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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1681406 |
Time | |
Date | 201909 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | OGG.Airport |
State Reference | HI |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Galley Furnishing |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
The first officer and I were assigned to operate a ferry flight with no flight attendants or other passengers aboard. We completed our pilot flying/pilot monitoring duties and completed the before start checklist as normal with the following exceptions:1) the cockpit door was kept open.2) cabin ready report was not received as it was not applicable.3) only the 1L and 1R doors were armed.with respect to keeping the cockpit door open during a ferry flight; both the first officer and I discussed whether we should keep the door open or closed. A decision was made to keep the door open; as this was the typical practice that was used in past ferry flights at both [company]; as well as both of my previous far part 121 airlines. In addition; I felt that because we had no flight attendants on board; we lacked the 'eyes and ears' in the back cabin; so leaving the cockpit door open would allow us to quickly asses the condition of the cabin in the event of an emergency (such as smoke and/or fire in the cabin).with respect to only arming the two forward doors; this was per the recommendation and direction given to me by our A321 fleet captain on my previous ferry flight. Upon landing with auto brakes set to medium; during deceleration and at approximately 80 knots a violent and loud bang was heard directly behind us. At the 70 kt. Call the first officer was startled by the presence of a galley cart that was tipped over sideways and blocking the cockpit door; with liquid pouring out of it and onto the floor.we taxied to the gate; shut the aircraft down and completed the parking checklist; and then I got out of my seat and physically lifted the galley cart back up on its wheels so that I could move it out of the way and exit the cockpit and disarm the 1L and 1R doors. Upon further examination; it was discovered that the galley cart that hit the forward flight attendant jumpseat and forward lavatory door came from the rear of the aircraft. This galley cart did not have its wheel brakes set; nor was the compartment it was stowed in locked and secured with the metal safety latches. In addition; there was a second galley cart that was not secured properly; with the brakes off; and it rolled partially into the right rear lavatory. Additionally; there were three galley bins that slid out from stowage and were on the floor; with an additional galley bin which was dislodged from its compartment and nearly falling out. All four aforementioned galley bin's stowage compartments were left in the unlocked and non-secure position.I feel it is very important for me to emphasize how dangerous this event was and the possible disaster that could have very easily happened if the galley cart which rolled down the aisle entered the flight deck during deceleration. The galley cart which rolled from the rear of the airplane was likely traveling at a speed of approximately 60 mph (estimated by taking approximately. Touchdown speed and the speed point at which the impact of the cart was made). There was substantial damage to the metal frame of the galley cart which was caused by the impact; which is a good indication of the amount of force present at impact. Luckily; the galley cart swerved at the last second and made impact with the forward flight attendant jumpseat and lavatory door; bringing it to a stop prior to entering the flight deck. However; if the galley cart had not swerved and instead came through the flight deck doorway; it would have made contact with one or both crew members; likely causing severe injury or death. In addition; the galley cart would have caused massive damage to the flight deck; and most likely would have driven the thrust levers forward; possibly in the toga mode. It is not unreasonable to assume that a major accident could have resulted if the galley cart made its way into the cockpit; which is a very scary and sobering thought.to date; there are no ferry flight specific checklists or procedures training for pilots who operate ferry flights; which is what I determine contributed to allowing this incident to occur. The lack of ferry-specific training and checklists; in my opinion; has to be addressed immediately.at the very least; specific checklists and procedures need to be developed for ferry flights which include the following items:1) guidance on whether to keep the flight deck door open or closed.2) guidance on which slides to arm.3) procedures for inspecting the cabin after all doors are closed and armed; which would include physically searching the cabin to ensure there are no unauthorized persons on board the aircraft and no suspicions packages or items present in the cabin.4) procedures for ensuring that all galleys are properly secured; to include verification of all galley carts having their brakes set and all safety latches properly secured.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A321 Captain reported that the ferry flight checklist was inadequate; causing an unsecured galley cart to impact the forward bulkhead during landing.
