Narrative:

Prior to the flight in ZZZ1 while exchanging command with the inbound crew they apologized for their delay due to two maintenance items found in ZZZ2 prior to their flight. One of these items was hydraulic fluid found around the landing gear; the inbound captain informed me that maintenance in ZZZ2 had informed him not to submit the items to the [logbook]; but he indicated that after maintenance fixed and serviced both items (including the hydraulic fluid) the aircraft operated normally for the flight from ZZZ2-ZZZ1. The flight from ZZZ1-ZZZ was uneventful aside from moderate turbulence enroute due to weather. On approach to ZZZ we were initially given an ATC initiated missed approach due to decreased separation from the deteriorating weather and the inability to continue prm (precision runway monitor) approaches. During this approach the gear was not extended. We were now noting our fuel was worth monitoring; but not in a critical state. On the 2nd approach we extended the landing gear; immediately I noted the extension both sounded and felt different from a normal extension. My attention immediately went to monitoring the landing gear indications which still showed in transit but felt was taking longer than normal. We received a hydraulic pump 3A caution message approximately 10 seconds after extension and I immediately checked the circuit breaker panel above the first officer's head to determine if the pump had been overexerted and popped; but found it was still in. At this point I brought up the hydraulic synoptic page which indicated 0% fluid in hydraulic system 3; it was about this point we also received the gear disagree warning message accompanied by a hydraulic 3 lo press caution message. We informed ATC that we needed to cancel our approach and be vectored to an area to work on a problem. I communicated to the first officer we had a time threat limited by our fuel state; delegated him to declare an emergency and handed him the block start report which had souls on board for to relay to ATC. I also transferred controls and radios to him and asked him to find us a 'spot' southwest of ZZZ3 where we could run our checklist and manage the problem. I also asked him to ACARS maintenance our issue and to ask dispatch for our nearest suitable VFR airport in case we had to face a potential gear up landing. At this point I began running the QRH and eventually was able to lower the landing gear via manual extension. I then called the flight attendant (who was on her first trip after IOE) and gave her a full briefing. I informed her that with the gear down and locked I anticipated a normal landing; with no need to brace; and no expectation for an evacuation or expedited deplaning. I then made a PA for the passengers and informed them of the situation and that our landing gear was safely locked. I told them to that we would be landing and sitting on the runway for some time; we would have fire personnel in and around the aircraft. I told them to not feel alarmed and that this is a normal process and to remain seated; calm; and to listen to both the direction of our flight attendant and myself. I came back from the PA and informed the first officer to set us up on a long final for runway xxc; ATC recommended runway xxl for their operations; after discussing; we agreed 10L would be better as it was longer. I then proceeded to accomplish the hydraulic 3 lo press caution message and nose gear door open warning message QRH procedures. We then briefed the approach; discussed that if we went missed we would immediately be going to msn as they were VFR; and with the gear being stuck in the down position; fuel would be critical because of the added drag and burn. We also discussed lack of nosewheel steering; possible asymmetric thrust during thrust reverser deployment; and loss of inboard braking resulting in the possibility of both pilots needing to brake together. At this point I asked my first officer if he had anything he felt I had missed or would be doing anything differently as well as if we are happy standing by our decision making at this point. We both agreed we were in the best position we could be at this point; stood by our decisions and were safe to go into ZZZ3 for landing. I then briefly checked in with the flight attendant and she said she was seated and ready for landing and the cabin was secure. During the approach at 5;000 ft; our ILS glideslope was acting erratically and captured prematurely; causing the aircraft to climb approximately 500 ft. I disconnected the autopilot and leveled the aircraft; then chose to recapture at 5;500 ft and monitor the glideslope behavior before reengaging the autopilot. We landed without issue and were able to stop fairly quickly with maximum reverse thrust. I immediately made an announcement over the PA for passengers to remain seated; to listen to mine and the flight attendant's direction; and to not be alarmed by fire personnel around the aircraft. Crash fire rescue met us at the aircraft and inspected both brakes and landing gear and noted no irregularities. During this time they requested an engine shutdown; which I secured #1 normally; allowing for us to still have outboard brake pressure. I did not shutdown the #2 engine until aircraft tow arrived and connected to the aircraft. Aircraft was towed with no other issues; proceeded to stand and greet all passengers as they deplaned; all seemed in mostly positive spirit. No injuries.follow up would be required from maintenance personnel in ZZZ2 on whether proper procedures were followed with regards to [logbook] discrepancies and whether a proper corrective action for a possible hydraulic leak were followed. Judging by the lack of fluid in our system after we extended the landing gear; the exertion on the system exacerbated a leak causing the entire system to drain and fail.retraining for maintenance personnel in regards to proper documentation of all discrepancies. I know as a pilot it would have been proper to stop the operation in ZZZ until proper documentation was made; but I was a third party to a conversation I was not present for and the inbound captain informed me the aircraft was operating normally. At that point there were no known discrepancies which makes it hard for me to create a write up for something I was not present for.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported a loss of hydraulic fluid that resulted in a diversion.

