Narrative:

We reached aircraft early; as it arrived; an hour before departure; as first officer (first officer) had two months experience on 737's. To get ahead; he conducted walk-around while passengers deplaned. All tires and other items appeared normal during exterior preflight. The aircraft mechanic later confirmed with me; during post flight; that he also checked the tires; with no issues noted. During preflight the first officer wrote down the hydraulic quantities of 92% a; and 87% B. We were near our max structural take-off weight. Load planning confirmed with me that we could not take an off-line pilot jumpseater; and closely monitored the weight of the last bags; the jetway was even brought back to the aircraft to remove a standby passenger to lower our weight. We needed to burn (at least) 400 lbs of fuel to lower our weight during taxi. We began taxiing with 44.2k lbs; and requested a delay near the end of the runway to reach 43.8k lbs. Our weight at the beginning of the take-off roll was 174.1k lbs.during the take-off roll; runway xr seemed rough to me; as if it needed repair; especially along the blackened center area during the first third of the runway. No asymmetry noted. I did note a very small; slightly abrupt jolt; upon lift-off. After lift-off we heard the next aircraft tell tower that they were unable to take-off due to FOD (foreign object damage) on 1R. We had noticed none. A couple minutes later; departure told us that there were tire pieces on the runway; probably from us. They asked our intentions; whether we wanted to return to ZZZ. With autopilot on; I remained PF (pilot flying). The first officer and I discussed our lack of secondary indications; and the seemingly normal take-off. As we were overweight; I was not in a hurry to land unnecessarily. We had many landing options enroute ZZZ1; and could also ask ZZZ1 for assistance if needed; upon arrival. We told [tracon] we would continue. Within a minute; the ENG1 low pressure light; on the a side of the hydraulic panel; illuminated. We assumed it was related to tire damage.the first officer ran the hydraulic pump low pressure QRH (quick reference handbook) checklist; and we secured the ENG1 pump. Upon checking the hydraulic system; the copilot first saw 18%; and I saw 14% quantity. Pressure still indicated normal (2900+); but we doubted that would remain within limits for long. We told approach we would be returning to ZZZ; and began reviewing loss of hydraulic system a QRH. A system pressure began dropping within a couple minutes. The first officer ran the loss of system a QRH. He also ensured an emergency was declared with ATC. I briefly notified the flight attendants; to not begin service; we would return to ZZZ within 30 minutes; we had a tire and hydraulic problem; and that I would most likely ask them to prep for evac (evacuation). Weather was perfect at ZZZ (VMC); winds 290/8; BKN70); and xr and xc were both 11;500 ft. We did not want xr; due to FOD; and planned/requested xc. First officer set up FMC (flight management computer). First officer ensured that approach knew we wanted emergency vehicles upon landing. I asked first officer to reiterate significant checklist items that would affect landing; and said we still needed approach brief; descent & approach checklists; and time for a PA announcement. He reminded me of the timing of the manual gear extension checklist as well. I also asked him to check FM (flight manual) for any guidance on overweight landings; and we found none. Instead; we calculated landing ground roll per emergency checklist (5-6;000ft); and discussed higher speeds (165kts for approach) in comparison to flap speeds. Dispatch additionally volunteered that xl landing would be 5000ft. I gave PA announcement to passengers; explaining problem briefly; plans to safely prep for all contingencies in back; and emphasized that they needed to listen to their very well trained flight attendants. First officer took control of plane while I briefed approach. We ran remaining checklists; reviewed evacuation checklist; and successfully extended gear manually. First officer emphasized that gear would not retract during go-around. I discussed importance of first officer's 'remain seated' call during landing roll-out; as back of aircraft was thinking extensively about evacuation. We decided we would be spring-loaded to initially say this; and it could be changed later. I had first officer talk directly with F/a's to clarify how he would communicate with them (which he did exceptionally well.) approach volunteered glideslope was out for xc ILS and offered visual. I requested localizer G/south out; to keep us matched more closely to planned approach. First officer also had box programmed for VNAV vertical guidance. Even though G/south indications were still received; and appeared correct; we referenced step-down altitudes on approach as well. About 3;000 feet; I disconnected autopilot and auto-throttle; and flew manually; to preclude excess automation programming on a VMC day; and focus upon approach speeds. PAPI 3-1 back-up; VNAV profile on fdi (flight director indicator); and step-down altitudes provided more than enough guidance. (Plus; we had emergency declared.) I