Narrative:

The first officer and I arrived at the aircraft about 30 minutes prior to proposed blockout time as a two pilot crew. The freight appeared to be loaded as I climbed the stairs so I continued to push for an on time departure. I entered the cockpit and started the preliminary flight deck procedure and was immediately asked to sign all of the paperwork including weight and balance. I took it as a sign that they were pushing for an on time departure as well and I signed the paperwork. I completed the flight deck procedure and sat in the seat and completed the CDU (control display unit) set up to match the flight plan. I then completed the initialization; performance and sent for a clearance. The first officer entered the cockpit at that point after doing the walk around; checking the main deck and also the upper deck. I verified the clearance and asked him to check the paperwork and completed the overhead preflight. At this point the fuel receipts showed up and were verified and entered. After the first officer completed his independent verification I briefed and called for the preflight checklist. We finished the preflight checklist and I opened the doors synoptic and seen that there were cargo doors still open. I called downstairs on the intercom to see if anybody was on the headset; this was right on time for blockout. I tracked down the gsc (ground security co-coordinator) to find out what the issues were and he explained to me that the aircraft had only arrived an hour prior and he was doing the best he could but we would be delay for at least 30 minutes. I informed the first officer and then we reviewed the notoc (notification to captain) which was fairly lengthy and intricate. When loading was finally completed we sent for new ATIS; checked the main deck; and pushed back after appropriate flows and checklist. We taxied out and took off.on the departure following the zzzzz departure procedure we made the turn south at point ZZZZZ1 and ATC inquired of our heading. The first officer reported the heading and ATC repeated their inquiry. The first officer and pilot monitoring shot me a look and I told him that I would handle the radio call; I reported that we were proceeding to point ZZZZZ1 on the zzzzz; at which point he gave us a heading of 060. We were inquisitive and started digging for the clearance to verify we were doing what we were supposed to be doing. There was the mistake; glaring at us was ZZZZZ2; plain as day! Speaking for myself I looked right at the clearance but had it in my mind and saw zzzzz instead of ZZZZZ1. The (first officer) reported doing very the same thing. I should have caught it; I really have no excuses; I can find contributions to the actions that I took but ultimately it was my mistake. I entered the departure; double and triple checked it; but yet failed to find the discrepancy. The event itself and the rest of the flight was uneventful; but it could have led to catastrophe. I wanted to file an as soon as possible to show how this can happen and the events that led up to it. I allowed myself as the captain to rush not only my own actions but the actions of my first officer as well to overlook a crucial CDU input in a distraction filled environment with only two pilots to mitigate the potential hazards. I also found extra time that I could have went back through the information at a slower pace; yet failed to do so; instead focusing on a large notac containing multiple hazmat threats. I have learned that I should not rush myself under most circumstances and that I should pay special attention to pre departure clearance (pre-departure clearance) clearances; for whatever reason my eyes and mind tricked me into seeing what I wanted to see instead of what was actually there. I have also learned to prioritize crucial flight planning by slowing down and making sure that is done correctly before moving on to other important tasks. I am a good pilot and I don't make too many mistakes; but I made this one and I will learn from itand move forward. I hope that others can learn from it as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Aircraft Flight Crew flew incorrect departure clearance after takeoff and ended uneventfully.

Narrative: The First Officer and I arrived at the aircraft about 30 minutes prior to proposed blockout time as a two pilot crew. The freight appeared to be loaded as I climbed the stairs so I continued to push for an on time departure. I entered the cockpit and started the preliminary flight deck procedure and was immediately asked to sign all of the paperwork including weight and balance. I took it as a sign that they were pushing for an on time departure as well and I signed the paperwork. I completed the flight deck procedure and sat in the seat and completed the CDU (Control Display Unit) set up to match the flight plan. I then completed the initialization; performance and sent for a clearance. The First Officer entered the cockpit at that point after doing the walk around; checking the main deck and also the upper deck. I verified the clearance and asked him to check the paperwork and completed the overhead preflight. At this point the fuel receipts showed up and were verified and entered. After the First Officer completed his independent verification I briefed and called for the preflight checklist. We finished the preflight checklist and I opened the doors synoptic and seen that there were cargo doors still open. I called downstairs on the intercom to see if anybody was on the headset; this was right on time for blockout. I tracked down the GSC (Ground Security Co-coordinator) to find out what the issues were and he explained to me that the aircraft had only arrived an hour prior and he was doing the best he could but we would be delay for at least 30 minutes. I informed the First Officer and then we reviewed the NOTOC (Notification to Captain) which was fairly lengthy and intricate. When loading was finally completed we sent for new ATIS; checked the main deck; and pushed back after appropriate flows and checklist. We taxied out and took off.On the departure following the ZZZZZ departure procedure we made the turn south at point ZZZZZ1 and ATC inquired of our heading. The First Officer reported the heading and ATC repeated their inquiry. The First Officer and Pilot Monitoring shot me a look and I told him that I would handle the radio call; I reported that we were proceeding to point ZZZZZ1 on the ZZZZZ; at which point he gave us a heading of 060. We were inquisitive and started digging for the clearance to verify we were doing what we were supposed to be doing. There was the mistake; glaring at us was ZZZZZ2; plain as day! Speaking for myself I looked right at the clearance but had it in my mind and saw ZZZZZ instead of ZZZZZ1. The (First Officer) reported doing very the same thing. I should have caught it; I really have no excuses; I can find contributions to the actions that I took but ultimately it was my mistake. I entered the departure; double and triple checked it; but yet failed to find the discrepancy. The event itself and the rest of the flight was uneventful; but it could have led to catastrophe. I wanted to file an ASAP to show how this can happen and the events that led up to it. I allowed myself as the Captain to rush not only my own actions but the actions of my First Officer as well to overlook a crucial CDU input in a distraction filled environment with only two pilots to mitigate the potential hazards. I also found extra time that I could have went back through the information at a slower pace; yet failed to do so; instead focusing on a large NOTAC containing multiple hazmat threats. I have learned that I should not rush myself under most circumstances and that I should pay special attention to PDC (Pre-Departure Clearance) clearances; for whatever reason my eyes and mind tricked me into seeing what I wanted to see instead of what was actually there. I have also learned to prioritize crucial flight planning by slowing down and making sure that is done correctly before moving on to other important tasks. I am a good pilot and I don't make too many mistakes; but I made this one and I will learn from itand move forward. I hope that others can learn from it as well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.