Narrative:

Primarily; the cause was the weather. Due to our fast upgrades a significant percentage of our first officers have no winter operations experience and have required significant instruction while transitioning into winter ops. The weather caused the need for anti-ice on; the smell of fluid caused the first officer to turn off the packs and bleeds; and the snow is what distracted me from better overseeing all of his actions. The first officer also reported fatigue being a probable cause; he has picked up trips so as to be on the edge of 100 flight hours in the previous month in order to build flight time. It was also an early show after a 12 hour overnight.with that said; it is my responsibility to do monitor and check all of his actions. I stand by my decision to abort given what I knew in that moment but we caused an unsafe situation though inattention that thankfully resulted in a positive outcome.it was early morning in [city]. Conditions were blowing light snow in darkness with somewhat reduced visibility; about 3 miles; and gusty winds down the runway. We started both engines before deicing for appropriate engine warm up; then began towards the runway. After 3 minutes from the end of deicing I asked that we set the aircraft up for the anti-ice ffod test; which was executed successfully. Afterwards; the first officer smelled some anti-ice fluid in the packs and turned them off. We still had about five minutes until our flow departure slot. We performed the taxi checklist and before takeoff items to the box while approaching the runway; but the first officer did not turn the bleeds and packs back on yet reported two packs off the engines. The blowing snow made it quite difficult to establish either taxiway or runway centerline without concentration; so I was especially focused on taxiing; and therefore did not double check his items as well as I should have. Runway braking action was reported good and once lined up the runway markings were visible; so I gave him the controls and assumed the role of pilot monitoring. Just after calling 80 kts. I heard the warning triple chime and saw the EICAS message anti-ice inoperative in icing conditions. While we had passed 80 kts. I did not yet know the source of the problem and was therefore worried that if we took off we may be unable to keep ice from accumulating while troubleshooting the issue or returning to the airport so I brought the thrust levers to max reverse; called for the controls; and brought us to a stop and off the runway. We reported the abort to tower immediately; then ran the rejected takeoff checklist. We looked towards the overhead panel and immediately realized the bleeds and packs were still off; thus precipitating that message. We resolved the problem; performed the after landing; taxi; and before landing checklists; inspected our visible surfaces for ice accretion; performed the before takeoff checklist with more care; and departed without issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ Captain reported that the First Officer had switched off bleed air due to odor; resulting in an EICAS warning and rejected takeoff.

Narrative: Primarily; the cause was the weather. Due to our fast upgrades a significant percentage of our First Officers have no winter operations experience and have required significant instruction while transitioning into winter ops. The weather caused the need for anti-ice on; the smell of fluid caused the First Officer to turn off the packs and bleeds; and the snow is what distracted me from better overseeing all of his actions. The First Officer also reported fatigue being a probable cause; he has picked up trips so as to be on the edge of 100 flight hours in the previous month in order to build flight time. It was also an early show after a 12 hour overnight.With that said; it is my responsibility to do monitor and check all of his actions. I stand by my decision to abort given what I knew in that moment but we caused an unsafe situation though inattention that thankfully resulted in a positive outcome.It was early morning in [City]. Conditions were blowing light snow in darkness with somewhat reduced visibility; about 3 miles; and gusty winds down the runway. We started both engines before deicing for appropriate engine warm up; then began towards the runway. After 3 minutes from the end of deicing I asked that we set the aircraft up for the anti-ice FFOD test; which was executed successfully. Afterwards; the First Officer smelled some anti-ice fluid in the packs and turned them off. We still had about five minutes until our flow departure slot. We performed the taxi checklist and before takeoff items to the box while approaching the runway; but the First Officer did not turn the bleeds and packs back on yet reported two packs off the engines. The blowing snow made it quite difficult to establish either taxiway or runway centerline without concentration; so I was especially focused on taxiing; and therefore did not double check his items as well as I should have. Runway braking action was reported good and once lined up the runway markings were visible; so I gave him the controls and assumed the role of Pilot Monitoring. Just after calling 80 kts. I heard the warning triple chime and saw the EICAS message Anti-Ice Inoperative in Icing conditions. While we had passed 80 kts. I did not yet know the source of the problem and was therefore worried that if we took off we may be unable to keep ice from accumulating while troubleshooting the issue or returning to the airport so I brought the thrust levers to max reverse; called for the controls; and brought us to a stop and off the runway. We reported the abort to Tower immediately; then ran the rejected takeoff checklist. We looked towards the overhead panel and immediately realized the bleeds and packs were still off; thus precipitating that message. We resolved the problem; performed the after landing; taxi; and before landing checklists; inspected our visible surfaces for ice accretion; performed the before takeoff checklist with more care; and departed without issue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.