Narrative:

I think it is important that this information gets to the safety committee because I suspect a systemic failure in coordinating [company] E-175 flights landing at ZZZ from oakland ARTCC to approach. The problem begins with the routing of our flights from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. Our flight plan has us proceeding from ZZZ2 to zzzzz intersection to the airport. When ZZZ is using runway xx; this puts us inbound against outbound traffic. Xxxxx is on the extended centerline of runway xx and is also the missed approach holding fix. There could be a scenario where; in the confusion of handing a missed approach off from local to the TRACON; separation might be lost with an inbound flight. This was also a good weather day on a holiday weekend. ZZZ is a popular GA airport with a mix of traffic and pilot skill levels. Imho flying inbound in a jet to such an airport on the upwind leg is not the most conservative way to enter a mix of traffic that includes helicopters and light aircraft. Granted; the controller would have our flight turn to enter the downwind. But what if there is a NORDO event or our flight is unable to immediately communicate with ATC due to frequency congestion; as happens at busy GA airports like this? Our clearance is from zzzzz to the airport. Zzzzz is not an initial fix for the instrument approach procedure to xx. The GPS rwy xx is the only approach available to [company] for this runway. The controllers would prefer to put us on downwind in the pattern with slower traffic; and clear us for the visual. But I would prefer to fly the instrument procedure; even on a nice day; to not have to make a visual 180 while descending and watching out for traffic. I feel that flying the instrument approach procedure to the runway is the more conservative plan. An additional consideration is that ZZZ can be reporting 10 and clear on a nice day like this was. It sits in a valley surrounded by coastal hills and mountains. I've been in the clouds receiving traffic advisories from controllers who think I can see and plan around VFR traffic lower and closer to the airport. The approach controller might be looking a metar that says its VMC there; not processing that the regional jet being vectored to the downwind is above the traffic pattern and still in the clouds. I discussed all this with my first officer early in the flight. We agreed to on plan to communicate our approach request to oak ARTCC prior to enroute fix ZZZZZ1. We requested direct ZZZZZ1 (an if) for the GPS rwy xx. Oak took a moment to check it; then cleared us direct ZZZZZ1 direct the airport. We set up for and briefed what should have been a seamless GPS approach providing charted MEA protections and an electronic glide path to the runway. We gave early notice of our intentions to not surprise the approach controller close in as the hand off to them seems a bit late and frequency congestion can delay our establishing communication with them after being handed off. As soon as we were handed off to approach; we clarified with the controller that we were requesting the GPS rwy xx procedure from ZZZZZ1; which is a nopt if. This is what we had requested when we were talking to oak and believed that it would have been coordinated with approach prior to the hand off. At first; we seemed to all be on the same page but then the approach controller vectored us off the transition and began to issue step descents. His vectors took us through and to the south side of the inbound course. He gave us a radar vectored modified course reversal; then a descent to 3;300' followed by a heading to intercept the inbound course. As the aircraft descended through 3;350' and was beginning to capture 3;300' the controller instructed us to amend our altitude to maintain 3;500'. He also amended the intercept heading which failed to take the wind into account. I looked up and clearly saw the runway at 10:30 to 11 o'clock at about 10 miles. We were in the valley well separated from any terrain; in a position to easily complete a stabilized visual approach to the runway. I responded to the controller; informing him that we were already at 3;300' and had the runway in sight. He cleared us for the visual. To this point; this is a report that suggests taking a look at the coordination from center to approach. What's wrong with a seamless instrument procedure from a transition to a busy GA airport on a holiday weekend; when I want to be watching out for traffic and not micromanaging headings and altitudes? But things got a little confusing; probably helped by the unnecessarily high cockpit workload that had developed. At some point after being cleared for the visual; I suspected the FMS guidance had become questionable. I don't know if the box became confused by the heading and altitude changes or if it was operator error as we tried to comply with the controller's instructions. We never knew why he vectored us off the transition because he did not tell us what his plan was. We had a plan that we briefed; but clearly it went out the window. All I know is I suspected the FMS might not be