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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1650327 |
Time | |
Date | 201905 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ORD.Airport |
State Reference | IL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Apologies for abruptness I am on an iphone in the back of the plane. Besides potentially fatiguing deadhead reassignments and operation into wocl (window of circadian low operations); I am concerned about the fact that scheduling contacted my first officer shortly prior to pushback on flight XXX and asked if he'd entertain a fdp (flight duty period) extension on flight XXXY. First officer and I had discussed earlier in the day that we'd take it leg by leg per far 117. He is on probation and told scheduling he would not extend. Scheduler stated that he'd start working first officer's removal. I found it odd that no attempt was made to contact me as we were both under the same fdp constraints. We were running behind and I decided to deal with it upon arrival in ord. Upon arrival in ord; first officer assumed he was released and began his trek to commute home. I checked schedule and contacted scheduling who said they knew we weren't extending but that we had to try to make the flight go. We arrived late; had no flight attendants; and the ramp was closed due to lightning. I explained this to the scheduler who; I assume by extension from 'the tower'; demanded that we board the aircraft and try to push. A storm that was forecast for more than 24 hours prior does not fall under the following definition of unforeseen operational circumstance: 'an unplanned event of insufficient duration to allow for adjustments to schedules; including unforecast weather; equipment malfunction or air traffic delay that is not reasonably expected.' this is an attempt at pilot pushing to an unsafe and illegal degree. It is unfortunate that passengers were boarded knowing full well the airplane would not push in time. Furthermore; it is inexcusable to push crews into a 'rushed' situation when the crew absolutely knows the conditions on the ground and in the air will not allow for the planned schedule. Couple this with an alleged comment to the first officer from an unknown person on the crew tracking line stating that they were 'running a few tests' to see how they could make the flight work and we have a definitive case of attempts at unrealistically changing flight plans to avoid far limitations. The ramp remained closed well after we were released. Had we accepted the extension; we would have potentially violated actual flight time limits as well.it should be obvious; but lack of staffing; poor communication; and failure to plan on [the company's] part does not constitute an emergency on my part. Stop trying to force the operation and listen to the professionals on the ground. Poor leaders and organizations force issues; solid leaders empower the folks doing the hard work on the ground and underwrite decisions and risk.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air Carrier pilot reported operations was forcing the flight crew to try to extend their Flight Duty Period when known delays were in effect due to weather and a ramp closure.
Narrative: Apologies for abruptness I am on an iPhone in the back of the plane. Besides potentially fatiguing deadhead reassignments and operation into WOCL (Window of Circadian Low operations); I am concerned about the fact that scheduling contacted my First Officer shortly prior to pushback on Flight XXX and asked if he'd entertain a FDP (Flight Duty Period) extension on Flight XXXY. First Officer and I had discussed earlier in the day that we'd take it leg by leg per FAR 117. He is on probation and told Scheduling he would not extend. Scheduler stated that he'd start working First Officer's removal. I found it odd that no attempt was made to contact me as we were both under the same FDP constraints. We were running behind and I decided to deal with it upon arrival in ORD. Upon arrival in ORD; First Officer assumed he was released and began his trek to commute home. I checked schedule and contacted Scheduling who said they knew we weren't extending but that we had to try to make the flight go. We arrived late; had no flight attendants; and the ramp was closed due to lightning. I explained this to the scheduler who; I assume by extension from 'the tower'; demanded that we board the aircraft and try to push. A storm that was forecast for more than 24 hours prior does not fall under the following definition of unforeseen operational circumstance: 'An unplanned event of insufficient duration to allow for adjustments to schedules; including unforecast weather; equipment malfunction or air traffic delay that is not reasonably expected.' This is an attempt at pilot pushing to an unsafe and illegal degree. It is unfortunate that passengers were boarded knowing full well the airplane would not push in time. Furthermore; it is inexcusable to push crews into a 'rushed' situation when the crew absolutely knows the conditions on the ground and in the air will not allow for the planned schedule. Couple this with an alleged comment to the First Officer from an unknown person on the crew tracking line stating that they were 'running a few tests' to see how they could make the flight work and we have a definitive case of attempts at unrealistically changing flight plans to avoid FAR limitations. The ramp remained closed well after we were released. Had we accepted the extension; we would have potentially violated actual flight time limits as well.It should be obvious; but lack of staffing; poor communication; and failure to plan on [the company's] part does not constitute an emergency on my part. Stop trying to force the operation and listen to the professionals on the ground. Poor leaders and organizations force issues; solid leaders empower the folks doing the hard work on the ground and underwrite decisions and risk.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.