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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1691748 |
Time | |
Date | 201910 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Turbine Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
This report is titled; 'did you have any issues on the last flight?' in cruise flight at FL350 I noticed the number two engine was indicating an lp vibration of 4.0. I handed control of the plane to my first officer and gave him the radios; while I pulled out the QRH and ran the QRH procedure for 'engine abnormal vibration.' reducing the engine thrust by 2% N1 returned the vibration to within normal range. The vibration was not associated with any peak throttle changes and was not momentary in nature. We also did not notice any actual vibrations from the engine; it was only indicated. Upon completion of the QRH we contacted dispatch via ACARS to notify them of the discrepancy and to coordinate a potential return to ZZZ for any needed maintenance action. I asked this question as I knew the plane had previous issues with the number two engine and coordinating maintenance action would likely be easier in a maintenance base. Dispatch responded with; 'did the message go away.' I replied that it did when I reduced thrust on the engine; and that I need to know immediately if operations would like me to return to ZZZ for maintenance or continue to our destination. This was due to our location in flight of nearly halfway between origin and destination. Dispatch responded with 'follow the QRH.' there seemed to be a lack of understanding of the what I was specifically asking; as the QRH has no further guidance regarding a land as soon as practical vs possible; it simply states -end-. The miac directs you to notify dispatch regarding the discrepancy and coordinate with them. With the flight being near the halfway point; the engine stable; and top of descent approaching; and with no specific guidance from operations; I elected to continue to our destination. Given the time constraints of the flight; I did not have an adequate amount of time (pull ATIS; load the approach; brief arrival; brief approach; find out gate; load landing numbers; etc.) to call dispatch and explain the intricacies of the QRH procedure and the potential need of maintenance work upon landing correlating with my original question on what dispatch would like me to do. Overall there was very little support from dispatch regarding this situation; and while I do not have a problem making a decision on whether to continue or return to ZZZ; it was very uncomfortable being told 'run the QRH' when specifically asking what they wanted us to do. It felt very much as if the dispatcher was 'hands off' and uninterested in the outcome of the flight given the abnormal situation we were in.upon landing; I looked into the maintenance logbook a little further and counted 10 previous write-ups for the same discrepancy in a roughly two-week period. Adding mine; 11. Additionally; the previous write-up for high engine vibration has a re-wiring of the harness and had an open discrepancy for high power engine runs needed. The follow logbook entry detailed the engine runs; which were done to 45%. That closed the discrepancy which was completed the day prior to this flight. This does not seem in line with what the previous entry called for; nor does it seem in line with my understanding of what the task card calls for (see attachments). I called up dispatch and maintenance control and informed them of the discrepancy on our flight. When notifying maintenance control; the controller stated; 'let me read this to you and you tell me if you think we even need a write-up' he proceeded to read a excerpt from the ge mx manual regarding a transient abnormal vibration indication based off peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. I stated that while it sounds like the guidance from ge says it is normal; and I felt that an indication such as that in the cockpit is abnormal and that I would like to write it up.I felt there was a lot of pressure from the controller to not write it up given that guidance from ge; but with the repeat discrepancies; and without that languagein front of me to read; I felt it was best to writ e the discrepancy in the logbook and have maintenance come out to look at the issue. He replied that if I did write it up; it would likely take contract maintenance a while to come out and we would likely have to do engine runs and that would take a long time. While these are all facts; I couldn't help but feel the intent of him telling me this information was to discourage me from writing it up due to the personal inconvenience it would cause myself and the crew. I had to interrupt him and start telling him what I was writing over the phone to finally get the discrepancy written up. About a half hour later; contract maintenance appeared at the aircraft with guidance from maintenance control on a corrective action. It consisted of an inspection of the wiring harness on the engine along with several other items. Additionally; it had guidance that directed us to do a high-power engine run. When reading over the guidance provided by maintenance control via maintenance task card; there were