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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1691647 |
Time | |
Date | 201909 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SEA.Airport |
State Reference | WA |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
This was the third day of this trip. The captain had regularly been arriving to the aircraft fairly late and then would wait to brief or run any checklists until nearly door closure. The captain was consistently rushing though checklists and occasionally missing items on the checklist after calling them correctly configured. I would reiterate the checklist item and he would usually then realize his mistake. Weather was good at the departure airport with clear skies and light winds. This flight was my leg. After liftoff the normal call out exchange of 'positive rate' and 'gear up' was made. However; the captain reached over and retracted the flaps; which were set at 15 degrees; instead of the landing gear. I noticed this as the flap lever was reaching the zero degree detent as the aircraft was climbing through approximately 150-200 ft. AGL. I ensured the aircraft was stable; at a safe airspeed; and still climbing and once again called 'gear up.' the captain acted somewhat confused by this and finally retracted the landing gear. I believe at this point he finally realized what he had done with the flaps; and stated 'well that was weird.' no further discussion occurred about what had happened for the remainder of the flight.the captain's rush to accomplish duties and checklists; and especially his incorrect configuration change of the aircraft at low altitude made me very unsafe and concerned about the potential outcome of that flight and future flights. I feel [that] this captain could use additional reiteration and training of standard operations. He is a long-time captain with [the company]; so knowledge of procedures doesn't seem to be the cause of this instance. I feel that his actions caused a safety hazard and could continue to cause them in the future.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier First Officer reported Captain was remiss in properly performing duties.
Narrative: This was the third day of this trip. The Captain had regularly been arriving to the aircraft fairly late and then would wait to brief or run any checklists until nearly door closure. The Captain was consistently rushing though checklists and occasionally missing items on the checklist after calling them correctly configured. I would reiterate the checklist item and he would usually then realize his mistake. Weather was good at the departure airport with clear skies and light winds. This flight was my leg. After liftoff the normal call out exchange of 'positive rate' and 'gear up' was made. However; the Captain reached over and retracted the flaps; which were set at 15 degrees; instead of the landing gear. I noticed this as the flap lever was reaching the zero degree detent as the aircraft was climbing through approximately 150-200 ft. AGL. I ensured the aircraft was stable; at a safe airspeed; and still climbing and once again called 'gear up.' The Captain acted somewhat confused by this and finally retracted the landing gear. I believe at this point he finally realized what he had done with the flaps; and stated 'well that was weird.' No further discussion occurred about what had happened for the remainder of the flight.The Captain's rush to accomplish duties and checklists; and especially his incorrect configuration change of the aircraft at low altitude made me very unsafe and concerned about the potential outcome of that flight and future flights. I feel [that] this Captain could use additional reiteration and training of standard operations. He is a long-time Captain with [the Company]; so knowledge of procedures doesn't seem to be the cause of this instance. I feel that his actions caused a safety hazard and could continue to cause them in the future.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.