Narrative:

The aircraft was cleared to taxi by ground control to runway 30L at sjc; the captain occupying the left seat and the first officer the right seat.the citation sovereign is equipped with only one wheel for hydraulic steering on the left side of the cockpit; therefore the captain is always taxing the airplane; then if the first officer is the pilot flying; he will take the flight controls once the airplane is aligned with the departure runway and at this point the captain will perform the pilot monitoring duties.upon arrival at the holding point at [runway] 30L the crew was instructed to cross [runway] 30L and hold short [runway] 30R; then after a couple of minutes a clearance to line up and wait [runway] 30R at A1 was given by the control tower. A1 is almost full length of the 11;000 ft. Runway; of which 10;134 ft. Could be used for takeoff distance. A1 is about 250 ft. Less than full length; therefore the takeoff distance available was 9;884 ft. And the distance required for takeoff with the given weather condition and airplane weight was 3;100 ft.once the airplane was aligned with runway 30R the captain became pilot monitoring and the first officer became the pilot flying.once the takeoff clearance was received the first officer applied the takeoff power and the captain monitored the engine instruments and the airspeed indicator to give the standard call out to the first officer.upon reaching V1; the master warning triggered a no take off situation and the takeoff was aborted by the captain; who immediately called abort and took the controls.while the airplane was slowing down the captain noticed that the master warning was triggered by a non-appropriate pitch trim setting. The trim was out of the normal take off range; almost full pitch down but during the taxi to the active runway it was properly set for takeoff; at about - 2.80 and the correct setting was double checked by both crew members when the before taxi and before takeoff check list were performed.at this point the first officer admitted that he applied forward trim during the takeoff roll; against manufacturer procedures that are calling for a given trim value preset before takeoff; since any other value could jeopardize the safety of the flight.apparently the first officer didn't realize that his trim application went so far that the trim setting was out of acceptable range for takeoff. Aerodynamic forces could prevent a lift off if the trim is full down or; in the opposite scenario; it could suddenly pitch up and stall upon lift off if the trim is full up.once runway 30R was vacated at intersection J (3;000 ft. Remaining to the end) and the captain reported to ATC the reason for the aborted takeoff; a clearance to return to taxi to [runway] 30L was received and while taxing on taxiway west to [runway] 30L; the crew performed an after landing and before takeoff checklist. All the instruments were showing normal conditions; the brakes were functioning normally and considered that due to runway length available; during the aborted takeoff it wasn't used the max power braking; but just normal braking; a visual inspection had not been considered necessary. The speed at touchdown during a normal landing is about the same speed of the aborted takeoff described above.upon reaching the holding point of runway 30L the crew was waiting for a takeoff clearance when an airplane who was on the same taxiway; behind the aircraft X; reported on tower frequency that smoke and flames were coming out of the wheel assembly of aircraft X. The tower passed the message to the crew and immediately the captain shut down the engines; reported to the tower that the airplane was holding position and the engines were shut down; then exited the aircraft with a fire extinguisher and discharged it on the flames which were coming from the wheel assembly. One fire extinguisher wasn't enough so he returned inside the airplane to get the second fire extinguisher; located under the first officer seat; and upon discharging also the second fire extinguisher there was no more visible fire.meanwhile; the fire trucks arrived on the scene and another fire extinguisher was discharged. The firemen applied a fan to cool down the brakes and wheel assembly temperature which through a heat gun was reported at 380 degrees on the left wheel assembly and 150 degrees on the right.the right wheel assembly didn't produce any smoke.the firemen reported to the captain that the fire was probably caused by hydraulic fluid which leaked over the wheel assembly. Some fluid was found on the ground near the wheel; but the nature of the fluid on the ground has not been verified.a post flight inspection was performed by the crew and no visible damages have been found; however at the time of writing this report; a professional inspection by an authorized operator has not been performed yet.I inspected aircraft X after a few hours; the brakes are cold and I have found a hydraulic leak on top of the wheel assembly on the left side; while the right side wheel is perfectly dry. I think the exposed hydraulic fluid could have leaked onto the hot brake and caused the fire. That's also the opinion of the captain of the sjc fire department.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE-680 Captain reported an incorrect takeoff trim setting made by the First Officer that resulted in a rejected takeoff and a wheel fire.

