Narrative:

We were approaching pit from the southwest with a plan for landing on runway 28L. I was the pilot flying; and they kept us high for quite some time. Then as we were abeam the airport; cleared us to the final approach fix altitude; 3;000 feet (1875 feet AGL). They gave us a turn to 360 degrees that was a heading directly to the FAF at about three miles; but we were still apparently 1;000-1;500 feet above the FAF altitude and we were in level change. I had the speedbrakes deployed and flaps 5. They then gave us the heading of 320 degrees and cleared [us] for the visual approach. Still high at that point; I called for flaps 10; and armed VOR/localizer. I could tell that the intercept heading would not have us intercepting the final approach course until well inside the final approach fix. I then called for 'landing gear down;' and the captain said 'I agree.' I had very good visuals with the runway and could see our rate of descent increasing. I knew we were still high; and going to intercept the glideslope first; so I armed approach.at that point; I was still on autopilot; and noticed my pitch mode in the FMA blanked out; and we were descending below glidepath; at approximately 1;600-1;700 feet AGL. The captain said 'where are you going?' at about the same time I heard a 'caution obstacle.' I immediately turned off autopilot and leveled and continued slowing; stowed the speed brakes; and called for flaps 15. I had good visual contact with the ground; and noticed we were approaching 1300 feet above field elevation; and close to glidepath. I called for 'flaps 30; before landing checklist;' and we completed the checklist and continued the approach to landing.I learned several important points. We should have gone around when we got the warning. I knew we'd have to do a [report on this incident]; but did not initially realize we should have gone around in night conditions even if VMC. I should've also taken a turn back to the north to intercept final approach course instead of staying on the same heading prior to the visual clearance. I also think I was too worried about working the MCP and staying with the autopilot; rather than flying the aircraft and keeping my rate of descent under control.the captain was supportive of my efforts to get back on glidepath; but reiterated that in night conditions; even if VMC; a 'caution obstacle' aural warning requires a go-around. I think I probably felt too confident with my flying skills; and accepted the short turn [to] final when I probably should have turned north to give myself more room to maneuver prior to intercepting the final approach course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew reported they were on a night visual approach and received a GPWS terrain warning. The crew did not execute a missed approach/go-around.

Narrative: We were approaching PIT from the southwest with a plan for landing on Runway 28L. I was the pilot flying; and they kept us high for quite some time. Then as we were abeam the airport; cleared us to the final approach fix altitude; 3;000 feet (1875 feet AGL). They gave us a turn to 360 degrees that was a heading directly to the FAF at about three miles; but we were still apparently 1;000-1;500 feet above the FAF altitude and we were in Level Change. I had the speedbrakes deployed and flaps 5. They then gave us the heading of 320 degrees and cleared [us] for the visual approach. Still high at that point; I called for flaps 10; and armed VOR/LOC. I could tell that the intercept heading would not have us intercepting the final approach course until well inside the final approach fix. I then called for 'landing gear down;' and the Captain said 'I agree.' I had very good visuals with the runway and could see our rate of descent increasing. I knew we were still high; and going to intercept the glideslope first; so I armed approach.At that point; I was still on autopilot; and noticed my pitch mode in the FMA blanked out; and we were descending below glidepath; at approximately 1;600-1;700 feet AGL. The Captain said 'Where are you going?' at about the same time I heard a 'Caution Obstacle.' I immediately turned off autopilot and leveled and continued slowing; stowed the speed brakes; and called for flaps 15. I had good visual contact with the ground; and noticed we were approaching 1300 feet above field elevation; and close to glidepath. I called for 'Flaps 30; Before Landing Checklist;' and we completed the checklist and continued the approach to landing.I learned several important points. We should have gone around when we got the warning. I knew we'd have to do a [report on this incident]; but did not initially realize we should have gone around in night conditions even if VMC. I should've also taken a turn back to the north to intercept final approach course instead of staying on the same heading prior to the visual clearance. I also think I was too worried about working the MCP and staying with the autopilot; rather than flying the aircraft and keeping my rate of descent under control.The Captain was supportive of my efforts to get back on glidepath; but reiterated that in night conditions; even if VMC; a 'Caution Obstacle' aural warning requires a go-around. I think I probably felt too confident with my flying skills; and accepted the short turn [to] final when I probably should have turned north to give myself more room to maneuver prior to intercepting the final approach course.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.