providing correct guidance so I elected to hand fly the visual approach; as cleared by ATC. I clicked off the autopilot and maneuvered the aircraft to intercept the inbound course and intercept the glide path initially based on distance to the runway; transitioning to the VASI. A moment after I called for flaps full I saw the throttles advancing out of the corner of my eye. I glanced at the FMS speed displayed on the pfd and saw 215 knots. I instinctively grabbed the throttles and pulled them back and almost simultaneously heard an over speed audible warning. I saw 168 indicated airspeed and immediately corrected. My first officer told me later that he saw 163 and decelerating when I called for full flaps; so he said speed checked and complied by moving the flap handle. The over speed occurred just a moment after the flap handle was positioned; so the flaps were not fully extended (they had just begun moving) at the moment we indicated 168 knots; a condition that I estimate lasted for 1-2 seconds. I have no idea where 215k came from. It was not a speed that we programmed and it is not part of the instrument approach procedure. I clicked off the auto-throttles and FD and just flew the airplane down the VASI to the runway; and landed. I filed a report for the over speed but didn't recall the FMS glitch so I attributed the 3 knot over speed to a wind gust. Now as I am recreating the flight for this report; I realize that my report was not accurate as to the cause of the over speed. I went online to try to amend the report or add a comment; but did not see a way to do so. One last contributing factor in retrospect given how tired I felt the next day when I initially tried to submit this; is fatigue. I thought I felt fine at the time of this flight but we had just completed a circadian swap from late pm to early am over one day. I feel embarrassed about the confusion that occurred in my cockpit and wonder if sticking to a pure am or pure pm schedule would have permitted me to be sharper. On the ground I received a call from scheduling notifying me that I was on fdp watch. This coupled with how tired I felt the next day makes me think mentioning the possibility of subconscious fatigue is appropriate. On the ground I contacted maintenance control in accordance with [company] fom. I described the event to the controller and was instructed that no action was necessary because the over speed indication was a single event lasting less than 10 seconds and less than 10 knots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported issues flying into a busy GA airport.

Narrative: I think it is important that this information gets to the safety committee because I suspect a systemic failure in coordinating [Company] E-175 flights landing at ZZZ from Oakland ARTCC to Approach. The problem begins with the routing of our flights from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. Our flight plan has us proceeding from ZZZ2 to ZZZZZ Intersection to the airport. When ZZZ is using runway XX; this puts us inbound against outbound traffic. XXXXX is on the extended centerline of runway XX and is also the missed approach holding fix. There could be a scenario where; in the confusion of handing a missed approach off from local to the TRACON; separation might be lost with an inbound flight. This was also a good weather day on a holiday weekend. ZZZ is a popular GA airport with a mix of traffic and pilot skill levels. IMHO flying inbound in a jet to such an airport on the upwind leg is not the most conservative way to enter a mix of traffic that includes helicopters and light aircraft. Granted; the controller would have our flight turn to enter the downwind. But what if there is a NORDO event or our flight is unable to immediately communicate with ATC due to frequency congestion; as happens at busy GA airports like this? Our clearance is from ZZZZZ to the airport. ZZZZZ is not an initial fix for the instrument approach procedure to XX. The GPS Rwy XX is the only approach available to [Company] for this runway. The controllers would prefer to put us on downwind in the pattern with slower traffic; and clear us for the visual. But I would prefer to fly the instrument procedure; even on a nice day; to not have to make a visual 180 while descending and watching out for traffic. I feel that flying the instrument approach procedure to the runway is the more conservative plan. An additional consideration is that ZZZ can be reporting 10 and clear on a nice day like this was. It sits in a valley surrounded by coastal hills and mountains. I've been in the clouds receiving traffic advisories from controllers who think I can see and plan around VFR traffic lower and closer to the airport. The Approach Controller might be looking a METAR that says its VMC there; not processing that the regional jet being vectored to the downwind is above the traffic pattern and still in the clouds. I discussed all this with my FO early in the flight. We agreed to on plan to communicate our approach request to OAK ARTCC prior to enroute fix ZZZZZ1. We requested Direct ZZZZZ1 (an IF) for the GPS