Narrative: The First Officer and I were assigned to operate a ferry flight with no flight attendants or other passengers aboard. We completed our Pilot Flying/Pilot Monitoring duties and completed the Before Start Checklist as normal with the following exceptions:1) The cockpit door was kept open.2) Cabin Ready Report was not received as it was not applicable.3) Only the 1L and 1R Doors were armed.With respect to keeping the cockpit door open during a ferry flight; both the First Officer and I discussed whether we should keep the door open or closed. A decision was made to keep the door open; as this was the typical practice that was used in past ferry flights at both [Company]; as well as both of my previous FAR Part 121 Airlines. In addition; I felt that because we had no flight attendants on board; we lacked the 'eyes and ears' in the back cabin; so leaving the cockpit door open would allow us to quickly asses the condition of the cabin in the event of an emergency (such as smoke and/or fire in the cabin).With respect to only arming the two forward doors; this was per the recommendation and direction given to me by our A321 Fleet Captain on my previous Ferry Flight. Upon landing with auto brakes set to Medium; during deceleration and at approximately 80 knots a violent and loud bang was heard directly behind us. At the 70 kt. Call the First Officer was startled by the presence of a galley cart that was tipped over sideways and blocking the cockpit door; with liquid pouring out of it and onto the floor.We taxied to the gate; shut the aircraft down and completed the parking checklist; and then I got out of my seat and physically lifted the galley cart back up on its wheels so that I could move it out of the way and exit the cockpit and disarm the 1L and 1R doors. Upon further examination; it was discovered that the galley cart that hit the forward Flight Attendant jumpseat and forward lavatory door came from the rear of the aircraft. This galley cart did not have its wheel brakes set; nor was the compartment it was stowed in locked and secured with the metal safety latches. In addition; there was a second galley cart that was not secured properly; with the brakes off; and it rolled partially into the right rear Lavatory. Additionally; there were three galley bins that slid out from stowage and were on the floor; with an additional galley bin which was dislodged from its compartment and nearly falling out. All four aforementioned galley bin's stowage compartments were left in the unlocked and non-secure position.I feel it is very important for me to emphasize how dangerous this event was and the possible disaster that could have very easily happened if the galley cart which rolled down the aisle entered the flight deck during deceleration. The galley cart which rolled from the rear of the airplane was likely traveling at a speed of approximately 60 MPH (estimated by taking approximately. Touchdown Speed and the speed point at which the impact of the cart was made). There was substantial damage to the metal frame of the galley cart which was caused by the impact; which is a good indication of the amount of force present at impact. Luckily; the galley cart swerved at the last second and made impact with the forward Flight Attendant jumpseat and lavatory door; bringing it to a stop prior to entering the flight deck. However; if the galley cart had not swerved and instead came through the flight deck doorway; it would have made contact with one or both crew members; likely causing severe injury or death. In addition; the galley cart would have caused massive damage to the flight deck; and most likely would have driven the thrust levers forward; possibly in the TOGA mode. It is not unreasonable to assume that a major accident could have resulted if the galley cart made its way into the cockpit; which is a very scary and sobering thought.To date; there are no ferry flight specific checklists or procedures training for pilots who operate ferry flights; which is what I determine contributed to allowing this incident to occur. The lack of ferry-specific training and checklists; in my opinion; has to be addressed immediately.At the very least; specific checklists and procedures need to be developed for ferry flights which include the following items:1) Guidance on whether to keep the flight deck door open or closed.2) Guidance on which slides to arm.3) Procedures for inspecting the cabin after all doors are closed and armed; which would include physically searching the cabin to ensure there are no unauthorized persons on board the aircraft and no suspicions packages or items present in the cabin.4) Procedures for ensuring that all Galleys are properly secured; to include verification of all galley carts having their brakes set and all safety latches properly secured.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.