Narrative:

While on the STAR into ZZZ I was the pilot flying and given a descent to 7;000 ft. Following the STAR. We were then given clearance direct to zzzzz intersection. While in the turn; both the captain and I simultaneously lost our mfd displays; as they both went dark at exactly the same time. We were on the arrival and our position was appropriate and our flight path was stabilized so we both began troubleshooting procedures to attempt to regain at least one working mfd. The arrival and approach has many way points and I consider the info provided on the mfds critical to situational and positional awareness. When I switched my drp to pfd as directed by procedure; it did not bring my screen back however it did cause the ap to enter roll mode. This was recognized immediately and I reselected navigation mode and 'FMS' was displayed on my pfd. With the assumption that our flight path was stabilized; both the captain and I continued troubleshooting; and ultimately after a minute or two I was able to get my mfd back. The captain's never came back. For an unknown reason; when my mfd came back; it was apparent from the map that we were a couple miles south of the desired course. At that moment ATC directed that we begin a turn back to the left (north) to re-intercept our course. The controller queried what happened and stated that he had to level-off a departing aircraft early to avoid a conflict. He mentioned that no loss of separation had occurred and told us we would have to call the controller after landing.faulty/insufficient equipment and a well known problem on the crj aircraft. Contributing factors: I failed to maintain positional awareness through my CDI which would have shown the navigational error. Both pilots went heads down to fix this problem which ultimately is one in which the aircraft can still be operated with. Tem was not optimized; one pilot should have stayed focused on flight path management; the other should have begun troubleshooting. Also due to high workload at time of failure (descent; turn; airspeed changes) the navigation error was more insidious than it would have been during most other phases of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported failure of both PFDs during initial approach resulted in a clearance deviation.

Narrative: While on the STAR into ZZZ I was the pilot flying and given a descent to 7;000 ft. following the STAR. We were then given clearance direct to ZZZZZ intersection. While in the turn; both the Captain and I simultaneously lost our MFD displays; as they both went dark at exactly the same time. We were on the arrival and our position was appropriate and our flight path was stabilized so we both began troubleshooting procedures to attempt to regain at least one working MFD. The arrival and approach has many way points and I consider the info provided on the MFDs critical to situational and positional awareness. When I switched my DRP to PFD as directed by procedure; it did not bring my screen back however it did cause the AP to enter roll mode. This was recognized immediately and I reselected NAV mode and 'FMS' was displayed on my PFD. With the assumption that our flight path was stabilized; both the Captain and I continued troubleshooting; and ultimately after a minute or two I was able to get my MFD back. The Captain's never came back. For an unknown reason; when my MFD came back; it was apparent from the map that we were a couple miles south of the desired course. At that moment ATC directed that we begin a turn back to the left (north) to re-intercept our course. The Controller queried what happened and stated that he had to level-off a departing aircraft early to avoid a conflict. He mentioned that no loss of separation had occurred and told us we would have to call the controller after landing.Faulty/insufficient equipment and a well known problem on the CRJ aircraft. Contributing factors: I failed to maintain positional awareness through my CDI which would have shown the navigational error. Both pilots went heads down to fix this problem which ultimately is one in which the aircraft can still be operated with. TEM was not optimized; one pilot should have stayed focused on flight path management; the other should have begun troubleshooting. Also due to high workload at time of failure (descent; turn; airspeed changes) the navigation error was more insidious than it would have been during most other phases of flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.