several conditions that needed to be true for the corrective action to take place. According to the maintenance task; the vibration needed to be transitory in nature. Below that was a definition of transitory. The definition was a condition that resulted in a high vibration indication as a result of peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. This condition did not match what was written up in the logbook for this discrepancy as the throttle was not moving and engine parameters were steady in cruise flight. Engine vibration indications did not reduce until the throttle was reduced per the QRH procedure. I informed the contract maintenance that I felt this task was the inappropriate one for the write up; and that I was going to call maintenance control and seek a remedy for that. The contract maintenance technician was very understanding and stated numerous times he felt 11 repeat discrepancies for the same issue were 'odd' and that he felt 'when something like that keeps happening you have to take corrective action with regards to replacing parts; you cannot keep writing it up' and that; 'them replacing the wiring harness was a good start; but clearly that did not resolve the issue.' I told him I appreciated the support and understood he was only acting on behalf of maintenance control in this situation. Upon calling maintenance control; I discussed my feelings regarding the maintenance task being inappropriate; and the maintenance control felt that while he agreed with what I was saying on principle; he was only going off the guidance that ge provided and that it was indicating a normal situation. I told him that I did not feel an amber indication on the EICAS to be a normal situation; to which he replied that is was 'right on the line.' I ask him if he felt it was truly appropriate to continue to sign the aircraft off and continue to have repeated write ups; to which he replied; that a situation such as that is less than ideal. I asked him what he would do to resolve it and he stated that he felt that was above his pay grade. At this point I asked to speak to the on duty chief pilot regarding this issue; as I felt there was a significant lack of accountability and responsibility on the company's part regarding this issue as no one wanted to stop the operation and ensure everything is truly being done safely and that an aircraft at company X was operating in a fully airworthy condition. Speaking with chief pilot on the phone; he sated he understood what I was saying and that I as PIC has full authority to stop the operation if I did not feel comfortable. This is the first time anyone empowered me to make a tough call and I appreciated chris' support over the issue. I informed him that I would be unwilling to accept the aircraft unless some maintenance action was taken to troubleshoot the issue; and that I would assist in this endeavor by doing engine runs so maintenance could troubleshoot the root cause of the high vibration.completing the engine runs; the vibration on the right engine appeared within normal range. We returned to the gate and the contract maintenance technician signed the aircraft off as airworthy. I called dispatch to notify them that I was not going to be accepting the plane. The dispatcher stated; 'so you are refusing an airworthy aircraft?' to which I replied; 'yes.' I see no reason to ask the pointed question other than to attempt to intimidate me into second guessing myself and taking the aircraft. I felt it was self-evident the circumstances of my unwillingness to accept the aircraft and that asking that question served no other purpose other than to intimidate me; which I feel is inappropriate. I titled this report; 'did you have any issues on the last flight?' because when reporting for duty before this flight; a company X maintenance technician in ZZZ made a special trip to the aircraft to ask me if it had any issues flying as it had; 'been written up a bunch for a high vibe' and that he; 'wanted to see if it was actually fixed' I informed him that I had just reported and didn't know if there any issues. I wish this had peaked my attention sooner than it did; as I think it summarizes the systematic issues I experienced on this flight. To the best of my knowledge this plane was operated the next day and I do not know if it has had any future issues with the right engine; but I cannot imagine the issue was resolved as no corrective action was taken by maintenance.I have read many accident reports in my time as a pilot and the one theme between them all is a culmination of small factors that usually add up to a toxic set of circumstances that lead to the eventual accident or incident. Having a high engine vibration indication; while not an emergency; may lead to an accident or incident if given enough time and opportunities for a crew to react poorly to that circumstance. I feel the company's unwillingness to resolve the repeat discrepancy is unacceptable and unsafe. Despite operational pressures; the airline should take a plane out of service for items that are clearly not resolved.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Captain reported refusing to fly an EMB-175 aircraft that had been written up 11 times for excessive engine vibration.