touched down about 2;500-3;000 feet down runway. I sacrificed earlier touchdown; to prioritize rate of descent and a smooth touchdown; to minimize gear impact. Touchdown was very smooth; I used reverse during first 5;000 ft of roll-out; with no asymmetry noted; and brakes during last 3;000 of roll-out. As there was no asymmetry; minimal roughness; and aircraft did respond well to initial use of (alternate) nose-wheel steering; I elected to turn onto taxiway xx; and then stop immediately after hold-short. Approximately 5-10 emergency vehicles were waiting. I started APU immediately. First officer decided to leave flaps in down position. Fire rescue gave us a contact frequency; and we spelled out we wanted tire inspection; check for smoke; excess heat; and leakage. They found significant tire damage; no smoke; temperatures of left and right brakes at 350F; and leakage. I had them clarify whether leakage was fuel or hydraulic; and it was hydraulic. They also found damage to underside of left wing; and we again asked for clarification on any fuel leakage from wing (there was none.)I was surprised that no tow vehicles were present. As we needed to stay on arff (aircraft rescue and fire fighting) and ground frequencies; I acars'd dispatch to request towing. It took 15 more minutes for tow tug to arrive. Beyond that; it took another 20 minutes; for arff to finish inspection; and clear out the 50+ people and 10+ vehicles. We made about 4 PA announcements; keeping passengers informed of fire inspection; request for tow equipment; arrival of tow equipment; and arrival gate. I additionally checked with F/a's (flight attendants) as to how they were doing; and how passengers were doing. They said all passengers were doing very well; which I believe is due to the excellent job our F/a's did; and the 20+ years experience they had. We were towed to gate X. The tow team requested that we initially request taxi. This led to confusion as to who was communication with ground throughout the remainder of the towing operation; especially when we entered the ramp. It would be better to just have the tow operator communicate with ground/ramp; per their usual procedures; rather than add pilots into the mix. We can easily just monitor the same frequencies. Passengers deplaned uneventfully. Even though first officer did a phenomenal job with every step of this event; he and I decided that we did not want to fly any more until the following day. Chance of distraction was too great; and we needed a break. I talked with flight manager and alpa (airline pilots association) incident hotline.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Flight Crew encountered tire tread failure during takeoff.

Narrative: We reached aircraft early; as it arrived; an hour before departure; as F/O (First Officer) had two months experience on 737's. To get ahead; he conducted walk-around while passengers deplaned. All tires and other items appeared normal during exterior preflight. The aircraft mechanic later confirmed with me; during post flight; that he also checked the tires; with no issues noted. During preflight the F/O wrote down the hydraulic quantities of 92% A; and 87% B. We were near our max structural take-off weight. Load Planning confirmed with me that we could not take an off-line pilot jumpseater; and closely monitored the weight of the last bags; the jetway was even brought back to the aircraft to remove a standby passenger to lower our weight. We needed to burn (at least) 400 lbs of fuel to lower our weight during taxi. We began taxiing with 44.2k lbs; and requested a delay near the end of the runway to reach 43.8k lbs. Our weight at the beginning of the take-off roll was 174.1k lbs.During the take-off roll; Runway XR seemed rough to me; as if it needed repair; especially along the blackened center area during the first third of the runway. No asymmetry noted. I did note a very small; slightly abrupt jolt; upon lift-off. After lift-off we heard the next aircraft tell Tower that they were unable to take-off due to FOD (Foreign Object Damage) on 1R. We had noticed none. A couple minutes later; Departure told us that there were tire pieces on the runway; probably from us. They asked our intentions; whether we wanted to return to ZZZ. With autopilot on; I remained PF (Pilot Flying). The F/O and I discussed our lack of secondary indications; and the seemingly normal take-off. As we were overweight; I was not in a hurry to land unnecessarily. We had many landing options enroute ZZZ1; and could also ask ZZZ1 for assistance if needed; upon arrival. We told [Tracon] we would continue. Within a minute; the ENG1 LOW PRESSURE light; on the A side of the Hydraulic panel; illuminated. We assumed it was related to tire damage.The F/O ran the HYDRAULIC PUMP LOW PRESSURE QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist; and we secured the ENG1 pump. Upon checking the hydraulic system; the copilot first saw 18%; and I saw 14% quantity. Pressure still indicated normal (2900+); but we doubted that would remain within limits for long. We told Approach we would be returning to ZZZ; and began reviewing Loss of Hydraulic System A QRH. A system pressure began dropping within a couple minutes. The