Narrative:

I was originally informed by the union as well as the chief pilot's office that the time limit had expired to file a report. However; I have now learned that exceptions are made and that program office may accept this report. On descent into hartford; the WX was 2 mi visibility in rain and 300 ft overcast. The captain was flying and briefed a flaps 30 approach and landing to runway 6. He briefed a captain flown approach using the autoplt and the HUD. The descent was normal until turning final when we realized a strong tailwind of about 30 KTS. Tower then called and advised us what to do in the event of a go around. I believe it was a hint. It became evident to me at that time that meeting stabilized approach criteria may be a little tough. We intercepted the localizer and lowered the landing gear as well as began configuring the wing flaps. Approaching 1000 ft AGL; I was sure that we were not going to meet stabilized approach criteria. The captain called for flaps 40 degrees and disconnected the autoplt in an attempt to save the approach. I called for a go around at 1000 ft. The airspeed was increasing. The vertical speed was in excess of 2000 FPM; the GS was full scale deflection down; the throttles were at idle and we had now drifted 1.5 dots right of course on the localizer. The captain responded to my go around call with something like; 'we're ok.' I then called all the deviations as required; airspeed; localizer; sink rate and GS. He did not respond. The airspeed had increased enough now to force the flaps to 'blow' back up to 30 degrees. I did consider taking control of the aircraft; but I hesitated to consider what the captain's reaction would be and I did not want a fight in the cockpit at that time. By the time I hesitated; we were approaching minimums and I made the approaching minimums call. Just prior to minimums; the runway became visible; the excessive descent rate continued down below the GS to about 1.5 DOT to which I called 'GS' as did the aircraft. The captain slowly leveled off and we landed normally and taxied to the gate. I tried to discuss it with the captain but he just said 'sorry' and did not want to discuss it. I was disappointed in myself for not taking the aircraft from the captain. I was distressed that he had put me in that position. I was angry he did not go around at my command. I feel I failed my responsibility to myself; my family; my passenger; my airline and my captain. Contributing factors may include the fact that I believe we have a strong 'captain's aircraft' mentality at our company. I did not want to piss off a captain by taking 'his' aircraft from his control. I realize now that I had a responsibility to do so as written in our operations manual. I also believe the captain became fixated on the GS and omitted everything else. I will be more vigilant than ever from that point forward on ensuring we do meet all stabilized approach criteria. I will not hesitate in the future to take the airplane from a captain despite the atmosphere. Supplemental information from acn 680156: I would like to remark that nowhere in the company operations manual does it talk about checking wind components prior to landing confign of the plane. Once GS capture occurred; I disconnected autoplt and reduced vertical speed for future flaps 40 degree extension. At this point; we were above GS with tailwind 25-30 NM and V target speed 155-160 KTS. By the time we crossed 1000 ft callout; we had several deviations; but I was so concentrated upon flying according to all parameters that I disregarded the first officer's suggestive comment: 'maybe we should go around?' had he/she voices this comment in a less casual and more assertive manner; something like: 'unstabilized approach; go around!' I would have immediately turned the plane around. I have learned the following lessons from this incident: 1) under all uncomfortable landing circumstances; it is better to go around and give oneself time to evaluate the situation; rather than continuing on the way and trying to meet the parameters. 2) before flying with a first officer for the first time; it is important to let him or her know that the captain is not the supreme authority/authorized whose decisions cannot be questioned. It is necessary to make the first officer feel that;if he or she is uncomfortable with something during the flight; he/she can always voice personal opinion assertively and expect it to be taken into account.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FO IS RELUCTANT TO ASSERT CTL OF THE ACFT DURING HIGHLY UNSTABILIZED INST APCH TO BDL. CAPT CONTINUES APCH TO MINIMUMS; BREAKS OUT AND LANDS.

