Narrative:

Upon arrival in the dfw area, we were cleared for a CAT I ILS approach to runway 26L. The captain flew this approach according to approved company procedure planning to autoland, due to the low visibility/ceiling. As we flew the ILS downwind and base legs, all INS indications were normal. However, on final approach, just prior to the OM, we were unable to select an autoplt approach with autoland redundancy. A crew assessment of the problem took place. Disengagement of the autoplt(south) and flight directors and reengagement of same resulted in a triple (fully operational) autoplt/autoland condition. The aircraft landed normally and we taxied clear of the active runway. Upon stopping short of the parallel runway (36R), the VHF communication radio was strangely silent. Upon reselection/rechannelization of tower frequency, we contacted tower. As it turned out, we were not in communication with the tower after landing and the aircraft behind us had to execute a go around as tower could not ascertain our location clear of the landing runway (36L) due to the restr visibility. Human performance considerations: although crew actions were procedurally oriented, a distraction (autoplt problem) at a critical portion of the precision approach. Added workload at a critical, mentally intensive and procedurally busy time set up a chain reaction in which proper communications were not assured. It is apparent that neither tower, approach control nor this crew acted in a timely manner to correct this discrepancy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF LGT ON CAT I APCH AND LNDG AT DFW TAXIED OFF RWY AND REALIZED THEY WERE NOT IN COM WITH TWR. COM WAS REESTABLISHED AND RECYCLING COM SELECTOR. FOLLOWING FLT HAD TO GO AROUND. MISSED APCH.

Narrative: UPON ARR IN THE DFW AREA, WE WERE CLRED FOR A CAT I ILS APCH TO RWY 26L. THE CAPT FLEW THIS APCH ACCORDING TO APPROVED COMPANY PROC PLANNING TO AUTOLAND, DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY/CEILING. AS WE FLEW THE ILS DOWNWIND AND BASE LEGS, ALL INS INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. HOWEVER, ON FINAL APCH, JUST PRIOR TO THE OM, WE WERE UNABLE TO SELECT AN AUTOPLT APCH WITH AUTOLAND REDUNDANCY. A CREW ASSESSMENT OF THE PROB TOOK PLACE. DISENGAGEMENT OF THE AUTOPLT(S) AND FLT DIRECTORS AND REENGAGEMENT OF SAME RESULTED IN A TRIPLE (FULLY OPERATIONAL) AUTOPLT/AUTOLAND CONDITION. THE ACFT LANDED NORMALLY AND WE TAXIED CLR OF THE ACTIVE RWY. UPON STOPPING SHORT OF THE PARALLEL RWY (36R), THE VHF COM RADIO WAS STRANGELY SILENT. UPON RESELECTION/RECHANNELIZATION OF TWR FREQ, WE CONTACTED TWR. AS IT TURNED OUT, WE WERE NOT IN COM WITH THE TWR AFTER LNDG AND THE ACFT BEHIND US HAD TO EXECUTE A GAR AS TWR COULD NOT ASCERTAIN OUR LOCATION CLR OF THE LNDG RWY (36L) DUE TO THE RESTR VISIBILITY. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: ALTHOUGH CREW ACTIONS WERE PROCEDURALLY ORIENTED, A DISTR (AUTOPLT PROB) AT A CRITICAL PORTION OF THE PRECISION APCH. ADDED WORKLOAD AT A CRITICAL, MENTALLY INTENSIVE AND PROCEDURALLY BUSY TIME SET UP A CHAIN REACTION IN WHICH PROPER COMS WERE NOT ASSURED. IT IS APPARENT THAT NEITHER TWR, APCH CTL NOR THIS CREW ACTED IN A TIMELY MANNER TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.