Narrative:

It's about 45 minutes prior to push I'm at [the gate] but no jet; no flight plan. I pull up my departure report for my dispatchers info. No name but the number is there so I call. It's a male voice and I begin the conversation about what we're doing and what information I need. He can't send the contaminated runway numbers I need to me until the jet is in; so asks me to request that via ACARS. Otherwise; the tone has been set that I'm a captain that coordinates. So here's our set up: all the other runways are closed. The majority of the storm has passed. The trend as I've been monitoring ATIS has been the winds moving more abeam and the runway worsening. On the people management side of my job; my first officer (first officer) had his earlier flight cancelled and he's been at the airport a while because he didn't know it had cancelled. My earlier flight also cancelled but I caught that early and we were both junior manned into this later flight. My flight attendant's (flight attendants) have been flying already and this is their last leg; they want to get to ZZZ. We deadhead home in the morning. One of my gate agents is supposed to be on break and both are being hassled by their supervisor. My ground crew has checked in; they're freezing; and I've told them we'll be a while. I've made a typical PA to the passengers explaining a lot is going on with getting the late aircraft ready and I will keep them advised; thank you for your understanding and patience. I've briefed my #1 that we are crunching numbers and weather issues.when I sat down on the flight deck; I sent [a] message to dispatch via ACARS. I have reviewed the takeoff card to verify that 1) the winds dictate I use 26K maximum power and 2) the contaminated runway dictates I use 26K maximum power 15 flaps recommended to reduce takeoff speeds. However; my experience tells me the more flaps I use; the more pronounced the crosswind will be and associated control issues. My gut tells me I have one safety trump card (using 26k max power) and two; maybe three safety issues (crosswind/gusts/runway condition) requiring 26k max that oppose each other for the recommended flap settings.I've called dispatch again to go over some things (it's a female voice this time so maybe a shift change; so we start fresh) and I'm having her help me make sure there are no takeoff crosswind limitations any longer because I swear we used to have them; a byproduct of constant revisions and reformatting in an electronic manner I may never get used to. First officer is looking into other things for me; like a guess on hold over time if we leave the gate; which drives how much knowledge/scenarios I need to leave the gate with; so I'm ready. I ask the dispatcher if anyone is getting out using xl. There are some regionals leaving. Any big jets? She can't tell type. Any recent condition reports? She had someone land xx reporting good/fair but xx is closed now; she can call tower and ask? Please do and call me back; and can you ask the duty pilot to look up whether there is a takeoff flap crosswind limit for the 737? Have him/her call me anyways please.the contaminated runway correction data has printed. It's a real eye catcher! Flaps 15 V1=117; vr=136. Flaps 5 V1=121; vr=142. In simple pilot speak; if we blow the downwind motor at V1 I need either 19 or 21 more knots on an unknown (drifting snow on ATIS) runway with gusting crosswinds to be able to pull the nose up and safely fly. Aborting is off the end for sure.back to my ipad. I finally find one of the things I've been looking for. That magic decoder ring chart that tabulates runway condition reports; braking action; pireps; and makes sense of them as they relate to each other is now called the runway condition assessment matrix and is in the landing app; which is nothing to do with taking off or deicing but there it finally is. Next I'm in the performance manual and find the other thing I'm looking for as my phone rings. It's the duty pilot. He can't find anything about takeoff flaps either but sympathizes with me that with his roughly 6;000 hours or so of being a 737 first officer remembers something about that too. It must be gone. We discuss that max demonstrated is 33 knots but what does that mean? Dry runway? And max landing crosswind is 20 knots. Why not takeoff? I remember having this discussion before... I recall dropping the language that we may not be going on the duty pilot and the dispatcher; but the conversations dropped off as something else came up.this is where I'm reminded of something I used to quip to my first officer's. 'The boeing test pilots and engineers; combined with the [company] test pilots; engineers; check airmen; and training department have figured out 99% of the things that can go wrong out here. We line pilots get the 1% remaining. And I'm not a test pilot or engineer. So we'll figure it out and be safe and conservative.'and then I find the last thing I've been looking for. Performance manual introduction. 'Because of the large variations with contaminated runways; the captain (sic) must use the takeoff performance data in conjunction with good pilot judgment.' I'm reminded of the last time I did this; runway xr was much worse in the last 10-15 knots of takeoff than I expected. I remember using data on the HUD pretty extensively despite not a low vis takeoff or runway while my eyes darted and found external clues and I remember the feeling of my hand in midair off the throttles above V1 like I was riding a bike with 'look ma! No hands!' as we bucked and rocked gaining the speed we needed. I remember a lot of things that have created my 'good pilot judgment' and I suddenly realize I'm an old man with a lot of wisdom and very good judgment. I ask my first officer to join me in looking in part 1 and the new version of part 1 for guidance regarding what to do if the captain believes it's unsafe to continue. All we could find was the dispatcher can cancel the flight.so I grab my hat and head to the gate agents. 