Narrative: I WAS ORIGINALLY INFORMED BY THE UNION AS WELL AS THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE THAT THE TIME LIMIT HAD EXPIRED TO FILE A RPT. HOWEVER; I HAVE NOW LEARNED THAT EXCEPTIONS ARE MADE AND THAT PROGRAM OFFICE MAY ACCEPT THIS RPT. ON DSCNT INTO HARTFORD; THE WX WAS 2 MI VISIBILITY IN RAIN AND 300 FT OVCST. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND BRIEFED A FLAPS 30 APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 6. HE BRIEFED A CAPT FLOWN APCH USING THE AUTOPLT AND THE HUD. THE DSCNT WAS NORMAL UNTIL TURNING FINAL WHEN WE REALIZED A STRONG TAILWIND OF ABOUT 30 KTS. TWR THEN CALLED AND ADVISED US WHAT TO DO IN THE EVENT OF A GAR. I BELIEVE IT WAS A HINT. IT BECAME EVIDENT TO ME AT THAT TIME THAT MEETING STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA MAY BE A LITTLE TOUGH. WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR AS WELL AS BEGAN CONFIGURING THE WING FLAPS. APCHING 1000 FT AGL; I WAS SURE THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MEET STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE THE APCH. I CALLED FOR A GAR AT 1000 FT. THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING. THE VERT SPD WAS IN EXCESS OF 2000 FPM; THE GS WAS FULL SCALE DEFLECTION DOWN; THE THROTTLES WERE AT IDLE AND WE HAD NOW DRIFTED 1.5 DOTS R OF COURSE ON THE LOC. THE CAPT RESPONDED TO MY GAR CALL WITH SOMETHING LIKE; 'WE'RE OK.' I THEN CALLED ALL THE DEVS AS REQUIRED; AIRSPD; LOC; SINK RATE AND GS. HE DID NOT RESPOND. THE AIRSPD HAD INCREASED ENOUGH NOW TO FORCE THE FLAPS TO 'BLOW' BACK UP TO 30 DEGS. I DID CONSIDER TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT; BUT I HESITATED TO CONSIDER WHAT THE CAPT'S REACTION WOULD BE AND I DID NOT WANT A FIGHT IN THE COCKPIT AT THAT TIME. BY THE TIME I HESITATED; WE WERE APCHING MINIMUMS AND I MADE THE APCHING MINIMUMS CALL. JUST PRIOR TO MINIMUMS; THE RWY BECAME VISIBLE; THE EXCESSIVE DSCNT RATE CONTINUED DOWN BELOW THE GS TO ABOUT 1.5 DOT TO WHICH I CALLED 'GS' AS DID THE ACFT. THE CAPT SLOWLY LEVELED OFF AND WE LANDED NORMALLY AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. I TRIED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE CAPT BUT HE JUST SAID 'SORRY' AND DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN MYSELF FOR NOT TAKING THE ACFT FROM THE CAPT. I WAS DISTRESSED THAT HE HAD PUT ME IN THAT POS. I WAS ANGRY HE DID NOT GO AROUND AT MY COMMAND. I FEEL I FAILED MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MYSELF; MY FAMILY; MY PAX; MY AIRLINE AND MY CAPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY INCLUDE THE FACT THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE A STRONG 'CAPT'S ACFT' MENTALITY AT OUR COMPANY. I DID NOT WANT TO PISS OFF A CAPT BY TAKING 'HIS' ACFT FROM HIS CTL. I REALIZE NOW THAT I HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO AS WRITTEN IN OUR OPS MANUAL. I ALSO BELIEVE THE CAPT BECAME FIXATED ON THE GS AND OMITTED EVERYTHING ELSE. I WILL BE MORE VIGILANT THAN EVER FROM THAT POINT FORWARD ON ENSURING WE DO MEET ALL STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. I WILL NOT HESITATE IN THE FUTURE TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE FROM A CAPT DESPITE THE ATMOSPHERE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 680156: I WOULD LIKE TO REMARK THAT NOWHERE IN THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL DOES IT TALK ABOUT CHKING WIND COMPONENTS PRIOR TO LNDG CONFIGN OF THE PLANE. ONCE GS CAPTURE OCCURRED; I DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND REDUCED VERT SPD FOR FUTURE FLAPS 40 DEG EXTENSION. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE ABOVE GS WITH TAILWIND 25-30 NM AND V TARGET SPD 155-160 KTS. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED 1000 FT CALLOUT; WE HAD SEVERAL DEVS; BUT I WAS SO CONCENTRATED UPON FLYING ACCORDING TO ALL PARAMETERS THAT I DISREGARDED THE FO'S SUGGESTIVE COMMENT: 'MAYBE WE SHOULD GO AROUND?' HAD HE/SHE VOICES THIS COMMENT IN A LESS CASUAL AND MORE ASSERTIVE MANNER; SOMETHING LIKE: 'UNSTABILIZED APCH; GO AROUND!' I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE PLANE AROUND. I HAVE LEARNED THE FOLLOWING LESSONS FROM THIS INCIDENT: 1) UNDER ALL UNCOMFORTABLE LNDG CIRCUMSTANCES; IT IS BETTER TO GO AROUND AND GIVE ONESELF TIME TO EVALUATE THE SIT; RATHER THAN CONTINUING ON THE WAY AND TRYING TO MEET THE PARAMETERS. 2) BEFORE FLYING WITH A FO FOR THE FIRST TIME; IT IS IMPORTANT TO LET HIM OR HER KNOW THAT THE CAPT IS NOT THE SUPREME AUTH WHOSE DECISIONS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED. IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE FO FEEL THAT;IF HE OR SHE IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH SOMETHING DURING THE FLT; HE/SHE CAN ALWAYS VOICE PERSONAL OPINION ASSERTIVELY AND EXPECT IT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.