37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1689982 |
Time | |
Date | 201908 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Gulfstream III (G1159A) |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Oxygen System/Portable |
Person 1 | |
Function | Observer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness |
Narrative:
Government has a program in which different centers produce instruments that are flown by government agency airplanes. The aircraft are gulfstream-III airplanes modified for research. I would like to report an incident that took place aboard the g-iii that reveals serious problems with regard to safety.the plane was initially stationed in ZZZ and scheduled to fly over foreign country. 3 [company] contractors were aboard a flight. We experienced smoke in the cabin shortly after takeoff. Pilots requested priority handling; coordinated with the airport tower; and we landed about 40 minutes later. Below are the details of the safety breach:1) there was not enough emergency equipment for all passengers. We had 3 [company] workers; and only 1 oxygen bottle. Each bottle can support 2 people. One person did not get enough access to the bottle; and had to get O2 in the emergency room after we landed. The two others had access to the bottle; and they were discharged by the emergency room. There was one cabin in the aircraft labeled as 'oxygen regulators'; which had no oxygen bottles inside.2) if pilots believe there might be fire in the airplane; they will not drop oxygen masks. Thus the availability of another source of emergency O2 is essential. The g-iii flies at 41;000 feet and we cannot simply open a window to get air if the cabin is filled with smoke. In this flight; the crew chief (civil servant) took 10-15 minutes to determine there was no fire. During this time; all three crewmembers were exposed to smoke.3) the g-iii is not a commercial aircraft. It carries many racks of electrical equipment inside; and a network of wires to support the instrumentation. It is also an aging aircraft that has shown electrical problems before; even if all proper care is taken with its regular maintenance. There has been other incidents of smoke in the aircraft. In fact; on another flight the smoke problem was observed before takeoff and the aircraft was again grounded. Thus; the event we experienced before is to be reasonably expected given the nature of our work.4) the incident occurred aboard the g-iii government agency X. Another government center also operates a g-iii. However they provide smoke hoods to all passengers. These systems are called epos. 5) all present in the flight presented written statements to [company] safety office as well as to the center describing the insufficient sources of emergency O2. However; they refused to purchase smoke hoods; provide additional training; or go over lessons learned from the event. Center spent time and resources to repair the aircraft and continue the data collection. [Company] workers were asked to show up to work before any corrective measures had taken place.6) mr. X was questioning the need for medical treatment of one crewmember; in order to change the mishap classification of the event. There is a clear conflict of interest as mr. X is part of routine g-iii operations.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Scientist/Observer reported that during a smoke in the cabin event; only one oxygen bottle with two masks was onboard with three crewmen; resulting in a crewmember becoming incapacitated; requiring medical treatment.
Narrative: Government has a program in which different centers produce instruments that are flown by government agency airplanes. The aircraft are Gulfstream-III airplanes modified for research. I would like to report an incident that took place aboard the G-III that reveals serious problems with regard to safety.The plane was initially stationed in ZZZ and scheduled to fly over foreign country. 3 [Company] contractors were aboard a flight. We experienced smoke in the cabin shortly after takeoff. Pilots requested priority handling; coordinated with the airport tower; and we landed about 40 minutes later. Below are the details of the safety breach:1) There was not enough emergency equipment for all passengers. We had 3 [Company] workers; and only 1 oxygen bottle. Each bottle can support 2 people. One person did not get enough access to the bottle; and had to get O2 in the emergency room after we landed. The two others had access to the bottle; and they were discharged by the emergency room. There was one cabin in the aircraft labeled as 'oxygen regulators'; which had no oxygen bottles inside.2) If pilots believe there might be fire in the airplane; they will not drop oxygen masks. Thus the availability of another source of emergency O2 is essential. The G-III flies at 41;000 feet and we cannot simply open a window to get air if the cabin is filled with smoke. In this flight; the crew chief (civil servant) took 10-15 minutes to determine there was no fire. During this time; all three crewmembers were exposed to smoke.3) The G-III is not a commercial aircraft. It carries many racks of electrical equipment inside; and a network of wires to support the instrumentation. It is also an aging aircraft that has shown electrical problems before; even if all proper care is taken with its regular maintenance. There has been other incidents of smoke in the aircraft. In fact; on another flight the smoke problem was observed before takeoff and the aircraft was again grounded. Thus; the event we experienced before is to be reasonably expected given the nature of our work.4) The incident occurred aboard the G-III government Agency X. Another government center also operates a G-III. However they provide smoke hoods to all passengers. These systems are called EPOS. 5) All present in the flight presented written statements to [Company] Safety Office as well as to the Center describing the insufficient sources of emergency O2. However; they refused to purchase smoke hoods; provide additional training; or go over lessons learned from the event. Center spent time and resources to repair the aircraft and continue the data collection. [Company] workers were asked to show up to work before any corrective measures had taken place.6) Mr. X was questioning the need for medical treatment of one crewmember; in order to change the mishap classification of the event. There is a clear conflict of interest as Mr. X is part of routine G-III operations.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.