Narrative:

I as the captain was the pilot monitoring and the first officer was the pilot flying. At rotation speed; vr; as the first officer initiated the rotation we heard a single loud banging noise; similar to an explosion; from the right aft side of the aircraft. We continued the takeoff climb normally and I as the captain elected to leave the landing gear down; suspecting a possible tire failure. I also thoroughly looked at the EICAS for any abnormal indications and there was absolutely none; everything was in the green and operating normally. We requested to climb to 10;000 MSL and asked for delay vectors to troubleshoot the issue and as we were being transferred to departure; ZZZ tower informed us they also had heard the loud banging noise and we requested a runway inspection for possible FOD. We were getting conflicting information as to the nature of the FOD; but departure finally told us ZZZ operations had found a rock on the side of the runway that could have possibly been the cause of the loud bang as the suspected FOD [that] impacted the aircraft. We followed [company] established procedures and I had the first officer continue flying while I performed any associated QRH procedures and communicated with dispatch. We elected to perform QRH X.X and to [request priority handling] as a precaution. I briefed the flight attendants using the test (type of emergency; evacuation; special instructions; and time) items and made a passenger announcement informing of further actions to return back to ZZZ due to a minor technical issue with the aircraft.after complying with all necessary procedures and checklists; I elected to conduct the landing and have the first officer be the pilot monitoring. After landing; we received an engine exceedance EICAS message and momentarily after that a corporate pilot informed ZZZ ground that he had seen momentary flames from the left engine during rotation. This post flight information was the missing clue that informed us of a possible compressor stall instead of FOD damage; since EICAS messages were shed as a result of the embraer K code logic. We returned to the gate and deplaned the passengers; I talked to dispatch; the on-duty chief pilot; and maintenance control. After analysis of all the information that was received post flight; the general consensus was that there was a possible momentary compressor stall of the right engine and not the left engine; since the ground observers might have misjudged based on their position on the airport property. In addition; I was also informed post-flight by two [other company] commuters who were nonrevenue passengers in the aircraft who also suspected catastrophic tire failure due to the nature of the noise. We recorded the discrepancy in the aircraft maintenance logbook and turned the aircraft over to maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported encountering an engine stall on takeoff resulting in returning to the departure airport.

Narrative: I as the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer was the Pilot Flying. At rotation speed; Vr; as the First Officer initiated the rotation we heard a single loud banging noise; similar to an explosion; from the right aft side of the aircraft. We continued the takeoff climb normally and I as the Captain elected to leave the landing gear down; suspecting a possible tire failure. I also thoroughly looked at the EICAS for any abnormal indications and there was absolutely none; everything was in the green and operating normally. We requested to climb to 10;000 MSL and asked for delay vectors to troubleshoot the issue and as we were being transferred to Departure; ZZZ Tower informed us they also had heard the loud banging noise and we requested a runway inspection for possible FOD. We were getting conflicting information as to the nature of the FOD; but Departure finally told us ZZZ Operations had found a rock on the side of the runway that could have possibly been the cause of the loud bang as the suspected FOD [that] impacted the aircraft. We followed [Company] established procedures and I had the First Officer continue flying while I performed any associated QRH procedures and communicated with Dispatch. We elected to perform QRH X.X and to [request priority handling] as a precaution. I briefed the flight attendants using the TEST (Type of Emergency; Evacuation; Special Instructions; and Time) items and made a passenger announcement informing of further actions to return back to ZZZ due to a minor technical issue with the aircraft.After complying with all necessary procedures and checklists; I elected to conduct the landing and have the First Officer be the Pilot Monitoring. After landing; we received an ENG EXCEEDANCE EICAS message and momentarily after that a corporate pilot informed ZZZ Ground that he had seen momentary flames from the left engine during rotation. This post flight information was the missing clue that informed us of a possible compressor stall instead of FOD damage; since EICAS messages were shed as a result of the Embraer K Code logic. We returned to the gate and deplaned the passengers; I talked to Dispatch; the on-duty Chief Pilot; and Maintenance Control. After analysis of all the information that was received post flight; the general consensus was that there was a possible momentary compressor stall of the right engine and not the left engine; since the ground observers might have misjudged based on their position on the airport property. In addition; I was also informed post-flight by two [other Company] commuters who were nonrevenue passengers in the aircraft who also suspected catastrophic tire failure due to the nature of the noise. We recorded the discrepancy in the aircraft maintenance logbook and turned the aircraft over to Maintenance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.