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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1611821 |
Time | |
Date | 201901 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Challenger 350 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45 Flight Crew Total 10400 Flight Crew Type 4000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
The flight was uneventful until approximately 1 mile from the threshold. I was executing an ILS approach in MVFR conditions; with the runway in sight; in a stabilized approach at vref +10 and slowing. With less than a half mile to touchdown; with the aircraft in controlled flight while hand-flying (without the autopilot) with the aid of flight director; glide slope; and localizer indicators functioning normally; and the runway in plain sight; the cas system indicated a master warning of engine fire in both engines; with an aural warning of 'left engine fire.' I did not notice any roll back of engine power or sense a loss of power at that point; and do not remember issuing any commands to the PNF. Being in close proximity to the runway; I elected to continue to the runway without changing any power settings or making any attitude changes. The PNF called out that both engines were indicating 'fire;' to which I assumed that the aircraft was indeed on fire; though I did not smell smoke or see flames. The PNF notified the tower of [the] 'fire;' and then executed immediate memory items for engine fire procedures; up to and including arming fire bottles and depressing the fire extinguishing button for the left engine; to which I sensed engine loss by yaw. Fire indications continued; though the PNF did not execute a second engine shutdown procedure. I continued to fly the airplane to the runway; under the assumption that the aircraft was on fire. The airplane touched down within the displaced threshold and just prior to the runway end identifying stripe. I then executed hard braking; deployed both thrust reversers without adding power; and exited runway; coming to a stop just past the hold short line; all while engine fire indications were still illuminated. I instructed the PNF to egress the passengers; upon which he depressed the 'emergency decompression' push button; then left his seat and escorted the 2 passengers on board down the airstairs of the main entrance onto the runway and away from the aircraft. I remained inside the aircraft to secure it; power down; and egress myself. No smoke and no flame; nor any fire damage or scorching evidence was detected upon inspection by me or the airport personnel. The passengers were ferried by airport authority vehicles to the appropriate facilities; while the aircraft; after close inspection and securing; was towed to the company hangar. After careful study and analysis by the company chief mechanic; and through conversations with bombardier engineers; and evaluations of on board computer data; it has been concluded that the engine fire detection and extinguishing system malfunctioned during a critical phase of flight (final approach to landing); sounding the 'engine fire alarm' through the cas master warning system; causing the crew to react as if the airplane were actually on fire. Outcome was positive; with no aircraft damage and no aircraft fire; and no injuries during evacuation. I have been informed that this is a known malfunction; but that had not been addressed by the manufacturer adequately to operators of the CL35 aircraft. My corporate flight department has operated the CL30/35 aircraft for the past 14 years; without incident or occurrence of this nature; and without knowledge that this problem was known by the manufacturer.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CL35 Captain reported receiving master warning indication of fire in both engines; with aural warning of 'left engine fire'; on final approach. Pilot not flying shut down the left engine in response; and post flight inspection revealed no sign of fire.
Narrative: The flight was uneventful until approximately 1 mile from the threshold. I was executing an ILS approach in MVFR conditions; with the runway in sight; in a stabilized approach at Vref +10 and slowing. With less than a half mile to touchdown; with the aircraft in controlled flight while hand-flying (without the autopilot) with the aid of flight director; glide slope; and localizer indicators functioning normally; and the runway in plain sight; the CAS system indicated a master warning of engine fire in both engines; with an aural warning of 'left engine fire.' I did not notice any roll back of engine power or sense a loss of power at that point; and do not remember issuing any commands to the PNF. Being in close proximity to the runway; I elected to continue to the runway without changing any power settings or making any attitude changes. The PNF called out that both engines were indicating 'fire;' to which I assumed that the aircraft was indeed on fire; though I did not smell smoke or see flames. The PNF notified the tower of [the] 'fire;' and then executed immediate memory items for engine fire procedures; up to and including arming fire bottles and depressing the fire extinguishing button for the left engine; to which I sensed engine loss by yaw. Fire indications continued; though the PNF did not execute a second engine shutdown procedure. I continued to fly the airplane to the runway; under the assumption that the aircraft was on fire. The airplane touched down within the displaced threshold and just prior to the runway end identifying stripe. I then executed hard braking; deployed both thrust reversers without adding power; and exited runway; coming to a stop just past the hold short line; all while engine fire indications were still illuminated. I instructed the PNF to egress the passengers; upon which he depressed the 'emergency decompression' push button; then left his seat and escorted the 2 passengers on board down the airstairs of the main entrance onto the runway and away from the aircraft. I remained inside the aircraft to secure it; power down; and egress myself. No smoke and no flame; nor any fire damage or scorching evidence was detected upon inspection by me or the airport personnel. The passengers were ferried by Airport Authority vehicles to the appropriate facilities; while the aircraft; after close inspection and securing; was towed to the company hangar. After careful study and analysis by the company Chief Mechanic; and through conversations with Bombardier engineers; and evaluations of on board computer data; it has been concluded that the engine fire detection and extinguishing system malfunctioned during a critical phase of flight (final approach to landing); sounding the 'engine fire alarm' through the CAS master warning system; causing the crew to react as if the airplane were actually on fire. Outcome was positive; with no aircraft damage and no aircraft fire; and no injuries during evacuation. I have been informed that this is a known malfunction; but that had not been addressed by the manufacturer adequately to operators of the CL35 aircraft. My corporate flight department has operated the CL30/35 aircraft for the past 14 years; without incident or occurrence of this nature; and without knowledge that this problem was known by the manufacturer.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.