Narrative:

I was working DR2 (departure radar); SR2 (satellite radar) and DR3 combined. Traffic was just beginning to slow down after being moderate to very busy. During that time I'd heard my supervisor; call someone on the recorded phone line and say something to the effect of; 'this is ridiculous; I've got one dr controller (me) working 15 airplanes while DR1 and SR1 are working two aircraft combined!' it appeared he was not allowed to combine SR1 to DR1 in order to get someone to help me. That morning I was told it was mandated by our air traffic manager; to have the SR1 position open regardless of traffic demand. Because of this; our shift was short on controllers and everyone was running close or over two hours per session. In this configuration; I was solely responsible for half of the departure airspace including climbing and turning around the 26 final; while four controllers were working the other half. I was given aircraft Y direct eeons at 12;000 ft. By the DR4 controller; I coordinated fl 230 with ZDV and climbed in my airspace. At the time I was also working an IFR ftg arrival who was unfamiliar to the airport and asked for vectors to final. Ftg is in very close proximity to den so I needed to be sure he didn't cross over his final. As a facility; new point out and scratch pad procedures have recently been implemented. As per the new procedure I made an automated point out for my ftg aircraft with the final controller at FR2 (final radar) without verbal coordination. I heard FR2 clear an aircraft for the rnz approach to 35R at den which does not protect for an IFR to 35 at ftg. I was about to call to confirm when I saw aircraft X headed toward aircraft Y and issued a traffic alert. I heard the DR4 controller yell that he didn't know where aircraft X was going and that he'd stopped him at 13;500 ft. And he was sorry. I found out later that aircraft X had been issued a heading from den without coordination. DR4 had climbed aircraft X and not noticed he was on a heading instead of the SID. In this case DR4 and I have shared airspace to 20 miles for departures; after that we have to coordinate which was not accomplished.supervisors should be allowed to move positions accordingly for traffic demand; particularly when they call to say it's warranted. From my perspective; the new automated point out/coordination procedures has increased workload overall. Having to enter extra information in the scratch pad takes time and still leaves things open for interpretation. In my example; I discovered the fr controller issued an interim altitude to protect my aircraft to ftg but it wasn't in the scratch pad. Normally I wouldn't have questioned the point out but now I do. The procedure does help in a couple commonly used deviations from the SOP; but many controllers are entering data even when they are complying with the SOP and then that redundant information needs to be removed later for accuracy. I now have to clear multiple fields should I elect to change anything about the aircraft. This all takes a lot of time and a lot of attention in a fast paced terminal environment and I've received a lot of aircraft with erroneous information in the data block because the controller didn't have time to fix it. I'd like to see this procedure used only in the handful of commonly used applications. At the very least to remind the workforce that this is not to be used on aircraft that are complying with the SOP.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Denver TRACON Controllers reported miscommunication between controllers and flight crew resulting in a potential conflict between two aircraft.

Narrative: I was working DR2 (Departure Radar); SR2 (Satellite Radar) and DR3 combined. Traffic was just beginning to slow down after being moderate to very busy. During that time I'd heard my Supervisor; call someone on the recorded phone line and say something to the effect of; 'This is ridiculous; I've got one DR Controller (me) working 15 airplanes while DR1 and SR1 are working two aircraft combined!' It appeared he was not allowed to combine SR1 to DR1 in order to get someone to help me. That morning I was told it was mandated by our Air Traffic Manager; to have the SR1 position open regardless of traffic demand. Because of this; our shift was short on controllers and everyone was running close or over two hours per session. In this configuration; I was solely responsible for half of the departure airspace including climbing and turning around the 26 final; while four controllers were working the other half. I was given Aircraft Y direct EEONS at 12;000 ft. by the DR4 controller; I coordinated FL 230 with ZDV and climbed in my airspace. At the time I was also working an IFR FTG arrival who was unfamiliar to the airport and asked for vectors to final. FTG is in very close proximity to DEN so I needed to be sure he didn't cross over his final. As a facility; new point out and scratch pad procedures have recently been implemented. As per the new procedure I made an automated point out for my FTG aircraft with the final controller at FR2 (Final Radar) without verbal coordination. I heard FR2 clear an aircraft for the RNZ approach to 35R at DEN which does not protect for an IFR to 35 at FTG. I was about to call to confirm when I saw Aircraft X headed toward Aircraft Y and issued a traffic alert. I heard the DR4 controller yell that he didn't know where Aircraft X was going and that he'd stopped him at 13;500 ft. and he was sorry. I found out later that Aircraft X had been issued a heading from DEN without coordination. DR4 had climbed Aircraft X and not noticed he was on a heading instead of the SID. In this case DR4 and I have shared airspace to 20 miles for departures; after that we have to coordinate which was not accomplished.Supervisors should be allowed to move positions accordingly for traffic demand; particularly when they call to say it's warranted. From my perspective; the new automated point out/coordination procedures has increased workload overall. Having to enter extra information in the scratch pad takes time and still leaves things open for interpretation. In my example; I discovered the FR controller issued an interim altitude to protect my aircraft to FTG but it wasn't in the scratch pad. Normally I wouldn't have questioned the point out but now I do. The procedure does help in a couple commonly used deviations from the SOP; but many controllers are entering data even when they are complying with the SOP and then that redundant information needs to be removed later for accuracy. I now have to clear multiple fields should I elect to change anything about the aircraft. This all takes a lot of time and a lot of attention in a fast paced terminal environment and I've received a lot of aircraft with erroneous information in the data block because the controller didn't have time to fix it. I'd like to see this procedure used only in the handful of commonly used applications. At the very least to remind the workforce that this is not to be used on aircraft that are complying with the SOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.