Narrative: This report is titled; 'Did you have any issues on the last flight?' In cruise flight at FL350 I noticed the number two engine was indicating an LP Vibration of 4.0. I handed control of the plane to my First Officer and gave him the radios; while I pulled out the QRH and ran the QRH procedure for 'Engine Abnormal Vibration.' Reducing the engine thrust by 2% N1 returned the vibration to within normal range. The vibration was not associated with any peak throttle changes and was not momentary in nature. We also did not notice any actual vibrations from the engine; it was only indicated. Upon completion of the QRH we contacted Dispatch via ACARS to notify them of the discrepancy and to coordinate a potential return to ZZZ for any needed Maintenance action. I asked this question as I knew the plane had previous issues with the number two engine and coordinating Maintenance action would likely be easier in a Maintenance base. Dispatch responded with; 'Did the message go away.' I replied that it did when I reduced thrust on the engine; and that I need to know immediately if Operations would like me to return to ZZZ for Maintenance or continue to our destination. This was due to our location in flight of nearly halfway between origin and destination. Dispatch responded with 'Follow the QRH.' There seemed to be a lack of understanding of the what I was specifically asking; as the QRH has no further guidance regarding a land as soon as practical vs possible; it simply states -END-. The MIAC directs you to notify dispatch regarding the discrepancy and coordinate with them. With the flight being near the halfway point; the engine stable; and top of descent approaching; and with no specific guidance from Operations; I elected to continue to our destination. Given the time constraints of the flight; I did not have an adequate amount of time (pull ATIS; load the approach; brief arrival; brief approach; find out gate; load landing numbers; etc.) to call dispatch and explain the intricacies of the QRH procedure and the potential need of Maintenance work upon landing correlating with my original question on what dispatch would like me to do. Overall there was very little support from Dispatch regarding this situation; and while I do not have a problem making a decision on whether to continue or return to ZZZ; it was very uncomfortable being told 'Run the QRH' when specifically asking what they wanted us to do. It felt very much as if the dispatcher was 'hands off' and uninterested in the outcome of the flight given the abnormal situation we were in.Upon Landing; I looked into the Maintenance logbook a little further and counted 10 previous write-ups for the same discrepancy in a roughly two-week period. Adding mine; 11. Additionally; the previous write-up for high engine vibration has a re-wiring of the harness and had an open discrepancy for high power engine runs needed. The follow logbook entry detailed the engine runs; which were done to 45%. That closed the discrepancy which was completed the day prior to this flight. This does not seem in line with what the previous entry called for; nor does it seem in line with my understanding of what the task card calls for (see attachments). I called up Dispatch and Maintenance Control and informed them of the discrepancy on our flight. When notifying Maintenance Control; the Controller stated; 'Let me read this to you and you tell me if you think we even need a write-up' He proceeded to read a excerpt from the GE MX manual regarding a transient abnormal vibration indication based off peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. I stated that while it sounds like the guidance from GE says it is normal; and I felt that an indication such as that in the cockpit is abnormal and that I would like to write it up.I felt there was a lot of pressure from the controller to not write it up given that guidance from GE; but with the repeat discrepancies; and without that languagein front of me to read; I felt it was best to writ e the discrepancy in the logbook and have Maintenance come out to look at the issue. He replied that if I did write it up; it would likely take contract Maintenance a while to come out and we would likely have to do engine runs and that would take a long time. While these are all facts; I couldn't help but feel the intent of him telling me this information was to discourage me from writing it up due to the personal inconvenience it would cause myself and the crew. I had to interrupt him and start telling him what I was writing over the phone to finally get the discrepancy written up. About a half hour later; contract Maintenance appeared at the aircraft with guidance from Maintenance Control on a corrective action. It consisted of an inspection of the wiring harness on the engine along with several other items. Additionally; it had guidance that directed us to do a high-power engine run. When reading over the guidance provided by Maintenance Control via Maintenance task card; there were several conditions that needed to be true for the corrective