Narrative:

I was the first officer and pilot monitoring. We arrived late due to a number of factors and the station attempted to get us out as quick as they could. We had a cargo door indication deferral and the MEL requires that the ground crew verify that the cargo door is closed. During my preflight walk around I briefed the ramp lead on this need. He seemed to be in a big rush so as I was starting to tell him he told me that he was aware. When we established communications with the push crew he was driving the tug. The headset was not working correctly so while he could hear us; we could not hear him. The captain again informed him of the MEL and asked if the door was secure and the ramp agent indicated that it was secure. We pushed back and departed some time later. On initial climb I was initially distracted because we left the landing gear down for a bit longer than normal due to warm brake temperatures. As a result my normal flow was disrupted and I took a bit longer to complete the after takeoff checklist. I completed it around 3;000 feet; which is when I perceived that my ears were popping. I looked down and checked the pressurization and saw that the rate was around 2;000 FPM climb with a cabin altitude around 3;000 feet and a delta P of 0.3. I told the captain that we were not pressurizing. He leveled the aircraft and I informed ATC. We did not have any caution messages yet as our cabin altitude was around 3;500 feet; but I decided to run the cabin altitude caution checklist as we agreed that it was the most appropriate. I verified that our 10th stage bleed system was pressurized and the packs were operating normally and then attempted manual pressurization which had no effect. We also started the APU and transferred the bleeds back to it to see if there was any change and there was not. I then attempted to contact dispatch via arinc and [local station] radio but could not use either due to our altitude. I messaged them via ACARS and confirmed that they wanted us to return to [departure airport]. Upon landing we asked the ground crew not to open the cargo door until we had verified it and I immediately inspected it. While the handle was latched and flush there was a visible gap at the top of the door large enough for me to see inside of the compartment.rushed turn led to incomplete briefings; ramp crew did not verify cargo door; open door led to inability to pressurize.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported a pressurization problem caused by an improperly closed cargo door necessitating a return to the departure airport.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and Pilot Monitoring. We arrived late due to a number of factors and the station attempted to get us out as quick as they could. We had a cargo door indication deferral and the MEL requires that the ground crew verify that the cargo door is closed. During my preflight walk around I briefed the Ramp Lead on this need. He seemed to be in a big rush so as I was starting to tell him he told me that he was aware. When we established communications with the push crew he was driving the tug. The headset was not working correctly so while he could hear us; we could not hear him. The Captain again informed him of the MEL and asked if the door was secure and the Ramp Agent indicated that it was secure. We pushed back and departed some time later. On initial climb I was initially distracted because we left the landing gear down for a bit longer than normal due to warm brake temperatures. As a result my normal flow was disrupted and I took a bit longer to complete the after takeoff checklist. I completed it around 3;000 feet; which is when I perceived that my ears were popping. I looked down and checked the pressurization and saw that the rate was around 2;000 FPM climb with a cabin altitude around 3;000 feet and a delta P of 0.3. I told the Captain that we were not pressurizing. He leveled the aircraft and I informed ATC. We did not have any caution messages yet as our cabin altitude was around 3;500 feet; but I decided to run the CABIN ALT caution checklist as we agreed that it was the most appropriate. I verified that our 10th stage bleed system was pressurized and the packs were operating normally and then attempted manual pressurization which had no effect. We also started the APU and transferred the bleeds back to it to see if there was any change and there was not. I then attempted to contact Dispatch via ARINC and [local station] radio but could not use either due to our altitude. I messaged them via ACARS and confirmed that they wanted us to return to [departure airport]. Upon landing we asked the ground crew not to open the cargo door until we had verified it and I immediately inspected it. While the handle was latched and flush there was a visible gap at the top of the door large enough for me to see inside of the compartment.Rushed turn led to incomplete briefings; ramp crew did not verify cargo door; open door led to inability to pressurize.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.