to 30 percent of the runway unusable. As we could not calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one nor could we land full length on such a short runway under poor braking conditions; we prepared for a possible discontinuation of the approach if conditions remained unchanged by the time we arrived.while on downwind; the captain asked the approach controller if they had the braking action for [runway] 27L. The controller responded with 5;5;5. When we were cleared and established on the ILS 27L we were instructed to contact tower. The tower controller said; 'cleared to land 27L; plan to exit alpha one.' when the controller didn't provide the information that they had earlier to previous arrivals; the captain then asked; 'why the planned exit alpha one?' the controller then responded; 'braking action good till alpha one; and poor beyond alpha one reported by a previous arrival.' the captain informed tower we were unable to accept the landing clearance and requested to discontinue the approach and get vectors for [runway] 28C.essentially; the controller was issuing an indirect request to land and hold short alpha one intersection with a contaminated runway. Also; the tower had not been providing this essential information to the flight crews nor the approach controllers. Telling pilots in a critical phase of flight after being fully configured and on the approach provided very little opportunity to evaluate and judge whether using the intended runway was the correct and safest course of action. Monitoring the frequency during the descent; it seemed to me by my observation that once pilots started questioning the information and runway condition given to them by the tower controller; the tower controller willfully and consciously began to withhold the details as to why the alpha one request was being made. Once we discontinued the approach; the [air carrier] flight behind us discontinued also. However; the aircraft that had yet to check in with tower continued the approach as the tower did not tell them the runway conditions. The tower only told them to plan to exit alpha one.O'hare tower did not provide the correct and timely informationabout the safety conditions of their runways to the flight crews nor the approach controllers. They withheld information and continued to do so even after bringing this information to their attention in order to facilitate getting aircraft on the ground. They removed the ability for pilots at [company] to properly assess policy and procedures to ensure that we operate our aircraft safely. An un-forecasted snow event left the airport unprepared and they chose to push and exceed the limits of safe operation for operational need.provide accurate information to pilots as soon as possible. Knowing that the runway was marginal and possibly unsatisfactory while still talking to the center controllers before talking to approach; provided our team the opportunity to plan and discuss our intentions. We could address proper policies and procedures to make sure we were working within the guidelines that the FAA and the company have provided. We would have been at a serious disadvantage had we been blindsided by the information on final 10 miles from landing or worse not known to ask the tower controller why they wanted us to plan alpha one?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported confusing information from the ORD Tower Controller related to braking action on the runway in use.

Narrative: While enroute [to] ORD; we utilized Auto-Updates for ATIS through ACARS as to elevate our situational awareness of the changing conditions at our destination where it was actively snowing. During holding on the arrival; we briefed the arrival; anticipated runways; A320 Land App; expected taxi route; and threats. The ATIS had provided information that braking action advisories were in effect while the reported braking action for Runway 28C 5;5;3 and all other runways 5;5;5. While computing our minimum landing distance; we computed the worst case minimum landing friction needed for both runways in use. At our weight and configuration; [Runway] 27L needed a minimum 4 medium to good braking for us to accept that runway. [Runway] 28C needed a minimum 2 poor or better braking action to accept that runway. Once released from the hold and continuing on the arrival; I selected Com2 to the Tower frequency for our anticipated planned Runway 27L. We were approximately 15-20 minutes from landing. While monitoring the frequency; I heard the Tower Controller give unconventional instructions. They were telling pilots; 'Cleared to land; plan to exit Alpha One; braking action reported GOOD till alpha one and POOR beyond alpha one within the last 20 minutes.' I could hear pilots question the Controller about the braking action. To which the Controller responded; 'The braking action is GOOD till alpha one; everyone else is making alpha one you are cleared to land.'I immediately informed the Captain of the situation and contradicting information being provided on the ATIS that we have been monitoring for the past few hours through multiple normal and special updates. We tried to calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one on [Runway] 27L realizing that the planned exit leaves 20 to 30 percent of the runway unusable. As we could not calculate the distance from the threshold to alpha one nor could we land full length on such a short runway under poor braking conditions; we prepared for a possible discontinuation of the approach if conditions remained unchanged by the time we arrived.While on downwind; the Captain asked the Approach Controller if they had the braking action for [Runway] 27L. The Controller responded with 5;5;5. When we were cleared and established on the ILS 27L we were instructed to contact Tower. The Tower Controller said; 'Cleared to land 27L; plan to exit Alpha One.' When the Controller didn't provide the information that they had earlier to previous arrivals; the Captain then asked; 'Why the planned exit Alpha One?' The Controller then responded; 'Braking action GOOD till alpha one; and POOR beyond alpha one reported by a previous arrival.' The Captain informed Tower we were unable to accept the landing clearance and requested to discontinue the approach and get vectors for [Runway] 28C.Essentially; the Controller was issuing an indirect request to Land and Hold Short Alpha one intersection with a contaminated runway. Also; the Tower had not been providing this essential information to the flight crews nor the Approach controllers. Telling pilots in a critical phase of flight after being fully configured and on the approach provided very little opportunity to evaluate and judge whether using the intended runway was the correct and safest course of action. Monitoring the frequency during the descent; it seemed to me by my observation that once pilots started questioning the information and runway condition given to them by the Tower Controller; the Tower Controller willfully and consciously began to withhold the details as to why the alpha one request was being made. Once we discontinued the approach; the [air carrier] flight behind us discontinued also. However; the aircraft that had yet to check in with Tower continued the approach as the Tower did not tell them the runway conditions. The Tower only told them to plan to exit Alpha One.O'hare Tower did not provide the correct and timely informationabout the safety conditions of their runways to the flight crews nor the Approach controllers. They withheld information and continued to do so even after bringing this information to their attention in order to facilitate getting aircraft on the ground. They removed the ability for pilots at [Company] to properly assess policy and procedures to ensure that we operate our aircraft safely. An un-forecasted snow event left the airport unprepared and they chose to push and exceed the limits of safe operation for operational need.Provide accurate information to pilots as soon as possible. Knowing that the runway was marginal and possibly unsatisfactory while still talking to the Center Controllers before talking to Approach; provided our team the opportunity to plan and discuss our intentions. We could address proper policies and procedures to make sure we were working within the guidelines that the FAA and the company have provided. We would have been at a serious disadvantage had we been blindsided by the information on final 10 miles from landing or worse not known to ask the Tower Controller WHY they wanted us to plan alpha one?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.