Narrative:

[Engineering department] originally wrote an ea (engineering authorization) for replacement of numerous damaged airbag seatbelt covers to be replaced nlt (no later than) 2902 fc (flight cycles). When the twd came; and the seat-belts could not be replaced; [engineering department] wrote a revision to the original ea allowing additional time provided no airbag material extrudes outside the covers. Per that ea; if there was any material found outside of the cover; the seat needed to be placed on MEL (they also mentioned a specific MEL; which is not their determination). After that ea was written; and during the accomplishment of repair instruction ii of the ea; maintenance found airbag material extruding outside of the cover. At that point ; and due to the amount of seats that would have been unusable; [engineering department] wrote another ea against the previous ea allowing the seats to continue in-service (useable) with subsequent inspections to be accomplished. This is in direct violation of the MEL's; [procedures manual] ([maintenance control] determines which MEL is to be used)in an effort to mitigate a delay and ensure all seats were available; regardless of the safety of the passengers; [engineering department] issued a 3rd ea against previous ea's. The use of ea's by engineering has been out of control and getting worse. All to ensure an on-time performance disregarding the safety of passengers and crew. There needs to be a limited availability for the use of engineering authorizations. In the past; every ea ([engineering] and [line engineering order]) came through maintenance control to be issued. The controller had to approve its use and their name was on the authorization prior to its issuance. We were the checks and balances. Now; there aren't any. There was also extremely limited [procedures manual] and guidelines for issuance of an authorization. I believe; in order to ensure safety and compliance; the use of the carte blanche ea process needs to be reined in and check and balances re-established as before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Maintenance Technician reports improper use of Engineering Authorization to defer maintenance action.

Narrative: [Engineering Department] originally wrote an EA (Engineering Authorization) for replacement of numerous damaged airbag seatbelt covers to be replaced NLT (No Later Than) 2902 FC (Flight Cycles). When the TWD came; and the seat-belts could not be replaced; [Engineering Department] wrote a revision to the original EA allowing additional time provided no airbag material extrudes outside the covers. Per that EA; if there was any material found outside of the cover; the seat needed to be placed on MEL (they also mentioned a specific MEL; which is not their determination). After that EA was written; and during the accomplishment of repair instruction II of the EA; Maintenance found airbag material extruding outside of the cover. At that point ; and due to the amount of seats that would have been unusable; [Engineering Department] wrote another EA against the previous EA allowing the seats to continue in-service (USEABLE) with subsequent inspections to be accomplished. This is in direct violation of the MEL's; [Procedures Manual] ([Maintenance Control] determines which MEL is to be used)In an effort to mitigate a delay and ensure all seats were available; regardless of the safety of the passengers; [Engineering Department] issued a 3rd EA against previous EA's. The use of EA's by engineering has been out of control and getting worse. All to ensure an on-time performance disregarding the safety of passengers and crew. There needs to be a limited availability for the use of Engineering Authorizations. In the past; every EA ([Engineering] and [Line Engineering Order]) came through Maintenance Control to be issued. The Controller had to approve its use and their name was on the Authorization prior to its issuance. We were the checks and balances. Now; there aren't any. There was also extremely limited [Procedures Manual] and guidelines for issuance of an Authorization. I believe; in order to ensure safety and compliance; the use of the carte blanche EA process needs to be reined in and check and balances re-established as before.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.