'My decision is that I'm not going. You'll have to cancel.' they call a supervisor. My head is spinning. Voices get raised on the phone; the gate agent hands it to me. 'You can't cancel a flight'. 'Well ok then I'm informing you that I can't safely takeoff'. 'This would have been something nice to know an hour ago!' 'I didn't have the information I needed an hour ago. And why am I arguing with you?! I'll be on the flight deck waiting.' I return to the airplane and brief my flight attendant's the weather is too bad to takeoff and we'll wait to see what happens next. My flight attendant's are concerned about the DOT departure delay for passengers and I inform them the door is still open so the clock has not started. Get with a gate agent please. I call dispatch; which I should have done before going to the gate agents; and tell her I am not comfortable with the conditions it is unsafe to takeoff. A ramp manager shows up in the flight deck door and introduces himself. 'Captain what would you like us to do with the passengers?' 'I don't know; I don't believe that's my responsibility; the door is open and I've just been scolded by a gate agent supervisor.' 'well aren't you refusing to fly?' 'no; the weather is unsafe. I'm not taking off.'at this point; I start dialing chief pilot numbers and get a hold of one. I explain and he is very nice; understanding and cordial. He is apologetic for the gate agent situation; and stands behind my decision. He knows me. I let him go to coordinate other things. My phone rings and it's the above conversation with crew schedule. The cs asks if my first officer is next to me and would I ask him if he is refusing to fly also? I refused to ask my first officer that on cs behalf and said something like; this is my decision to not take off in this weather; my first officer is busy taking care of things for me. They removed him also and re-crewed the flight. I asked my first officer to leave quickly and quietly and I would follow expecting that by then all eyes will be on me. The phone rang; it was the same chief pilot soi motioned my first officer to wait. My chief had to ask me something serious; it was all over social media I had made a PA it was unsafe to fly and I was refusing to fly. Had I made such a PA? I informed him no way. The only PA's I had made were updates to our delay in a professional manner. Good enough for him; someone else put it out.my first officer departed the flight deck; I gathered my gear and followed; exchanging glances with the passengers; crew; and ramp manager. Essentially; I made a well thought out decision I am getting paid to make; and was shamed for it. There was no need to say; 'this is being recorded...' we all know that. It was emphasis. Shame. An effort to sway me. We pilots can be our own worst enemies to how serious our job really is; but that's the way it is.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reported refusing an aircraft due to weather conditions that appeared to make departing unsafe.

Narrative: It's about 45 minutes prior to push I'm at [the gate] but no jet; no flight plan. I pull up my Departure Report for my Dispatchers info. No name but the number is there so I call. It's a male voice and I begin the conversation about what we're doing and what information I need. He can't send the contaminated runway numbers I need to me until the jet is in; so asks me to request that via ACARS. Otherwise; the tone has been set that I'm a Captain that coordinates. So here's our set up: All the other runways are closed. The majority of the storm has passed. The trend as I've been monitoring ATIS has been the winds moving more abeam and the runway worsening. On the people management side of my job; my FO (First Officer) had his earlier flight cancelled and he's been at the airport a while because he didn't know it had cancelled. My earlier flight also cancelled but I caught that early and we were both junior manned into this later flight. My FA's (flight attendants) have been flying already and this is their last leg; they want to get to ZZZ. We deadhead home in the morning. One of my gate agents is supposed to be on break and both are being hassled by their supervisor. My ground crew has checked in; they're freezing; and I've told them we'll be a while. I've made a typical PA to the passengers explaining a lot is going on with getting the late aircraft ready and I will keep them advised; thank you for your understanding and patience. I've briefed my #1 that we are crunching numbers and weather issues.When I sat down on the flight deck; I sent [a] message to Dispatch via ACARS. I have reviewed the takeoff card to verify that 1) the winds dictate I use 26K MAX power and 2) the contaminated runway dictates I use 26K MAX power 15 flaps recommended to reduce takeoff speeds. However; my experience tells me the more flaps I use; the more pronounced the crosswind will be and associated control issues. My gut tells me I have one safety trump card (using 26k max power) and two; maybe three safety issues (Crosswind/Gusts/Runway condition) requiring 26k max that oppose each other for the recommended flap settings.I've called Dispatch again to go over some things (It's a female voice this time so maybe a shift change; so we start fresh) and I'm having her help me make sure there are no takeoff crosswind limitations any longer because I swear we used to have them; a byproduct of constant revisions and reformatting in an electronic manner I may never get used to. FO is looking into other things for me; like a guess on hold over time if we leave the gate; which drives how much knowledge/scenarios I need to leave the gate with; so I'm ready. I ask the Dispatcher if anyone is getting out using XL. There are some regionals leaving. Any big jets? She can't tell type. Any recent condition reports? She had someone land