Narrative:

Wheel well fire indication climbing through FL260. Climbing out from a fuel stop in ZZZZ on a hot day we experienced a wheel well fire indication approximately 20 minutes into the flight. Because we were on an airspeed restricted climb for traffic we were able to comply with the QRH checklist requiring gear extension immediately without having to slow down. Within a very few seconds of extending the gear the fire indication went out. Total time of illumination of the fire indication was less than 20 seconds. We left the gear down for 20 minutes per the procedure. It was obvious to me that flying with the gear extended was going to impact performance so I elected to retract the landing gear after 20 minutes. There was no subsequent reillumination of the fire warning light. Because it was illuminated for such a short time I surmised that there was no possibility of the fire loop having been burned through; and that the warning system was still operational. I decided there was no longer a risk of immediate danger because of the fire indication.during the 20 minutes that the landing gear were extended the first officer and I had ample opportunity to both read and re-read the procedure. I also took advantage of the time to contact [operations] and keep her in the loop and ask for destination and fuel consideration options.now that the immediate emergency was handled I turned it to the considerations of 'plan to land at the nearest suitable airport'.I called [operations] and asked for new fuel calculations to destination. I was able to do the math regarding our current weight and flight to any of the nearby airports myself. All the airports [nearby] were close enough that landing at them would require an overweight landing. I did not think that it was wise to do an overweight landing on landing gear that may or may not have had fuse plugs melted. 'Nearest' airport became a very fine judgment because there was no point flying in circles to choose a high altitude or closed airport just because it was nearest. I elected to fly north to burn the fuel so that we could be below max landing weight. Along our route of flight I kept track of every possible diversion airport just in case of a re-illumination of the warning. We did not actually burn down to mlw (maximum landing weight) until entering [the united states]. At this point 'nearest suitable' arguably became our destination. Also; at this point we had not fallen out of the sky with a burning wing so I figured we probably still wouldn't. I elected to fly to ZZZ rather than [another closer airport] (so; at this point not technically nearest suitable... But most reasonable) we landed uneventfully at ZZZ having requested crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) standing by. I had decided at that point we were; in my estimation; not an emergency aircraft. That is why we flew for several hours after a fire indication. Crash fire rescue equipment inspected our main landing gear after we exited the runway and; based on their observations; I made the determination there was no reason not to taxi under our own power to parking. Post flight inspection found no obvious cause for the fire indication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported wheel well fire indication during climb.

Narrative: Wheel well fire indication climbing through FL260. Climbing out from a fuel stop in ZZZZ on a hot day we experienced a Wheel Well Fire indication approximately 20 minutes into the flight. Because we were on an airspeed restricted climb for traffic we were able to comply with the QRH checklist requiring gear extension immediately without having to slow down. Within a very few seconds of extending the gear the fire indication went out. Total time of illumination of the fire indication was less than 20 seconds. We left the gear down for 20 minutes per the procedure. It was obvious to me that flying with the gear extended was going to impact performance so I elected to retract the landing gear after 20 minutes. There was no subsequent reillumination of the fire warning light. Because it was illuminated for such a short time I surmised that there was no possibility of the fire loop having been burned through; and that the warning system was still operational. I decided there was no longer a risk of immediate danger because of the fire indication.During the 20 minutes that the landing gear were extended the First Officer and I had ample opportunity to both read and re-read the procedure. I also took advantage of the time to contact [Operations] and keep her in the loop and ask for destination and fuel consideration options.Now that the immediate emergency was handled I turned it to the considerations of 'plan to land at the nearest suitable airport'.I called [Operations] and asked for new fuel calculations to destination. I was able to do the math regarding our current weight and flight to any of the nearby airports myself. All the airports [nearby] were close enough that landing at them would require an overweight landing. I did not think that it was wise to do an overweight landing on landing gear that may or may not have had fuse plugs melted. 'Nearest' airport became a very fine judgment because there was no point flying in circles to choose a high altitude or closed airport just because it was nearest. I elected to fly north to burn the fuel so that we could be below Max Landing Weight. Along our route of flight I kept track of every possible diversion airport just in case of a re-illumination of the warning. We did not actually burn down to MLW (Maximum Landing Weight) until entering [the United States]. At this point 'nearest suitable' arguably became our destination. Also; at this point we had not fallen out of the sky with a burning wing so I figured we probably still wouldn't. I elected to fly to ZZZ rather than [another closer airport] (So; at this point not technically nearest suitable... But most reasonable) We landed uneventfully at ZZZ having requested CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) standing by. I had decided at that point we were; in my estimation; not an emergency aircraft. That is why we flew for several hours after a fire indication. CFR inspected our main landing gear after we exited the runway and; based on their observations; I made the determination there was no reason not to taxi under our own power to parking. Post flight inspection found no obvious cause for the fire indication.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.