action to take place. According to the Maintenance task; the vibration needed to be transitory in nature. Below that was a definition of transitory. The definition was a condition that resulted in a high vibration indication as a result of peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. This condition did not match what was written up in the logbook for this discrepancy as the throttle was not moving and engine parameters were steady in cruise flight. Engine vibration indications did not reduce until the throttle was reduced per the QRH procedure. I informed the contract Maintenance that I felt this task was the inappropriate one for the write up; and that I was going to call Maintenance Control and seek a remedy for that. The contract Maintenance Technician was very understanding and stated numerous times he felt 11 repeat discrepancies for the same issue were 'odd' and that he felt 'when something like that keeps happening you have to take corrective action with regards to replacing parts; you cannot keep writing it up' and that; 'Them replacing the wiring harness was a good start; but clearly that did not resolve the issue.' I told him I appreciated the support and understood he was only acting on behalf of Maintenance Control in this situation. Upon calling Maintenance Control; I discussed my feelings regarding the Maintenance task being inappropriate; and the Maintenance Control felt that while he agreed with what I was saying on principle; he was only going off the guidance that GE provided and that it was indicating a normal situation. I told him that I did not feel an amber indication on the EICAS to be a normal situation; to which he replied that is was 'right on the line.' I ask him if he felt it was truly appropriate to continue to sign the aircraft off and continue to have repeated write ups; to which he replied; that a situation such as that is less than ideal. I asked him what he would do to resolve it and he stated that he felt that was above his pay grade. At this point I asked to speak to the on duty Chief Pilot regarding this issue; as I felt there was a significant lack of accountability and responsibility on the company's part regarding this issue as no one wanted to stop the operation and ensure everything is truly being done safely and that an aircraft at Company X was operating in a fully airworthy condition. Speaking with Chief Pilot on the phone; he sated he understood what I was saying and that I as PIC has full authority to stop the operation if I did not feel comfortable. This is the first time anyone empowered me to make a tough call and I appreciated Chris' support over the issue. I informed him that I would be unwilling to accept the aircraft unless some Maintenance action was taken to troubleshoot the issue; and that I would assist in this endeavor by doing engine runs so Maintenance could troubleshoot the root cause of the high vibration.Completing the engine runs; the vibration on the right engine appeared within normal range. We returned to the gate and the contract Maintenance Technician signed the aircraft off as airworthy. I called dispatch to notify them that I was not going to be accepting the plane. The dispatcher stated; 'So you are refusing an airworthy aircraft?' to which I replied; 'Yes.' I see no reason to ask the pointed question other than to attempt to intimidate me into second guessing myself and taking the aircraft. I felt it was self-evident the circumstances of my unwillingness to accept the aircraft and that asking that question served no other purpose other than to intimidate me; which I feel is inappropriate. I titled this report; 'Did you have any issues on the last flight?' because when reporting for duty before this flight; a Company X Maintenance Technician in ZZZ made a special trip to the aircraft to ask me if it had any issues flying as it had; 'Been written up a bunch for a high vibe' and that he; 'wanted to see if it was actually fixed' I informed him that I had just reported and didn't know if there any issues. I wish this had peaked my attention sooner than it did; as I think it summarizes the systematic issues I experienced on this flight. To the best of my knowledge this plane was operated the next day and I do not know if it has had any future issues with the right engine; but I cannot imagine the issue was resolved as no corrective action was taken by Maintenance.I have read many accident reports in my time as a pilot and the one theme between them all is a culmination of small factors that usually add up to a toxic set of circumstances that lead to the eventual accident or incident. Having a high engine vibration indication; while not an emergency; may lead to an accident or incident if given enough time and opportunities for a crew to react poorly to that circumstance. I feel the company's unwillingness to resolve the repeat discrepancy is unacceptable and unsafe. Despite operational pressures; the airline should take a plane out of service for items that are clearly not resolved.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.