XX reporting good/fair but XX is closed now; she can call Tower and ask? Please do and call me back; and can you ask the Duty Pilot to look up whether there is a takeoff flap crosswind limit for the 737? Have him/her call me anyways please.The CONTAMINATED RUNWAY CORRECTION data has printed. It's a real eye catcher! Flaps 15 V1=117; VR=136. Flaps 5 V1=121; VR=142. In simple pilot speak; if we blow the downwind motor at V1 I need either 19 or 21 more knots on an unknown (drifting snow on ATIS) runway with gusting crosswinds to be able to pull the nose up and safely fly. Aborting is off the end for sure.Back to my iPad. I finally find one of the things I've been looking for. That magic decoder ring chart that tabulates runway condition reports; braking action; PIREPs; and makes sense of them as they relate to each other is now called the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix and is in the landing app; which is nothing to do with taking off or deicing but there it finally is. Next I'm in the performance manual and find the other thing I'm looking for as my phone rings. It's the Duty Pilot. He can't find anything about takeoff flaps either but sympathizes with me that with his roughly 6;000 hours or so of being a 737 FO remembers something about that too. It must be gone. We discuss that max demonstrated is 33 knots but what does that mean? Dry runway? And max landing crosswind is 20 knots. Why not takeoff? I remember having this discussion before... I recall dropping the language that we may not be going on the Duty Pilot and the Dispatcher; but the conversations dropped off as something else came up.This is where I'm reminded of something I used to quip to my FO's. 'The Boeing test pilots and engineers; combined with the [company] test pilots; engineers; Check Airmen; and training department have figured out 99% of the things that can go wrong out here. We line pilots get the 1% remaining. And I'm not a test pilot or engineer. So we'll figure it out and be safe and conservative.'And then I find the last thing I've been looking for. Performance Manual Introduction. 'Because of the large variations with contaminated runways; the Captain (sic) must use the takeoff performance data in conjunction with good pilot judgment.' I'm reminded of the last time I did this; runway XR was much worse in the last 10-15 knots of takeoff than I expected. I remember using data on the HUD pretty extensively despite not a low vis takeoff or runway while my eyes darted and found external clues and I remember the feeling of my hand in midair off the throttles above V1 like I was riding a bike with 'look ma! no hands!' as we bucked and rocked gaining the speed we needed. I remember a lot of things that have created my 'good pilot judgment' and I suddenly realize I'm an old man with a lot of wisdom and very good judgment. I ask my FO to join me in looking in Part 1 and the new version of Part 1 for guidance regarding what to do if the Captain believes it's unsafe to continue. All we could find was the Dispatcher can cancel the flight.So I grab my hat and head to the gate agents. 'My decision is that I'm not going. You'll have to cancel.' They call a Supervisor. My head is spinning. Voices get raised on the phone; the gate agent hands it to me. 'You can't cancel a flight'. 'Well ok then I'm informing you that I can't safely takeoff'. 'This would have been something nice to know an hour ago!' 'I didn't have the information I needed an hour ago. And why am I arguing with you?! I'll be on the flight deck waiting.' I return to the airplane and brief my FA's the weather is too bad to takeoff and we'll wait to see what happens next. My FA's are concerned about the DOT departure delay for passengers and I inform them the door is still open so the clock has not started. Get with a Gate Agent please. I call Dispatch; which I should have done before going to the gate agents; and tell her I am not comfortable with the conditions it is unsafe to takeoff. A Ramp Manager shows up in the flight deck door and introduces himself. 'Captain what would you like us to do with the passengers?' 'I don't know; I don't believe that's my responsibility; the door is open and I've just been scolded by a gate agent supervisor.' 'Well aren't you refusing to fly?' 'No; the weather is unsafe. I'm not taking off.'At this point; I start dialing Chief Pilot numbers and get a hold of one. I explain and he is very nice; understanding and cordial. He is apologetic for the gate agent situation; and stands behind my decision. He knows me. I let him go to coordinate other things. My phone rings and it's the above conversation with Crew Schedule. The CS asks if my FO is next to me and would I ask him if he is refusing to fly also? I refused to ask my FO that on CS behalf and said something like; this is my decision to not take off in this weather; my FO is busy taking care of things for me. They removed him also and re-crewed the flight. I asked my FO to leave quickly and quietly and I would follow expecting that by then all eyes will be on me. The phone rang; it was the same Chief Pilot soI motioned my FO to wait. My Chief had to ask me something serious; it was all over social media I had made a PA it was unsafe to fly and I was refusing to fly. Had I made such a PA? I informed him no way. The only PA's I had made were updates to our delay in a professional manner. Good enough for him; someone else put it out.My FO departed the flight deck; I gathered my gear and followed; exchanging glances with the passengers; crew; and Ramp Manager. Essentially; I made a well thought out decision I am getting paid to make; and was shamed for it. There was no need to say; 'This is being recorded...' We all know that. It was emphasis. Shame. An effort to sway me. We pilots can be our own worst enemies to how serious our job really is; but that's the way it is.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.