Narrative: Prior to the flight in ZZZ1 while exchanging command with the inbound crew they apologized for their delay due to two maintenance items found in ZZZ2 prior to their flight. One of these items was hydraulic fluid found around the landing gear; the inbound Captain informed me that Maintenance in ZZZ2 had informed him not to submit the items to the [logbook]; but he indicated that after Maintenance fixed and serviced both items (including the hydraulic fluid) the aircraft operated normally for the flight from ZZZ2-ZZZ1. The flight from ZZZ1-ZZZ was uneventful aside from moderate turbulence enroute due to weather. On approach to ZZZ we were initially given an ATC initiated Missed Approach due to decreased separation from the deteriorating weather and the inability to continue PRM (Precision Runway Monitor) approaches. During this approach the gear was not extended. We were now noting our fuel was worth monitoring; but not in a critical state. On the 2nd approach we extended the landing gear; immediately I noted the extension both sounded and felt different from a normal extension. My attention immediately went to monitoring the landing gear indications which still showed in transit but felt was taking longer than normal. We received a HYD PUMP 3A Caution message approximately 10 seconds after extension and I immediately checked the Circuit Breaker Panel above the First Officer's head to determine if the pump had been overexerted and popped; but found it was still in. At this point I brought up the Hydraulic Synoptic Page which indicated 0% fluid in Hydraulic System 3; it was about this point we also received the GEAR DISAGREE warning message accompanied by a HYD 3 LO PRESS Caution message. We informed ATC that we needed to cancel our approach and be vectored to an area to work on a problem. I communicated to the First Officer we had a time threat limited by our fuel state; delegated him to declare an emergency and handed him the Block Start Report which had Souls on Board for to relay to ATC. I also transferred controls and radios to him and asked him to find us a 'spot' southwest of ZZZ3 where we could run our checklist and manage the problem. I also asked him to ACARS Maintenance our issue and to ask Dispatch for our nearest suitable VFR airport in case we had to face a potential gear up landing. At this point I began running the QRH and eventually was able to lower the landing gear via Manual Extension. I then called the Flight Attendant (who was on her first trip after IOE) and gave her a full briefing. I informed her that with the gear down and locked I anticipated a normal landing; with no need to brace; and no expectation for an evacuation or expedited deplaning. I then made a PA for the passengers and informed them of the situation and that our landing gear was safely locked. I told them to that we would be landing and sitting on the runway for some time; we would have fire personnel in and around the aircraft. I told them to not feel alarmed and that this is a normal process and to remain seated; calm; and to listen to both the direction of our Flight Attendant and myself. I came back from the PA and informed the First Officer to set us up on a long final for Runway XXC; ATC recommended Runway XXL for their operations; after discussing; we agreed 10L would be better as it was longer. I then proceeded to accomplish the HYD 3 LO PRESS Caution message and NOSE GEAR DOOR Open Warning Message QRH procedures. We then briefed the approach; discussed that if we went missed we would immediately be going to MSN as they were VFR; and with the gear being stuck in the down position; fuel would be critical because of the added drag and burn. We also discussed lack of nosewheel steering; possible asymmetric thrust during thrust reverser deployment; and loss of inboard braking resulting in the possibility of both pilots needing to brake together. At this point I asked my First Officer if he had anything he felt I had missed or would be doing anything differently as well as if we are happy standing by our decision making at this point. We both agreed we were in the best position we could be at this point; stood by our decisions and were safe to go into ZZZ3 for landing. I then briefly checked in with the Flight Attendant and she said she was seated and ready for landing and the cabin was secure. During the approach at 5;000 ft; our ILS Glideslope was acting erratically and captured prematurely; causing the aircraft to climb approximately 500 ft. I disconnected the autopilot and leveled the aircraft; then chose to recapture at 5;500 ft and monitor the glideslope behavior before reengaging the autopilot. We landed without issue and were able to stop fairly quickly with maximum reverse thrust. I immediately made an announcement over the PA for passengers to remain seated; to listen to mine and the Flight Attendant's direction; and to not be alarmed by fire personnel around the aircraft. Crash Fire Rescue met us at the aircraft and inspected both brakes and landing gear and noted no irregularities. During this time they requested an engine shutdown; which I secured #1 normally; allowing for us to still have outboard brake pressure. I did not shutdown the #2 engine until aircraft tow arrived and connected to the aircraft. Aircraft was towed with no other issues; proceeded to stand and greet all passengers as they deplaned; all seemed in mostly positive spirit. No injuries.Follow up would be required from Maintenance personnel in ZZZ2 on whether proper procedures were followed with regards to [logbook] Discrepancies and whether a proper corrective action for a possible hydraulic leak were followed. Judging by the lack of fluid in our system after we extended the landing gear; the exertion on the system exacerbated a leak causing the entire system to drain and fail.Retraining for maintenance personnel in regards to proper documentation of all discrepancies. I know as a pilot it would have been proper to stop the operation in ZZZ until proper documentation was made; but I was a third party to a conversation I was not present for and the inbound Captain informed me the aircraft was operating normally. At that point there were no known discrepancies which makes it hard for me to create a write up for something I was not present for.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.