Narrative:

The event took place as we prepared to push on day two of this trip; but this was my fourth consecutive day of flying. I was tired and ready to get home. We were to fly an aircraft with multiple mels; two of which related to the auto speed brake system being inoperative. As we arrived at the gate; the operations agent had advised that we would also likely have a jumpseater; whom she described as being 'shifty' when she had asked him who he worked for and what he did. Naturally; he showed up to the flight deck about 10 minutes before push; with a boarding pass that read he was approved for the flight deck. Still; I took the time to examine his license and company identification. Turns out he was a newly hired dispatcher with [other carrier]; who wasn't familiar with either the 737 or our jumpseat operation and general procedures. So at what is normally the busiest time in the preflight flow; I took the time to walk him through the operation of the seat; comm and oxygen panels; sterile cockpit and emergency escape procedures; and all the rest that one does with a first-time jumpseater.unfortunately; this left me feeling rushed once we began our preflight briefings and checklists. So even though we had discussed the inoperative auto speed brakes; I completely neglected to ask the first officer to back me up on speed brakes should we conduct an rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff). In addition; and the point of this report; is that when our takeoff performance data arrived via ACARS; I also overlooked the fact that there was no mention of MEL 1 on the 'remarks' page of our performance data. Somehow it had not been applied. Thankfully; the ZZZ weather and runway conditions were ok; and runway xxl provides ample stopping margin. But on reaching cruise; as we began to discuss the weather in ZZZ1; which our release noted may deteriorate and have low ceilings and visibility; we also began discussing our MEL and how it might affect us on arrival into ZZZ1. When we looked at out ZZZ takeoff data again; we realized that the performance hit from inoperative auto speed brakes had not been applied. We then queried dispatch via ACARS to ask whether the MEL had been annotated to our [weight and balance] data and he replied that it was. We responded that it had not been applied to our takeoff data; but that we had overlooked that fact and would be filing an as soon as possible report. As a result; we requested our landing performance data somewhat earlier than normal; and were pleased to note that the MEL was applied to that data. Otherwise; the flight was uneventful; and we never even felt ourselves in the 'yellow;' in this case probably because ignorance is bliss.I'm unfamiliar with the procedures that our dispatchers use to ensure that pertinent mels are correctly applied to performance data; but I imagine that fatigue and backside-of-the-clock duty times affect their performance at least as much as ours. Thankfully; the weather and airport conditions were such that in this case; safety was likely not compromised to any major degree. That's what I'm not sure what can be done to mitigate future episodes of this sort other than trying to maintain vigilance; especially on those days when one is feeling both tired and rushed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported that distraction and time pressure caused a departure with incorrect performance data.

Narrative: The event took place as we prepared to push on day two of this trip; but this was my fourth consecutive day of flying. I was tired and ready to get home. We were to fly an aircraft with multiple MELs; two of which related to the auto speed brake system being inoperative. As we arrived at the gate; the Operations Agent had advised that we would also likely have a jumpseater; whom she described as being 'shifty' when she had asked him who he worked for and what he did. Naturally; he showed up to the flight deck about 10 minutes before push; with a boarding pass that read he was approved for the flight deck. Still; I took the time to examine his license and Company ID. Turns out he was a newly hired Dispatcher with [other carrier]; who wasn't familiar with either the 737 or our jumpseat operation and general procedures. So at what is normally the busiest time in the preflight flow; I took the time to walk him through the operation of the seat; comm and oxygen panels; sterile cockpit and emergency escape procedures; and all the rest that one does with a first-time jumpseater.Unfortunately; this left me feeling rushed once we began our preflight briefings and checklists. So even though we had discussed the inoperative auto speed brakes; I completely neglected to ask the First Officer to back me up on speed brakes should we conduct an RTO (Rejected Takeoff). In addition; and the point of this report; is that when our takeoff performance data arrived via ACARS; I also overlooked the fact that there was no mention of MEL 1 on the 'Remarks' page of our performance data. Somehow it had not been applied. Thankfully; the ZZZ weather and runway conditions were OK; and Runway XXL provides ample stopping margin. But on reaching cruise; as we began to discuss the weather in ZZZ1; which our Release noted may deteriorate and have low ceilings and visibility; we also began discussing our MEL and how it might affect us on arrival into ZZZ1. When we looked at out ZZZ takeoff data again; we realized that the performance hit from inoperative auto speed brakes had not been applied. We then queried Dispatch via ACARS to ask whether the MEL had been annotated to our [weight and balance] data and he replied that it was. We responded that it had not been applied to our takeoff data; but that we had overlooked that fact and would be filing an ASAP report. As a result; we requested our landing performance data somewhat earlier than normal; and were pleased to note that the MEL was applied to that data. Otherwise; the flight was uneventful; and we never even felt ourselves in the 'Yellow;' in this case probably because ignorance is bliss.I'm unfamiliar with the procedures that our dispatchers use to ensure that pertinent MELs are correctly applied to performance data; but I imagine that fatigue and backside-of-the-clock duty times affect their performance at least as much as ours. Thankfully; the weather and airport conditions were such that in this case; Safety was likely not compromised to any major degree. That's what I'm not sure what can be done to mitigate future episodes of this sort other than trying to maintain vigilance; especially on those days when one is feeling both tired and rushed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.