Narrative:

This letter serves to comply with item 15 on the NASA form arc 277, giving a more details report of the tailskid strike occurring on an large transport at mia. On approach to runway 9L mia with the first officer flying, the tower requested our flight change to runway 12. We complied with the request and established ourselves on centerline and VASI for 12 with normal sink rate and fuel flow. At just above 50', we both felt the aircraft begin sinking at a high rate at which time the first officer applied full power while raising the nose. None of the flight crew had ever experienced a low altitude sink rate of this magnitude in the yrs we have flown. The aircraft touched down squarely on the main landing gear and immediately became airborne again. The go around maneuver was continued and request made for another approach. The tailskid light illuminated, which was some cause for concern, but the integrity of the aircraft was not in question. Other than the light remaining illuminated, we did not otherwise suspect damage; but, as a precaution, I requested that the emergency equipment be standing by for our landing. The first officer made a smooth T/D on 9L and we taxied to the gate. After conversation with tower by phone, I learned that an air carrier B widebody transport had taxied beyond the hold short line of 9L, prompting the request for our runway change to 12. I also learned that after our clearance to land on 12, the widebody transport was cleared to taxi into position on 9L while we were landing on 12. The tower supervisor said that air carrier B was requested to remain at idle power, but I suspect the widebody transport would be unable to move at idle. We never saw the widebody transport due to night conditions. The break-away thrust on the widebody transport was evidently directed at the T/D zone of our runway. The resulting tailwind seems to be the most plausible explanation for the high sink rate our flight experienced. If not for the quick and decisive action of the first officer, there probably would have been much more serious damage to the aircraft with injuries. 2 actions of the first officer minimized the damage: early increase to full power and his awareness and restraint in using normal go around pitch attitude which would have damaged #2 engine. My reflection on this incident has made me aware of a procedure which I would like reviewed for possible change. I have always felt that close to the ground both pilots should be outside monitoring sink rate, aircraft attitude and runway alignment. I understand air carrier a is the only airline that has the PNF make 10' callouts below 50' on narrow body equipment. If an aircraft were to develop a low altitude sink or misaligh with the PNF looking inside, it is not likely that the condition would be noticed in time to correct. I recognize that the captain has the authority not to make such callouts, but this does not go far enough in my opinion. The F//O should have the same discretion in the event the captain errs, and possibly beyond that, the procedure should be considered for deletion. Many other capts I have spoken with express the same concern. A second reflection is that the FAA should never allow the possibility of jet wake from taxiing aircraft to influence landing or departing aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ENCOUNTERED LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR OR WAKE TURBULENCE RESULTING IN HARD TOUCHDOWN, FOLLOWED BY BOUNCE AND GO AROUND. TAILSKID STRIKE. UNABLE CALLBACK, EITHER REPORTER.

Narrative: THIS LETTER SERVES TO COMPLY WITH ITEM 15 ON THE NASA FORM ARC 277, GIVING A MORE DETAILS RPT OF THE TAILSKID STRIKE OCCURRING ON AN LGT AT MIA. ON APCH TO RWY 9L MIA WITH THE F/O FLYING, THE TWR REQUESTED OUR FLT CHANGE TO RWY 12. WE COMPLIED WITH THE REQUEST AND ESTABLISHED OURSELVES ON CENTERLINE AND VASI FOR 12 WITH NORMAL SINK RATE AND FUEL FLOW. AT JUST ABOVE 50', WE BOTH FELT THE ACFT BEGIN SINKING AT A HIGH RATE AT WHICH TIME THE F/O APPLIED FULL PWR WHILE RAISING THE NOSE. NONE OF THE FLT CREW HAD EVER EXPERIENCED A LOW ALT SINK RATE OF THIS MAGNITUDE IN THE YRS WE HAVE FLOWN. THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN SQUARELY ON THE MAIN LNDG GEAR AND IMMEDIATELY BECAME AIRBORNE AGAIN. THE GAR MANEUVER WAS CONTINUED AND REQUEST MADE FOR ANOTHER APCH. THE TAILSKID LIGHT ILLUMINATED, WHICH WAS SOME CAUSE FOR CONCERN, BUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ACFT WAS NOT IN QUESTION. OTHER THAN THE LIGHT REMAINING ILLUMINATED, WE DID NOT OTHERWISE SUSPECT DAMAGE; BUT, AS A PRECAUTION, I REQUESTED THAT THE EMER EQUIP BE STANDING BY FOR OUR LNDG. THE F/O MADE A SMOOTH T/D ON 9L AND WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. AFTER CONVERSATION WITH TWR BY PHONE, I LEARNED THAT AN ACR B WDB HAD TAXIED BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF 9L, PROMPTING THE REQUEST FOR OUR RWY CHANGE TO 12. I ALSO LEARNED THAT AFTER OUR CLRNC TO LAND ON 12, THE WDB WAS CLRED TO TAXI INTO POS ON 9L WHILE WE WERE LNDG ON 12. THE TWR SUPVR SAID THAT ACR B WAS REQUESTED TO REMAIN AT IDLE PWR, BUT I SUSPECT THE WDB WOULD BE UNABLE TO MOVE AT IDLE. WE NEVER SAW THE WDB DUE TO NIGHT CONDITIONS. THE BREAK-AWAY THRUST ON THE WDB WAS EVIDENTLY DIRECTED AT THE T/D ZONE OF OUR RWY. THE RESULTING TAILWIND SEEMS TO BE THE MOST PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE HIGH SINK RATE OUR FLT EXPERIENCED. IF NOT FOR THE QUICK AND DECISIVE ACTION OF THE F/O, THERE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WITH INJURIES. 2 ACTIONS OF THE F/O MINIMIZED THE DAMAGE: EARLY INCREASE TO FULL PWR AND HIS AWARENESS AND RESTRAINT IN USING NORMAL GAR PITCH ATTITUDE WHICH WOULD HAVE DAMAGED #2 ENG. MY REFLECTION ON THIS INCIDENT HAS MADE ME AWARE OF A PROC WHICH I WOULD LIKE REVIEWED FOR POSSIBLE CHANGE. I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT CLOSE TO THE GND BOTH PLTS SHOULD BE OUTSIDE MONITORING SINK RATE, ACFT ATTITUDE AND RWY ALIGNMENT. I UNDERSTAND ACR A IS THE ONLY AIRLINE THAT HAS THE PNF MAKE 10' CALLOUTS BELOW 50' ON NARROW BODY EQUIP. IF AN ACFT WERE TO DEVELOP A LOW ALT SINK OR MISALIGH WITH THE PNF LOOKING INSIDE, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE CONDITION WOULD BE NOTICED IN TIME TO CORRECT. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE CAPT HAS THE AUTHORITY NOT TO MAKE SUCH CALLOUTS, BUT THIS DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH IN MY OPINION. THE F//O SHOULD HAVE THE SAME DISCRETION IN THE EVENT THE CAPT ERRS, AND POSSIBLY BEYOND THAT, THE PROC SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR DELETION. MANY OTHER CAPTS I HAVE SPOKEN WITH EXPRESS THE SAME CONCERN. A SECOND REFLECTION IS THAT THE FAA SHOULD NEVER ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY OF JET WAKE FROM TAXIING ACFT TO INFLUENCE LNDG OR DEPARTING ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.