Narrative:

I was given a gate call for aircraft X for 'broken straps' on nose gear from my lead mechanic. I went to the aircraft and noted the data plate on the nose strut was damaged and barely still attached to the strut assembly. There were no retaining straps on the strut for the data plate. The data plate had only been attached by adhesive on the back of the data plate and a perimeter seal of aerodynamic sealant of the data plate. The aircraft was fully boarded and due out in 6 minutes when I arrived at the gate. There are 2 [non-essential equipment furnishing] that refer to the straps for the nose gear data plate and the data plate itself. The [non-essential equipment furnishing] for the straps says the data plate must be secure (at this point I had removed the damaged data plate since it was barely hanging onto the strut). The [non-essential equipment furnishing] for the data plate does not cover the straps. I thought I would be able to apply both [non-essential equipment furnishing] and release the aircraft. I called [maintenance control] and explained and they said I could not apply both [non-essential equipment furnishing] because the one for the straps said the data plate needed to be secure. I relayed this information to my lead and pulled a reference [company 1] [engineering order] #xxxxx to replace the data plate and straps. I went to the hangar to get the required materials from stores. At the hangar; I spoke to quality control. I asked about installing the straps using the [engineering order] as reference and having quality control north/a the rest of the [engineering order]. He expressed no interest in doing this. I returned to the gate with all the parts to complete the [engineering order] entirely. My lead was on the phone with [maintenance control]. [Maintenance control] was telling my lead that I should put the straps on the nose strut and reference the one step on the [engineering order] and then put the data plate on [non-essential equipment furnishing]. I told him I was fine with that; however; that per the gmm 7-10 page 3 under jobcards/[engineering authorization]/[engineering order] work procedures it states the uncompleted steps on the [engineering order] needed to be marked north/a by quality control. My lead had a phone conversation with quality control and quality control did not want to do this. At this point; the flight was approximately 2 hours delayed. [Maintenance control] and my lead began to get agitated that I would not do what they were asking. I told them what they were asking me to do was non-compliant and the [engineering order] uncompleted steps needed to be north/a by quality control. Any supervisor on duty was completely absent during this with no input. I was again asked to do the non-compliant procedure and refused. At this point; I was 1 hour past my scheduled end of shift and decided to go home as to avoid confrontation. Had this been a safety of flight item; I would never have left. On my drive home; I was thinking that aircraft X was an aircraft that we had received from [company 2] and [engineering order] #xxxxx may have never been applied on conformity from them. Therefore; using the [engineering order] has a reference in any fashion would not have been legal; even the way my lead and [maintenance control] wanted to use it. The next day; I went to quality control and spoke with an inspector. He looked up for me that [engineering order] #xxxxx had never been applied to the aircraft. In pmi; my lead released the plane by installing the straps per just the one step the [engineering order] and placing the data plate on [non-essential equipment furnishing]. This was non-compliant. The remainder of the [engineering order] was not filled out north/a by quality control; and doubly the [engineering order] cannot be used as a follow on reference because it had never been complied with previously. The night of the original event the aircraft flew to station where mx there installed the data plate using amm 32-20as a reference and not the [engineering order]. I saw the aircraft recently and noted the data plate and straps on not installed correctly per the [engineering order]# R32011. The aircraft is currently flying in this configuration as of the writing of this report. Lastly; the next day I happen to have a gate call at the same gate as aircraft X from the night before. The ramp crew stated my lead; who came out and did the non-compliant procedure was demeaning me publicly to the ramp and flight crew stating I refused to do what was asked and had gone home. I refused to do what was asked because it was non-compliant. Again; no supervisor on duty input ever took place during this entire event. I think the behavior of my lead and [maintenance control] speaks to a cultural issue that exists from time to time below the surface that needs to be addressed. Had this been a safety of flight item; I would have never left and I would have stood my ground against doing something non-compliant as long as necessary.I did some further follow up on the data plate. The conformity from [company 2] jobcard does contain the procedure to install the data plate per the [engineering order] #xxxxx. However; per pmi; the [engineering order] does not show as complied with. Furthermore; this fleet is currently cycling through station ZZZ for gear changes. I noted the gear on aircraft aircraft X was changed in july 2019. The data plates on the nose struts are not being attached per the [engineering order]. I have also noted several other aircraft (post ZZZ gear change) with incorrectly installed data plates. I referred all of this to my quality control manager.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Technician reported refusing to work on aircraft because the verbal instructions he was ordered to comply with deviated from the references and were non compliant.

