Narrative:

Absolutely nothing looked abnormal to me in the rfo (relief first officer) seat. Then; I thought right at touchdown to a split second after (another crewmember thinks possible just prior to) touchdown; we received a 'go-around' call from the landing enhancement software. Considering we were on the ground; we did not go-around. This was not a go-around at 10 feet where you know the wheels will touch. This was after touchdown with us transitioning from the flight phase to the roll out phase; lowering the nose; ensuring spoiler deployment etc. Although I was the relief pilot; I am also a captain. I am pretty sure I would've made the same decision as the captain to keep the airplane on the ground. That is key; 'keep the airplane on the ground;' we were not airborne when we got the callout. Had we gotten it 2 seconds earlier; I'm sure we would've gone around. Even in the landing printout; nothing was out of normal. None of us could figure out what the software was sensing to give the callout. Bottom line; this was an extremely late callout by the software that I think put us in a more dangerous position by telling us to go-around when we were actually on the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 Relief First Officer reported 'go-around' callout from landing software during landing touchdown.

Narrative: Absolutely nothing looked abnormal to me in the RFO (Relief First Officer) seat. Then; I thought right at touchdown to a split second after (another crewmember thinks possible just prior to) touchdown; we received a 'go-around' call from the landing enhancement software. Considering we were on the ground; we did not go-around. This was not a go-around at 10 feet where you know the wheels will touch. This was after touchdown with us transitioning from the flight phase to the roll out phase; lowering the nose; ensuring spoiler deployment etc. Although I was the Relief Pilot; I am also a Captain. I am pretty sure I would've made the same decision as the Captain to keep the airplane on the ground. That is key; 'keep the airplane on the ground;' we were not airborne when we got the callout. Had we gotten it 2 seconds earlier; I'm sure we would've gone around. Even in the landing printout; nothing was out of normal. None of us could figure out what the software was sensing to give the callout. Bottom line; this was an extremely late callout by the software that I think put us in a more dangerous position by telling us to go-around when we were actually on the ground.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.