Narrative: The aircraft was cleared to taxi by Ground Control to Runway 30L at SJC; the Captain occupying the left seat and the First Officer the right seat.The Citation Sovereign is equipped with only one wheel for hydraulic steering on the left side of the cockpit; therefore the Captain is always taxing the airplane; then if the First Officer is the Pilot Flying; he will take the flight controls once the airplane is aligned with the departure runway and at this point the Captain will perform the Pilot Monitoring duties.Upon arrival at the holding point at [Runway] 30L the crew was instructed to cross [Runway] 30L and hold short [Runway] 30R; then after a couple of minutes a clearance to line up and wait [Runway] 30R at A1 was given by the Control Tower. A1 is almost full length of the 11;000 ft. runway; of which 10;134 ft. could be used for takeoff distance. A1 is about 250 ft. less than full length; therefore the takeoff distance available was 9;884 ft. and the distance required for takeoff with the given weather condition and airplane weight was 3;100 ft.Once the airplane was aligned with Runway 30R the Captain became Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer became the Pilot Flying.Once the takeoff clearance was received the First Officer applied the takeoff power and the Captain monitored the engine instruments and the airspeed indicator to give the standard call out to the First Officer.Upon reaching V1; the MASTER WARNING triggered a no take off situation and the takeoff was aborted by the Captain; who immediately called ABORT and took the controls.While the airplane was slowing down the Captain noticed that the MASTER WARNING was triggered by a non-appropriate pitch trim setting. The trim was out of the normal take off range; almost full pitch down but during the taxi to the active runway it was properly set for takeoff; at about - 2.80 and the correct setting was double checked by both crew members when the before taxi and before takeoff check list were performed.At this point the First Officer admitted that he applied forward trim during the takeoff roll; against manufacturer procedures that are calling for a given trim value preset before takeoff; since any other value could jeopardize the safety of the flight.Apparently the First Officer didn't realize that his trim application went so far that the trim setting was out of acceptable range for takeoff. Aerodynamic forces could prevent a lift off if the trim is full down or; in the opposite scenario; it could suddenly pitch up and stall upon lift off if the trim is full up.Once Runway 30R was vacated at Intersection J (3;000 ft. remaining to the end) and the Captain reported to ATC the reason for the aborted takeoff; a clearance to return to taxi to [Runway] 30L was received and while taxing on Taxiway W to [Runway] 30L; the crew performed an after landing and before takeoff checklist. All the instruments were showing normal conditions; the brakes were functioning normally and considered that due to runway length available; during the aborted takeoff it wasn't used the max power braking; but just normal braking; a visual inspection had not been considered necessary. The speed at touchdown during a normal landing is about the same speed of the aborted takeoff described above.Upon reaching the holding point of Runway 30L the crew was waiting for a takeoff clearance when an airplane who was on the same taxiway; behind the Aircraft X; reported on Tower frequency that smoke and flames were coming out of the wheel assembly of Aircraft X. The Tower passed the message to the crew and immediately the Captain shut down the engines; reported to the Tower that the airplane was holding position and the engines were shut down; then exited the aircraft with a fire extinguisher and discharged it on the flames which were coming from the wheel assembly. One fire extinguisher wasn't enough so he returned inside the airplane to get the second fire extinguisher; located under the First Officer seat; and upon discharging also the second fire extinguisher there was no more visible fire.Meanwhile; the fire trucks arrived on the scene and another fire extinguisher was discharged. The firemen applied a fan to cool down the brakes and wheel assembly temperature which through a heat gun was reported at 380 degrees on the left wheel assembly and 150 degrees on the right.The right wheel assembly didn't produce any smoke.The firemen reported to the Captain that the fire was probably caused by hydraulic fluid which leaked over the wheel assembly. Some fluid was found on the ground near the wheel; but the nature of the fluid on the ground has not been verified.A post flight inspection was performed by the crew and no visible damages have been found; however at the time of writing this report; a professional inspection by an authorized operator has not been performed yet.I inspected Aircraft X after a few hours; the brakes are cold and I have found a hydraulic leak on top of the wheel assembly on the left side; while the right side wheel is perfectly dry. I think the exposed hydraulic fluid could have leaked onto the hot brake and caused the fire. That's also the opinion of the Captain of the SJC Fire Department.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.