Narrative:

I was captain and pilot flying on flight XXXX ZZZ2-ZZZ. At approximately xa:45 near ZZZ1 airport and approximately 40 minutes from landing; we received the ECAM cautions hydraulic G rsvr lo lvl; G engine 1 pump lo pr; and G system lo pr. These indications of a loss of green hydraulic system quantity were confirmed by the hydraulic page indicating no quantity in the green system. I stated 'my aircraft' and we proceeded with the fix (fly identify execute) strategy. The first officer/pm (first officer / pilot flying) checked the qrc (quick reference checklist) and determined it was not an immediate action or ECAM exception. I transferred aircraft control to the first officer and accomplished the ECAM procedures. Then referenced the QRH for follow up procedures. We also received a call from a flight attendant informing us that they heard a loud noise that sounded like the hydraulic pump and then it stopped. I asked if she could see any fluid or other indications and she said she didn't. I thanked her for the information and informed her we were running a procedure and to contact me if she noticed anything further. After completing the ECAM and QRH follow-up procedures we formulated a plan. We would [request priority handling] with ATC. We were now just a few minutes from start of descent into ZZZ; and we determined a landing at ZZZ would be the safest and most appropriate point of landing. From the procedures; we knew that we would have to gravity extend the gear; the flap/slats would be slow; we would need to accomplish an abnormal landing assessment; normal braking was inoperative (inoperative) but we had alternate braking with anti-skid; and nose wheel steering was inoperative. This would require at least a 15 mile final to accomplish the gravity gear extension procedure and to account for slow moving flaps. Due to inoperative nose wheel steering we would not be able to taxi and a full stop on the runway with a tow in to gate would be required. We also wanted fire equipment standing by and wanted to be inspected upon stopping regarding the fluid leak. I instructed the first officer to send a message to dispatch to communicate our emergency and plan; and to prepare for arrival/landing at ZZZ. I [requested priority landing] with ATC and communicated our problem and plan; including our intention to full stop runway xx and require a tow in. After this; I ran the non-routine landings consideration checklist in the QRH. I contacted the flight attendant's and communicated our emergency and our plan for a precautionary landing and tow-in. I made a PA to do the same for the passengers. We performed a normal descent on the zzzzz arrival to runway xx. At the appropriate time I gave control of the aircraft back to the first officer and extended the landing gear using the QRH left/G gravity extension procedure. I resumed aircraft control after the gear was down and locked and the procedure was completed. We made a normal landing. Aircraft control was noticeably more difficult than I was expecting decelerating through 80 kts. With only differential braking but we maintained centerline just fine. After coming to a stop I made the PA to remain seated and that we would be inspected by safety vehicles. The safety vehicles performed their inspection and informed us of an obvious hydraulic leak on the number one engine. After performing the after landing flows; we shut down both engines. Dispatch had already coordinated with operations for the tow in crew and they met the aircraft within a few minutes. We were towed into the gate with one of the fire vehicles following us. The first officer; flight attendants; ATC; fire crews; dispatch; operations; and ground crew all did an exemplary job throughout this event.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported a leak in the green hydraulic system prior to top of descent.

Narrative: I was Captain and Pilot Flying on Flight XXXX ZZZ2-ZZZ. At approximately XA:45 near ZZZ1 airport and approximately 40 minutes from landing; we received the ECAM Cautions HYD G RSVR LO LVL; G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR; AND G SYS LO PR. These indications of a loss of Green Hydraulic System Quantity were confirmed by the Hydraulic page indicating no quantity in the Green system. I stated 'my aircraft' and we proceeded with the FIX (Fly Identify Execute) strategy. The FO/PM (First Officer / Pilot Flying) checked the QRC (Quick Reference Checklist) and determined it was not an Immediate Action or ECAM exception. I transferred aircraft control to the FO and accomplished the ECAM procedures. Then referenced the QRH for follow up procedures. We also received a call from a flight attendant informing us that they heard a loud noise that sounded like the hydraulic pump and then it stopped. I asked if she could see any fluid or other indications and she said she didn't. I thanked her for the information and informed her we were running a procedure and to contact me if she noticed anything further. After completing the ECAM and QRH follow-up procedures we formulated a plan. We would [request priority handling] with ATC. We were now just a few minutes from start of descent into ZZZ; and we determined a landing at ZZZ would be the safest and most appropriate point of landing. From the procedures; we knew that we would have to gravity extend the gear; the flap/slats would be slow; we would need to accomplish an abnormal landing assessment; normal braking was INOP (Inoperative) but we had alternate braking with Anti-Skid; and nose wheel steering was INOP. This would require at least a 15 mile final to accomplish the Gravity Gear Extension Procedure and to account for slow moving Flaps. Due to inoperative nose wheel steering we would not be able to taxi and a full stop on the runway with a tow in to gate would be required. We also wanted Fire Equipment standing by and wanted to be inspected upon stopping regarding the fluid leak. I instructed the FO to send a message to dispatch to communicate our emergency and plan; and to prepare for arrival/landing at ZZZ. I [requested priority landing] with ATC and communicated our problem and plan; including our intention to full stop Runway XX and require a tow in. After this; I ran the Non-Routine Landings Consideration Checklist in the QRH. I contacted the FA's and communicated our emergency and our plan for a precautionary landing and tow-in. I made a PA to do the same for the passengers. We performed a normal descent on the ZZZZZ arrival to Runway XX. At the appropriate time I gave control of the aircraft back to the FO and extended the landing gear using the QRH L/G Gravity Extension Procedure. I resumed aircraft control after the gear was down and locked and the procedure was completed. We made a normal landing. Aircraft control was noticeably more difficult than I was expecting decelerating through 80 kts. with only differential braking but we maintained centerline just fine. After coming to a stop I made the PA to remain seated and that we would be inspected by safety vehicles. The safety vehicles performed their inspection and informed us of an obvious hydraulic leak on the number one engine. After performing the after landing flows; we shut down both engines. Dispatch had already coordinated with operations for the tow in crew and they met the aircraft within a few minutes. We were towed into the gate with one of the fire vehicles following us. The FO; flight attendants; ATC; fire crews; dispatch; operations; and ground crew all did an exemplary job throughout this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.