Narrative: I was given a gate call for Aircraft X for 'broken straps' on nose gear from my Lead Mechanic. I went to the aircraft and noted the data plate on the nose strut was damaged and barely still attached to the strut assembly. There were no retaining straps on the strut for the data plate. The data plate had only been attached by adhesive on the back of the data plate and a perimeter seal of aerodynamic sealant of the data plate. The aircraft was fully boarded and due out in 6 minutes when I arrived at the gate. There are 2 [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing] that refer to the straps for the nose gear data plate and the data plate itself. The [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing] for the straps says the data plate must be secure (at this point I had removed the damaged data plate since it was barely hanging onto the strut). The [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing] for the data plate does not cover the straps. I thought I would be able to apply both [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing] and release the aircraft. I called [Maintenance Control] and explained and they said I could not apply both [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing] because the one for the straps said the data plate needed to be secure. I relayed this information to my lead and pulled a reference [Company 1] [Engineering Order] #XXXXX to replace the data plate and straps. I went to the hangar to get the required materials from stores. At the hangar; I spoke to Quality Control. I asked about installing the straps using the [Engineering Order] as reference and having Quality Control N/A the rest of the [Engineering Order]. He expressed no interest in doing this. I returned to the gate with all the parts to complete the [Engineering Order] entirely. My lead was on the phone with [Maintenance Control]. [Maintenance Control] was telling my Lead that I should put the straps on the nose strut and reference the one step on the [Engineering Order] and then put the data plate on [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing]. I told him I was fine with that; however; that per the GMM 7-10 page 3 under jobcards/[Engineering Authorization]/[Engineering Order] work procedures it states the uncompleted steps on the [Engineering Order] needed to be marked N/A by Quality Control. My lead had a phone conversation with Quality Control and Quality Control did not want to do this. At this point; the flight was approximately 2 hours delayed. [Maintenance Control] and my Lead began to get agitated that I would not do what they were asking. I told them what they were asking me to do was non-compliant and the [Engineering Order] uncompleted steps needed to be N/A by Quality Control. Any Supervisor on duty was completely absent during this with no input. I was again asked to do the non-compliant procedure and refused. At this point; I was 1 hour past my scheduled end of shift and decided to go home as to avoid confrontation. Had this been a safety of flight item; I would never have left. On my drive home; I was thinking that Aircraft X was an aircraft that we had received from [Company 2] and [Engineering Order] #XXXXX may have never been applied on conformity from them. Therefore; using the [Engineering Order] has a reference in any fashion would not have been legal; even the way my lead and [Maintenance Control] wanted to use it. The next day; I went to Quality Control and spoke with an inspector. He looked up for me that [Engineering Order] #XXXXX had never been applied to the aircraft. In PMI; my Lead released the plane by installing the straps per just the one step the [Engineering Order] and placing the data plate on [Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing]. This was non-compliant. The remainder of the [Engineering Order] was not filled out N/A by Quality Control; and doubly the [Engineering Order] cannot be used as a follow on reference because it had never been complied with previously. The night of the original event the aircraft flew to station where MX there installed the data plate using AMM 32-20as a reference and not the [Engineering Order]. I saw the aircraft recently and noted the data plate and straps on not installed correctly per the [Engineering Order]# R32011. The aircraft is currently flying in this configuration as of the writing of this report. Lastly; the next day I happen to have a gate call at the same gate as Aircraft X from the night before. The ramp crew stated my lead; who came out and did the non-compliant procedure was demeaning me publicly to the ramp and flight crew stating I refused to do what was asked and had gone home. I refused to do what was asked because it was non-compliant. Again; no supervisor on duty input ever took place during this entire event. I think the behavior of my lead and [Maintenance Control] speaks to a cultural issue that exists from time to time below the surface that needs to be addressed. Had this been a safety of flight item; I would have never left and I would have stood my ground against doing something non-compliant as long as necessary.I did some further follow up on the data plate. The conformity from [Company 2] jobcard does contain the procedure to install the data plate per the [Engineering Order] #XXXXX. However; per PMI; the [Engineering Order] does not show as complied with. Furthermore; this fleet is currently cycling through station ZZZ for gear changes. I noted the gear on aircraft Aircraft X was changed in July 2019. The data plates on the nose struts are not being attached per the [Engineering Order]. I have also noted several other aircraft (post ZZZ gear change) with incorrectly installed data plates. I referred all of this to my Quality Control Manager.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.