Narrative:

We were level at 8;000 ft. 25 miles east of ZZZ. Approximately 5 miles to the visual to runway xxl we heard a pop and then felt a vibration throughout the aircraft. Engine indications indicated rollback on #2 engine; yaw; and roll were observed. Captain was flying; turned off the auto pilot and auto throttles and hand flew. Captain and first officer verified #2 engine failure. First officer immediately [advised ATC]. Captain and first officer assessed the engine; did the immediate action items for severe engine damage; followed up with the qrc; and completed the checklists in the QRH. Tower continued; rightfully; for more information (souls; fuel; state of engine; etc.). Captain took the radios; passed the pertinent info as well as requesting fire truck support; and continued to fly the airplane. First officer continued with the checklists. QRH severe engine damage was completed including pulling the fire handle. At step number seven we verified we still had vibrations at 230 kts. With the engine secure. We went to the one engine inoperative checklist. We completed all checklist at about 1;000 ft. AGL and cleared to land. We completed a normal engine out flaps 15 landing and roll out and cleared the runway onto the parallel taxiway. On taxiway X; facing east; we stopped at xx where the firetrucks met us. A discrete frequency was given; and the first officer talked with 'red dog' (crash fire rescue); and ground control. Captain talked with the passengers explain the situation; to remain seated; and we would taxi back to the gate. A separate call to the flight attendants confirmed people were seated. Crash fire rescue indicated the engine looked secure and we single engine taxi back to the gate with one fire vehicle following. The only out of order steps that the captain chose to do after [requesting priority handling] was to start the APU immediately. While the first officer was completing the extensive checklist the captain also turned off the flap inhibit switch; selected flaps 15 speeds in the FMC and turned the engine ignition on the good engine to cont. The captain decided to use captains authority for this checklist deviation as configuring for a single engine landing was more preferred than a complex high altitude go around with terrain at las vegas. The first officer followed up with all of these items as he completed the checklists at 1;000 ft. Upon debrief with maintenance it appeared through data link that it was #4 engine bearing seal failure and N1 seized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported an engine failure during initial approach to landing.

Narrative: We were level at 8;000 ft. 25 miles east of ZZZ. Approximately 5 miles to the visual to Runway XXL we heard a pop and then felt a vibration throughout the aircraft. Engine indications indicated rollback on #2 engine; yaw; and roll were observed. Captain was flying; turned off the auto pilot and auto throttles and hand flew. Captain and First Officer verified #2 engine failure. First Officer immediately [advised ATC]. Captain and First Officer assessed the engine; did the immediate action items for severe engine damage; followed up with the QRC; and completed the checklists in the QRH. Tower continued; rightfully; for more information (souls; fuel; state of engine; etc.). Captain took the radios; passed the pertinent info as well as requesting fire truck support; and continued to fly the airplane. First Officer continued with the checklists. QRH severe engine damage was completed including pulling the fire handle. At step number seven we verified we still had vibrations at 230 kts. with the engine secure. We went to the one engine inoperative checklist. We completed all checklist at about 1;000 ft. AGL and cleared to land. We completed a normal engine out flaps 15 landing and roll out and cleared the runway onto the parallel taxiway. On Taxiway X; facing east; we stopped at XX where the firetrucks met us. A discrete frequency was given; and the First Officer talked with 'Red Dog' (Crash Fire Rescue); and Ground Control. Captain talked with the passengers explain the situation; to remain seated; and we would taxi back to the gate. A separate call to the Flight Attendants confirmed people were seated. Crash Fire Rescue indicated the engine looked secure and we single engine taxi back to the gate with one fire vehicle following. The only out of order steps that the Captain chose to do after [requesting priority handling] was to start the APU immediately. While the First Officer was completing the extensive checklist the Captain also turned off the flap inhibit switch; selected flaps 15 speeds in the FMC and turned the engine ignition on the good engine to CONT. The Captain decided to use Captains Authority for this checklist deviation as configuring for a single engine landing was more preferred than a complex high altitude go around with terrain at Las Vegas. The First Officer followed up with all of these items as he completed the checklists at 1;000 ft. Upon debrief with Maintenance it appeared through data link that it was #4 engine bearing seal failure and N1 seized.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.