F/O ran the LOSS OF SYSTEM A QRH. He also ensured an emergency was declared with ATC. I briefly notified the flight attendants; to not begin service; we would return to ZZZ within 30 minutes; we had a tire and hydraulic problem; and that I would most likely ask them to prep for Evac (Evacuation). Weather was perfect at ZZZ (VMC); winds 290/8; BKN70); and XR and XC were both 11;500 ft. We did not want XR; due to FOD; and planned/requested XC. F/O set up FMC (Flight Management Computer). F/O ensured that Approach knew we wanted emergency vehicles upon landing. I asked F/O to reiterate significant checklist items that would affect landing; and said we still needed approach brief; descent & approach checklists; and time for a PA announcement. He reminded me of the timing of the manual gear extension checklist as well. I also asked him to check FM (Flight Manual) for any guidance on overweight landings; and we found none. Instead; we calculated landing ground roll per emergency checklist (5-6;000ft); and discussed higher speeds (165kts for approach) in comparison to flap speeds. Dispatch additionally volunteered that XL landing would be 5000ft. I gave PA announcement to passengers; explaining problem briefly; plans to safely prep for all contingencies in back; and emphasized that they needed to listen to their very well trained flight attendants. F/O took control of plane while I briefed approach. We ran remaining checklists; reviewed evacuation checklist; and successfully extended gear manually. F/O emphasized that gear would not retract during go-around. I discussed importance of F/O's 'remain seated' call during landing roll-out; as back of aircraft was thinking extensively about evacuation. We decided we would be spring-loaded to initially say this; and it could be changed later. I had F/O talk directly with F/A's to clarify how he would communicate with them (which he did exceptionally well.) Approach volunteered glideslope was out for XC ILS and offered visual. I requested LOC G/S out; to keep us matched more closely to planned approach. F/O also had box programmed for VNAV vertical guidance. Even though G/S indications were still received; and appeared correct; we referenced step-down altitudes on approach as well. About 3;000 feet; I disconnected autopilot and auto-throttle; and flew manually; to preclude excess automation programming on a VMC day; and focus upon approach speeds. PAPI 3-1 back-up; VNAV profile on FDI (flight Director Indicator); and step-down altitudes provided more than enough guidance. (Plus; we had emergency declared.) I touched down about 2;500-3;000 feet down runway. I sacrificed earlier touchdown; to prioritize rate of descent and a smooth touchdown; to minimize gear impact. Touchdown was very smooth; I used reverse during first 5;000 ft of roll-out; with no asymmetry noted; and brakes during last 3;000 of roll-out. As there was no asymmetry; minimal roughness; and aircraft did respond well to initial use of (alternate) nose-wheel steering; I elected to turn onto taxiway XX; and then stop immediately after hold-short. Approximately 5-10 emergency vehicles were waiting. I started APU immediately. F/O decided to leave flaps in down position. Fire Rescue gave us a contact frequency; and we spelled out we wanted tire inspection; check for smoke; excess heat; and leakage. They found significant tire damage; no smoke; temperatures of left and right brakes at 350F; and leakage. I had them clarify whether leakage was fuel or hydraulic; and it was hydraulic. They also found damage to underside of left wing; and we again asked for clarification on any fuel leakage from wing (there was none.)I was surprised that no tow vehicles were present. As we needed to stay on ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) and Ground frequencies; I ACARs'd Dispatch to request towing. It took 15 more minutes for tow tug to arrive. Beyond that; it took another 20 minutes; for ARFF to finish inspection; and clear out the 50+ people and 10+ vehicles. We made about 4 PA announcements; keeping passengers informed of fire inspection; request for tow equipment; arrival of tow equipment; and arrival gate. I additionally checked with F/A's (Flight Attendants) as to how they were doing; and how passengers were doing. They said all passengers were doing very well; which I believe is due to the excellent job our F/A's did; and the 20+ years experience they had. We were towed to gate X. The tow team requested that we initially request taxi. This led to confusion as to who was communication with Ground throughout the remainder of the towing operation; especially when we entered the ramp. It would be better to just have the tow operator communicate with Ground/Ramp; per their usual procedures; rather than add pilots into the mix. We can easily just monitor the same frequencies. Passengers deplaned uneventfully. Even though F/O did a phenomenal job with every step of this event; he and I decided that we did not want to fly any more until the following day. Chance of distraction was too great; and we needed a break. I talked with Flight Manager and ALPA (Airline Pilots Association) Incident Hotline.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.