Rwy XX. OAK took a moment to check it; then cleared us Direct ZZZZZ1 Direct the airport. We set up for and briefed what should have been a seamless GPS approach providing charted MEA protections and an electronic glide path to the runway. We gave early notice of our intentions to not surprise the Approach Controller close in as the hand off to them seems a bit late and frequency congestion can delay our establishing communication with them after being handed off. As soon as we were handed off to Approach; we clarified with the controller that we were requesting the GPS Rwy XX procedure from ZZZZZ1; which is a NoPT IF. This is what we had requested when we were talking to OAK and believed that it would have been coordinated with Approach prior to the hand off. At first; we seemed to all be on the same page but then the Approach Controller vectored us off the transition and began to issue step descents. His vectors took us through and to the south side of the inbound course. He gave us a radar vectored modified course reversal; then a descent to 3;300' followed by a heading to intercept the inbound course. As the aircraft descended through 3;350' and was beginning to capture 3;300' the controller instructed us to amend our altitude to maintain 3;500'. He also amended the intercept heading which failed to take the wind into account. I looked up and clearly saw the runway at 10:30 to 11 o'clock at about 10 miles. We were in the valley well separated from any terrain; in a position to easily complete a stabilized visual approach to the runway. I responded to the controller; informing him that we were already at 3;300' and had the runway in sight. He cleared us for the visual. To this point; this is a report that suggests taking a look at the coordination from Center to Approach. What's wrong with a seamless instrument procedure from a transition to a busy GA airport on a holiday weekend; when I want to be watching out for traffic and not micromanaging headings and altitudes? But things got a little confusing; probably helped by the unnecessarily high cockpit workload that had developed. At some point after being cleared for the visual; I suspected the FMS guidance had become questionable. I don't know if the box became confused by the heading and altitude changes or if it was operator error as we tried to comply with the controller's instructions. We never knew why he vectored us off the transition because he did not tell us what his plan was. We had a plan that we briefed; but clearly it went out the window. All I know is I suspected the FMS might not be providing correct guidance so I elected to hand fly the visual approach; as cleared by ATC. I clicked off the autopilot and maneuvered the aircraft to intercept the inbound course and intercept the glide path initially based on distance to the runway; transitioning to the VASI. A moment after I called for Flaps Full I saw the throttles advancing out of the corner of my eye. I glanced at the FMS speed displayed on the PFD and saw 215 knots. I instinctively grabbed the throttles and pulled them back and almost simultaneously heard an over speed audible warning. I saw 168 indicated airspeed and immediately corrected. My FO told me later that he saw 163 and decelerating when I called for full flaps; so he said speed checked and complied by moving the flap handle. The over speed occurred just a moment after the flap handle was positioned; so the flaps were not fully extended (they had just begun moving) at the moment we indicated 168 knots; a condition that I estimate lasted for 1-2 seconds. I have no idea where 215k came from. It was not a speed that we programmed and it is not part of the instrument approach procedure. I clicked off the auto-throttles and FD and just flew the airplane down the VASI to the runway; and landed. I filed a report for the over speed but didn't recall the FMS glitch so I attributed the 3 knot over speed to a wind gust. Now as I am recreating the flight for this report; I realize that my report was not accurate as to the cause of the over speed. I went online to try to amend the report or add a comment; but did not see a way to do so. One last contributing factor in retrospect given how tired I felt the next day when I initially tried to submit this; is fatigue. I thought I felt fine at the time of this flight but we had just completed a circadian swap from late PM to early AM over one day. I feel embarrassed about the confusion that occurred in my cockpit and wonder if sticking to a pure AM or pure PM schedule would have permitted me to be sharper. On the ground I received a call from Scheduling notifying me that I was on FDP watch. This coupled with how tired I felt the next day makes me think mentioning the possibility of subconscious fatigue is appropriate. On the ground I contacted Maintenance Control in accordance with [Company] FOM. I described the event to the controller and was instructed that no action was necessary because the over speed indication was a single event lasting less than 10 seconds and less than 10 knots.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.