Narrative:

Giving line check to crew; we were cleared for the localizer 31 into lga. Captain was flying. At the FAF; he initiated a descent using vs mode at 800fpm down. Due to the strong headwind and resulting lower than normal ground speed; the aircraft descended well below the visual glide path as indicated by four red lights on the PAPI. I called to 'check the PAPI; we're too low' and 'you have four reds over there'; however; no adjustment was made. The autopilot captured our dda (derived decision altitude) rounded to the nearest 100 feet at 700 feet MSL. The captain seemed surprised that the aircraft was leveling off and disconnected the autopilot to continue the descent. The first officer advised 'we need to stay at 700 [feet]' [but] the captain continued to descend. At 650 feet; the GPWS alerted 'obstacle; obstacle; pull up'. The crew hesitated as if they were unsure of what the warning was; I called 'go-around; go-around; go-around' from the jump seat. The crew executed a go-around maneuver. We discussed the lower ground speed and decided 500-600 fpm was more appropriate for given conditions while setting up for the subsequent approach. The second approach was completed without further event. Loss of situational awareness on final. Lack of familiarity with procedures for a localizer approach. Failure to use available PAPI. Expectation bias allowing dismissal of conflicting information from first officer and line check pilot.more thorough briefing in gusty conditions and familiarity with procedures not frequently used. Better CRM and communication from all pilot on the flight deck. Faster reaction to GPWS alerts; especially at low altitudes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Check Pilot reported the Flying Pilot descended below the glide path on approach and executed a go-around after receiving a GPWS obstacle warning.

Narrative: Giving line check to crew; we were cleared for the LOC 31 into LGA. Captain was flying. At the FAF; he initiated a descent using VS mode at 800fpm down. Due to the strong headwind and resulting lower than normal ground speed; the aircraft descended well below the visual glide path as indicated by four red lights on the PAPI. I called to 'check the PAPI; we're too low' and 'you have four reds over there'; however; no adjustment was made. The autopilot captured our DDA (Derived Decision Altitude) rounded to the nearest 100 feet at 700 feet MSL. The Captain seemed surprised that the aircraft was leveling off and disconnected the autopilot to continue the descent. The First Officer advised 'we need to stay at 700 [feet]' [but] the Captain continued to descend. At 650 feet; the GPWS alerted 'OBSTACLE; OBSTACLE; PULL UP'. The crew hesitated as if they were unsure of what the warning was; I called 'GO-AROUND; GO-AROUND; GO-AROUND' from the jump seat. The crew executed a go-around maneuver. We discussed the lower ground speed and decided 500-600 fpm was more appropriate for given conditions while setting up for the subsequent approach. The second approach was completed without further event. Loss of situational awareness on final. Lack of familiarity with procedures for a LOC approach. Failure to use available PAPI. Expectation bias allowing dismissal of conflicting information from First Officer and Line Check Pilot.More thorough briefing in gusty conditions and familiarity with procedures not frequently used. Better CRM and communication from all pilot on the flight deck. Faster reaction to GPWS alerts; especially at low altitudes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.