Narrative:

Captain was pilot flying; and I (first officer) was pilot monitoring. First leg of a 4 day sequence. Flight was uneventful until arrival -to-approach phase into ZZZZ. Night flight isolated thunderstorms; with moderate turbulence. We were cleared for the STAR; ILS DME runway xx. During before landing checklist the recall step turned our attention to a pack light that had temporarily illuminated and created a distraction in the cockpit; it was determined it was illuminated for temporary changes in duct pressure. Now below 10;000 ft. MSL; once cleared for the approach; pilot flying set up the mode control panel automation for an ILS approach. It is unknown whether the event occurred because of automation malfunction or self-induced automation errors that occurred as a result from the aforementioned distraction. This led to a situation where we were temporarily without proper navigation indications. Lateral mode had reverted to control wheel steering in the roll mode. Pilot monitoring lost flight director indications. Pilot flying was able to restore glide-slope indications on pilot flying side. In an attempt to restore proper navigation indications to both pilots displays; the pilot monitoring told the captain: 'hey let's level off; tell ATC and get a turn out and fix this automation'; followed by 'hey time-out' 'I'm not comfortable lets figure this out'; and finally I spoke directly to ATC and requested a turn to holding to troubleshoot the problem; but aircraft did not because the captain told me to tell ATC that we were continuing. We were able to restore partial navigation indications to the captain side of the cockpit. The captain was determined to continue the approach in an effort to safely land with working but degraded navigation equipment. I tried to encourage the captain to discontinue the approach and restore proper navigation displays to both sides while in holding. It is important to mention that we were carrying plenty of ferried fuel to divert: we had all the time necessary to fix the problem (we landed with 12;000 lbs. Of fuel; or approximately 2 hours of fuel). I believed that discontinuing the approach and going to holding to be the safest course of action. I utilized all cockpit resource management strategies to help the captain make the right decision to discontinue the approach and go to holding to restore proper navigational inputs to both displays. After exhausting all efforts to do this; and being told to tell ATC we are continuing; I helped the captain make the best approach possible. I had to be very directive on configuration and airspeed. Additionally; I am writing this report because it is unknown if we were fully flap configured by 1;000 ft. AGL. In any case; not having flaps in the fully configured landing position we should have executed a go-around; I as pilot monitoring should have called for the go-around when it was not executed by the captain. However; I feel it necessary to mention that I am not confident the captain would have responded to my go-around call as I had exhausted all attempts to help him discontinue the approach earlier. Other than the flaps; we were stabilized and I did not want to have to wrestle the pilot for the flight controls if he decided to not go-around. Under the circumstances I felt that a stabilized landing was the safer option; and ultimately it is what occurred.this event occurred when a distraction led to an error being introduced to the mode control panel. It is unknown if it was crew or navigational degradation that caused this loss of navigational display. This led to a situation where we were temporarily without proper navigation indications. This event was further compounded by the captain's resistance to suggestions from the first officer (myself) to discontinue the approach in an effort to fix unknown navigational issues. I think we should further emphasize the use and implementation of protected phrases; example: 'I'm in the yellow; I'm in the red.' and how unfamiliar crews can better communicate when there is high task loading.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported multiple instrument failures that resulted in an unstabilized approach.

Narrative: Captain was Pilot flying; and I (First Officer) was Pilot Monitoring. First leg of a 4 day sequence. Flight was uneventful until arrival -to-approach phase into ZZZZ. Night flight isolated thunderstorms; with moderate turbulence. We were cleared for the STAR; ILS DME Runway XX. During before landing checklist the recall step turned our attention to a Pack light that had temporarily illuminated and created a distraction in the cockpit; it was determined it was illuminated for temporary changes in duct pressure. Now below 10;000 ft. MSL; once cleared for the approach; pilot flying set up the mode control panel automation for an ILS approach. It is unknown whether the event occurred because of automation malfunction or self-induced automation errors that occurred as a result from the aforementioned distraction. This led to a situation where we were temporarily without proper navigation indications. Lateral mode had reverted to control wheel steering in the roll mode. Pilot monitoring lost flight director indications. Pilot flying was able to restore glide-slope indications on pilot flying side. In an attempt to restore proper navigation indications to both pilots displays; the pilot monitoring told the Captain: 'hey let's level off; tell ATC and get a turn out and fix this automation'; followed by 'hey time-out' 'I'm not comfortable lets figure this out'; and finally I spoke directly to ATC and requested a turn to holding to troubleshoot the problem; but aircraft did not because the Captain told me to tell ATC that we were continuing. We were able to restore partial navigation indications to the Captain side of the cockpit. The Captain was determined to continue the approach in an effort to safely land with working but degraded navigation equipment. I tried to encourage the Captain to discontinue the approach and restore proper navigation displays to both sides while in holding. It is important to mention that we were carrying plenty of ferried fuel to divert: we had all the time necessary to fix the problem (we landed with 12;000 lbs. of fuel; or approximately 2 hours of fuel). I believed that discontinuing the approach and going to holding to be the safest course of action. I utilized all cockpit resource management strategies to help the Captain make the right decision to discontinue the approach and go to holding to restore proper navigational inputs to both displays. After exhausting all efforts to do this; and being told to tell ATC we are continuing; I helped the Captain make the best approach possible. I had to be very directive on configuration and airspeed. Additionally; I am writing this report because it is unknown if we were fully flap configured by 1;000 ft. AGL. In any case; not having flaps in the fully configured landing position we should have executed a go-around; I as Pilot Monitoring should have called for the go-around when it was not executed by the Captain. However; I feel it necessary to mention that I am not confident the Captain would have responded to my go-around call as I had exhausted all attempts to help him discontinue the approach earlier. Other than the flaps; we were stabilized and I did not want to have to wrestle the pilot for the flight controls if he decided to not go-around. Under the circumstances I felt that a stabilized landing was the safer option; and ultimately it is what occurred.This event occurred when a distraction led to an error being introduced to the mode control panel. It is unknown if it was crew or navigational degradation that caused this loss of navigational display. This led to a situation where we were temporarily without proper navigation indications. This event was further compounded by the Captain's resistance to suggestions from the First Officer (myself) to discontinue the approach in an effort to fix unknown navigational issues. I think we should further emphasize the use and implementation of protected phrases; example: 'I'm in the yellow; I'm in the red.' And how unfamiliar crews can better communicate when there is high task loading.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.