Narrative:

Started takeoff roll prior to completing the checklist. We were cleared for immediate takeoff. Tower had traffic on approach from the opp direction. The progression of the cockpit work seemed to be normal, so I anticipated that the checklist would be completed on time. The list was completed at about 60 KTS, and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. Other than poor judgement on my part, what contributed to this occurrence? What activated my poor judgement? Not taking adequate time is something I normally emphasize avoiding. An XO25 departure from an outlying airport, requiring an XA45 wake-up. Because I had flown with the second officer before, I assumed he was experienced, when in fact he is fairly new. Additionally, he had been up 1 hour before I was. The ACARS didn't give a manifest check, thus giving an additional work item to the second officer. First officer, in addition to an early get-up, had a major personal problem dumped on him the previous day. According to studies, we were about 60% effective from fatigue. In a normal, rested frame of mind (nrfm), I would have been aware of the second officer's workload and would never have allowed this hurry-up situation to develop. In a briefing, I emphasize that we are never in a hurry, 'hurry' yields errors. In a 'nrfm,' the first officer would have ben more assertive about waiting until the second officer was ready and the list completed. In an 'nrfm,' the second officer would have had the manifest check by voice, and his procedures completed. He would have also been more assertive about needing time. We had a debrief on this. What was learned? I will add to my briefing when necessary, a statement of my own mental state of mind, how alert I feel. I will make an inquiry into how the crew feels. We'll determine if we're 100% or less.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF PRIOR TO COMPLETING TKOF CHECKLIST.

Narrative: STARTED TKOF ROLL PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE CHKLIST. WE WERE CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. TWR HAD TFC ON APCH FROM THE OPP DIRECTION. THE PROGRESSION OF THE COCKPIT WORK SEEMED TO BE NORMAL, SO I ANTICIPATED THAT THE CHKLIST WOULD BE COMPLETED ON TIME. THE LIST WAS COMPLETED AT ABOUT 60 KTS, AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. OTHER THAN POOR JUDGEMENT ON MY PART, WHAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE? WHAT ACTIVATED MY POOR JUDGEMENT? NOT TAKING ADEQUATE TIME IS SOMETHING I NORMALLY EMPHASIZE AVOIDING. AN XO25 DEP FROM AN OUTLYING ARPT, REQUIRING AN XA45 WAKE-UP. BECAUSE I HAD FLOWN WITH THE S/O BEFORE, I ASSUMED HE WAS EXPERIENCED, WHEN IN FACT HE IS FAIRLY NEW. ADDITIONALLY, HE HAD BEEN UP 1 HR BEFORE I WAS. THE ACARS DIDN'T GIVE A MANIFEST CHK, THUS GIVING AN ADDITIONAL WORK ITEM TO THE S/O. F/O, IN ADDITION TO AN EARLY GET-UP, HAD A MAJOR PERSONAL PROB DUMPED ON HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING TO STUDIES, WE WERE ABOUT 60% EFFECTIVE FROM FATIGUE. IN A NORMAL, RESTED FRAME OF MIND (NRFM), I WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE S/O'S WORKLOAD AND WOULD NEVER HAVE ALLOWED THIS HURRY-UP SITUATION TO DEVELOP. IN A BRIEFING, I EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NEVER IN A HURRY, 'HURRY' YIELDS ERRORS. IN A 'NRFM,' THE F/O WOULD HAVE BEN MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT WAITING UNTIL THE S/O WAS READY AND THE LIST COMPLETED. IN AN 'NRFM,' THE S/O WOULD HAVE HAD THE MANIFEST CHK BY VOICE, AND HIS PROCS COMPLETED. HE WOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT NEEDING TIME. WE HAD A DEBRIEF ON THIS. WHAT WAS LEARNED? I WILL ADD TO MY BRIEFING WHEN NECESSARY, A STATEMENT OF MY OWN MENTAL STATE OF MIND, HOW ALERT I FEEL. I WILL MAKE AN INQUIRY INTO HOW THE CREW FEELS. WE'LL DETERMINE IF WE'RE 100% OR LESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.