Narrative:

I was in pdx. There is some significant and new construction going on there that presented number of challenges and safety issues. The construction is very close proximity to the gates. There were numerous procedural changes to the push back and taxi in. We were asked to do non-standard things; as well as things that are just unrealistic; such as taxiing out using no power. It was all a surprise to us. Taxi to the tow-in spot was around a tight corner (had to square it off) bounded by the construction (with vague instructions from ground that were seemingly oblivious to the presence of the construction); and was an unannounced tow-in. During pushback; they pushed us straight back literally right to the boundary of the construction zone (because it's right there); with our engines hanging over and pointed at the workers just a few feet away. This is hard for me to describe well; but it was just nuts where they put us; and where the jet blast was going to go. Also; the push crew was trying to dictate our engine start plan; and apparently they had people stationed behind the wing in the danger zone of engine 1. They requested that we taxi out with power at idle; which is just a silly thing to say. An airbus with both engines running on flat hard ground can actually do this (and we did); but with any other combo of engine or jet (737) I do not think that is physically possible. I feel like nothing was thought out with regard to the construction and mitigation procedures.my biggest concern is the fact that there was basically no notice whatsoever of the magnitude of the significant changes to the ramp; the procedures; and the safety issues. It was not mentioned on the ATIS; the chart on jepp FD pro; nor in any pilot bulletin or ops alert. On the flight to pdx; there was one brief NOTAM about kilo being closed. It was a standard; brief; taxiway closure NOTAM that did not do justice to the degree to which the ramp is torn up; and how close it all is to our gates. For our flight out the next morning; another NOTAM had been added with more specifics about the tow-in. I feel like we are buried daily in an avalanche bulletins and lengthy ATIS and scores of pages of NOTAMS; and yet we are not informed sufficiently about significant; real world changes that are cropping up that actually matter in real time. Another example of this would be the recent change to the ord VOR. That one was in the NOTAMS; but should have been an ops alert too. There are numerous solutions to all of this. First and foremost; crews need to know it's coming. I suggest a thorough ops alert with pictures/diagrams. For pushback; the crew needs to get the aircraft away from the construction; for clearance; for safety; for engines running; etc. Farther down kilo would work fine; close to the spot where they connect the tug for the taxi-in. Pushing us straight back into the construction is not acceptable. If it's a mandatory tow-in; it should be a mandatory tow-out. The push crew could also change the angle of the aircraft or flip it around facing east so that the blast does not go into the faces of the workers. This should probably also be a mandatory 2 engine start situation until the constructions ends. My push crew had complained about send getting blown back - yes; this is a jet aircraft operation. In order to function; we have to start the engines. Some mitigation other than pushing us to the construction barrier and leaving the engines off must be worked out.let me reiterate: there are major hazards and safety concerns going on here. We need to get some eyes and analysis on this and figure out some solutions. The danger zone because the engine was pushed over the construction zone and needs to be wing walked for taxi out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported unsafe engine starting procedures; pushback; and taxi procedures at this location due to construction.

Narrative: I was in PDX. There is some significant and new construction going on there that presented number of challenges and safety issues. The construction is VERY close proximity to the gates. There were numerous procedural changes to the push back and taxi in. We were asked to do non-standard things; as well as things that are just unrealistic; such as taxiing out using no power. It was all a surprise to us. Taxi to the tow-in spot was around a tight corner (had to square it off) bounded by the construction (with vague instructions from ground that were seemingly oblivious to the presence of the construction); and was an unannounced tow-in. During pushback; they pushed us straight back literally right to the boundary of the construction zone (because it's right there); with our engines hanging over and pointed at the workers just a few feet away. This is hard for me to describe well; but it was just nuts where they put us; and where the jet blast was going to go. Also; the push crew was trying to dictate our engine start plan; and apparently they had people stationed behind the wing in the danger zone of engine 1. They requested that we taxi out with power at idle; which is just a silly thing to say. An Airbus with both engines running on flat hard ground can actually do this (and we did); but with any other combo of engine or jet (737) I do not think that is physically possible. I feel like nothing was thought out with regard to the construction and mitigation procedures.My biggest concern is the fact that there was basically NO NOTICE whatsoever of the magnitude of the significant changes to the ramp; the procedures; and the safety issues. It was not mentioned on the ATIS; the chart on Jepp FD Pro; nor in any pilot bulletin or Ops Alert. On the flight to PDX; there was one brief NOTAM about Kilo being closed. It was a standard; brief; taxiway closure NOTAM that did not do justice to the degree to which the ramp is torn up; and how close it all is to our gates. For our flight out the next morning; another NOTAM had been added with more specifics about the tow-in. I feel like we are buried daily in an avalanche bulletins and lengthy ATIS and scores of pages of NOTAMS; and yet we are not informed sufficiently about significant; real world changes that are cropping up that actually matter in real time. Another example of this would be the recent change to the ORD VOR. That one was in the NOTAMS; but should have been an Ops Alert too. There are numerous solutions to all of this. First and foremost; crews need to know it's coming. I suggest a thorough Ops Alert with pictures/diagrams. For pushback; the crew needs to get the aircraft away from the construction; for clearance; for safety; for engines running; etc. Farther down Kilo would work fine; close to the spot where they connect the tug for the taxi-in. Pushing us straight back into the construction is not acceptable. If it's a mandatory tow-in; it should be a mandatory tow-out. The push crew could also change the angle of the aircraft or flip it around facing east so that the blast does not go into the faces of the workers. This should probably also be a mandatory 2 engine start situation until the constructions ends. My push crew had complained about send getting blown back - yes; this is a jet aircraft operation. In order to function; we have to start the engines. Some mitigation other than pushing us to the construction barrier and leaving the engines off must be worked out.Let me reiterate: there are major hazards and safety concerns going on here. We need to get some eyes and analysis on this and figure out some solutions. The danger zone because the engine was pushed over the construction zone and needs to be wing walked for taxi out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.