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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1656348 |
Time | |
Date | 201906 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Maintenance |
Narrative:
I arrived at aircraft X and began my preflight as normal. When I turned on fuel pump 1 the knob felt loose. I turned the pump back off and noticed the internal safety was not present. The internal safety is intended to prevent the pumps from accidentally being turned off. I tried pump 2 which felt the same and again noted the internal safety was not present. The APU master switch was in the same condition; the internal safeties were not present. I wrote the three items up and contacted maintenance. The mechanic arrived and asked what was wrong. I explained the above to the mechanic. His reply was it's supposed to be like that. I again explained the reason for the safety as we would not want to accidentally bump the pumps off in flight. The mechanic became aggravated and stated he would go and try a new one but if it was the same; he would be signing the aircraft off as good. After an extended time I noticed we were given a different aircraft. I arrived at the aircraft Y where I found the same conditions. The fuel pump power knobs did not have a working internal safety along with the APU. I noted the discrepancies in the aml (aircraft maintenance log) and contacted maintenance by radio. Maintenance responded with 'what safety are you talking about; we've never had an issue with this before.' the mechanic came out and looked at the panels; he stated there was nothing wrong with this. I explained the importance of the safeties. He responded with no switches have an internal safety or detent like that; I showed him the properly working bus tie switch. The mechanic left and then returned after a few minutes where he began taking pictures of the panels. The mechanic stated 'I'm sending these to the moc (maintenance operations control) manager; expect a call from your chief.' I replied no problem; I'll be happy to explain the safety issues to him. I attempted to contact [manager] without success; I then called another manager who came out to the aircraft. I explained my issues with the fuel pump safety which manager agreed was an issue. We arrived on the flight deck where the mechanic told us both that there was nothing wrong; I showed manager my concerns with the safeties and explained that I have been flying these airplanes for almost 4 years and have never come across an aircraft without the safety. This was when the mechanic replied 'look the airplanes are old and we know that the detents are broken; you don't expect me to go out and replace all these panels do you?' I responded with yes; this is a safety of flight issue! Manager explained to me that they didn't have the authority to decide if it was an issue and recommend; I reach out to a chief pilot. I contacted captain. I explained to captain my safety concerns with the aircraft and my concerns with the lack of maintenance being performed. It was clear that the mechanic knew of the issue and was turning a blind eye to it. I also felt as if I was being threatened by the mechanic by stating I should be expecting a call from my chief. The maintenance manager arrived at the aircraft and stated he would be signing the aircraft off as ok. He stated that the safeties were not working but maintenance and pilots have no reason to be testing if the safeties are working. I tried to explain that I wasn't testing the safeties I had a concern with how loose the knobs were when I found the missing safeties. He said he was still signing it off as good because his book does not say anything about the use of the knobs and the safety. At this point we were 2 hours late and I was tired of arguing; I finally agreed to take the aircraft if maintenance would sign it off as good however; I would be following up with flight and flight safety. In the end I realized I never should have allowed maintenance to pressure me into taking an aircraft that I felt was not safe to fly. Safety is being jeopardized by the complacency of maintenance personnel. Possibly induced stress while pushing for on-time performance. Maintenance technician admitted he was aware it was an issue in almost all of the 145 fleet. He utilized the reason for not fixing it was because it was broken or worn in most all other 145's. My suggestion is if we know it's an issue then why not begin fixing it before it becomes so overwhelming.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-145 Captain reported the detent function of the fuel pump 'ON/OFF' switches was broken. Reportedly; this is common occurrence for this fleet.
Narrative: I arrived at Aircraft X and began my preflight as normal. When I turned on fuel pump 1 the knob felt loose. I turned the pump back off and noticed the internal safety was not present. The internal safety is intended to prevent the pumps from accidentally being turned off. I tried pump 2 which felt the same and again noted the internal safety was not present. The APU master switch was in the same condition; the internal safeties were not present. I wrote the three items up and contacted Maintenance. The mechanic arrived and asked what was wrong. I explained the above to the mechanic. His reply was it's supposed to be like that. I again explained the reason for the safety as we would not want to accidentally bump the pumps off in flight. The mechanic became aggravated and stated he would go and try a new one but if it was the same; he would be signing the aircraft off as good. After an extended time I noticed we were given a different aircraft. I arrived at the Aircraft Y where I found the same conditions. The fuel pump power knobs did not have a working internal safety along with the APU. I noted the discrepancies in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) and contacted maintenance by radio. Maintenance responded with 'what safety are you talking about; we've never had an issue with this before.' The mechanic came out and looked at the panels; he stated there was nothing wrong with this. I explained the importance of the safeties. He responded with no switches have an internal safety or detent like that; I showed him the properly working bus tie switch. The mechanic left and then returned after a few minutes where he began taking pictures of the panels. The mechanic stated 'I'm sending these to the MOC (Maintenance Operations Control) manager; expect a call from your chief.' I replied no problem; I'll be happy to explain the safety issues to him. I attempted to contact [manager] without success; I then called another manager who came out to the aircraft. I explained my issues with the fuel pump safety which manager agreed was an issue. We arrived on the flight deck where the mechanic told us both that there was nothing wrong; I showed manager my concerns with the safeties and explained that I have been flying these airplanes for almost 4 years and have never come across an aircraft without the safety. This was when the mechanic replied 'look the airplanes are old and we know that the detents are broken; you don't expect me to go out and replace all these panels do you?' I responded with yes; this is a safety of flight issue! Manager explained to me that they didn't have the authority to decide if it was an issue and recommend; I reach out to a chief pilot. I contacted Captain. I explained to Captain my safety concerns with the aircraft and my concerns with the lack of maintenance being performed. It was clear that the mechanic knew of the issue and was turning a blind eye to it. I also felt as if I was being threatened by the mechanic by stating I should be expecting a call from my Chief. The Maintenance Manager arrived at the aircraft and stated he would be signing the aircraft off as ok. He stated that the safeties were not working but Maintenance and pilots have no reason to be testing if the safeties are working. I tried to explain that I wasn't testing the safeties I had a concern with how loose the knobs were when I found the missing safeties. He said he was still signing it off as good because his book does not say anything about the use of the knobs and the safety. At this point we were 2 hours late and I was tired of arguing; I finally agreed to take the aircraft if Maintenance would sign it off as good however; I would be following up with flight and flight safety. In the end I realized I never should have allowed maintenance to pressure me into taking an aircraft that I felt was not safe to fly. Safety is being jeopardized by the complacency of maintenance personnel. Possibly induced stress while pushing for on-time performance. Maintenance technician admitted he was aware it was an issue in almost all of the 145 fleet. He utilized the reason for not fixing it was because it was broken or worn in most all other 145's. My suggestion is if we know it's an issue then why not begin fixing it before it becomes so overwhelming.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.