Narrative:

After experiencing an inflight flight control malfunction on takeoff and throughout the flight; I [notified ATC] and returned to the departure airport for landing. Due to controllability issues; I elected to land as soon as possible and performed an overweight; but otherwise normal; landing. We spent 17 minutes in the air but 1:40 out of the blocks dealing with the flight control issue and hot brakes from the overweight landing. After blocking in and coordinating with the local operations; maintenance; flight attendants; passengers; etc; I spoke with the [chief pilot] and briefed him on the event. He performed the fatigue test on me and my 2 first officers. We all scored low enough to continue with duty if we chose to do so. I had a meeting with my first officers and we; as a crew; concluded that we felt comfortable continuing to a finite point in the future; as we knew we were running on adrenaline and would be flying for another 7-8 hours under the best conditions. We were aware of our limitations and had the best interest of ourselves; our customers and our airline in mind when making this decision. I relayed to my [area] flight manager and [chief piot] that we felt comfortable continuing until xa:00 off the blocks. This was approximately 1:45 in the future when I made the call. We coordinated with dispatch for a new flight plan; proceeded to the new aircraft; and prepared the flight deck for departure. We were completely ready for pushback by XA45. I advised the gate agents; zone; flight attendants and passengers that we would time out at XB00; so to expedite the loading. They were unable to meet this time limit and at XB15; were still loading passengers and bags. At approximately XB20 we were replaced by another crew and we exited the aircraft. I asked the [chief pilot] for a hotel for my crew as my first officers had commuted in that day and we assumed we would be on reserve for the next 2 days. We also had a thorough 1 hour debrief of the day's activities at the hotel. When we checked our schedule; it showed ftg [fatigue]; our pay was removed for the trip and our sick list debited. This was all completely unexpected by us; as we were given the option to continue or be removed from the trip immediately after the emergency was declared. I believe this was absolutely an operational fatigue issue and was throughout the evening led to believe this was the case. My first officers and I were committed to completing the mission as long as we were fit for duty. We determined this would not be the case if the departure was delayed beyond a certain point - 2200hrs. We were also prepared for a reassignment over our next 2 av days; but were instead placed on ftg with no pay and sick time deduction. This seems to be counter intuitive and would lead us in the future to possibly fly in a less than 'fit for duty' state - exactly the opposite of what this is designed to prevent. It is my hope and expectation that this will be resolved as an operational fatigue event due to the aircraft emergency situation that we successfully executed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reported after an in-flight emergency; air return; continuing ground delays and reaching an agreement with management regarding the crew timing out/fatigue; the crew was later placed on Fatigue status and compensated from their sick leave bank.

Narrative: After experiencing an inflight flight control malfunction on takeoff and throughout the flight; I [notified ATC] and returned to the departure airport for landing. Due to controllability issues; I elected to land as soon as possible and performed an overweight; but otherwise normal; landing. We spent 17 minutes in the air but 1:40 out of the blocks dealing with the flight control issue and hot brakes from the overweight landing. After blocking in and coordinating with the local Operations; Maintenance; flight attendants; passengers; etc; I spoke with the [Chief Pilot] and briefed him on the event. He performed the fatigue test on me and my 2 First Officers. We all scored low enough to continue with duty if we chose to do so. I had a meeting with my First Officers and we; as a crew; concluded that we felt comfortable continuing to a finite point in the future; as we knew we were running on adrenaline and would be flying for another 7-8 hours under the best conditions. We were aware of our limitations and had the best interest of ourselves; our customers and our airline in mind when making this decision. I relayed to my [area] Flight Manager and [Chief Piot] that we felt comfortable continuing until XA:00 off the blocks. This was approximately 1:45 in the future when I made the call. We coordinated with Dispatch for a new flight plan; proceeded to the new aircraft; and prepared the flight deck for departure. We were completely ready for pushback by XA45. I advised the gate agents; zone; flight attendants and passengers that we would time out at XB00; so to expedite the loading. They were unable to meet this time limit and at XB15; were still loading passengers and bags. At approximately XB20 we were replaced by another crew and we exited the aircraft. I asked the [Chief Pilot] for a hotel for my crew as my First Officers had commuted in that day and we assumed we would be on reserve for the next 2 days. We also had a thorough 1 hour debrief of the day's activities at the hotel. When we checked our schedule; it showed FTG [fatigue]; our pay was removed for the trip and our sick list debited. This was all completely unexpected by us; as we were given the option to continue or be removed from the trip immediately after the emergency was declared. I believe this was absolutely an operational fatigue issue and was throughout the evening led to believe this was the case. My First Officers and I were committed to completing the mission as long as we were fit for duty. We determined this would not be the case if the departure was delayed beyond a certain point - 2200hrs. We were also prepared for a reassignment over our next 2 AV days; but were instead placed on FTG with no pay and sick time deduction. This seems to be counter intuitive and would lead us in the future to possibly fly in a less than 'fit for duty' state - exactly the opposite of what this is designed to prevent. It is my hope and expectation that this will be resolved as an Operational Fatigue event due to the aircraft emergency situation that we successfully executed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.