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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1696638 |
Time | |
Date | 201910 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Brake System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control |
Narrative:
We were cleared to 'line up and wait' onto runway xx at ZZZ. We completed all checklists and were 'cleared for takeoff'. At approximately 110 kts. The master caution illuminated amber with flight control enunciated. The first officer (first officer) called; 'master caution' and I read flight control. I first said that; 'I'm continuing'. I then observed the airspeed at 110 kts. And that I had over 8000 ft. Of usable runway. I thought of the gulfstream crash with the gust lock engaged and opted to reject the takeoff. I initiated the reject procedures and told the first officer to call the control tower and inform them of our reject. I let the rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) auto brakes apply brakes while I steered the aircraft on the center line and applied full reverse thrust. I began decreasing reverse thrust at approximately 70 kts. I also applied the toe brakes at 60 kts. To take the aircraft out of rejected takeoff auto brakes mode. This did not work and I could feel the rejected takeoff auto brakes still applying maximum braking. I immediately retracted the spoilers to take the aircraft out of rejected takeoff. The brakes were still being applied at maximum so I reached for the auto brakes switch and turned it off. I observed the auto brakes disarm amber light illuminate however the brakes were locked up and the wheels were not turning. The aircraft came to a complete stop just past taxiway X. The first officer was talking to the control tower and informing them of our situation. I then tried to taxi the aircraft to clear the active runway. The brakes were locked and would not allow the aircraft to move. The first officer informed the tower that we need a tug to be removed from the runway. The tower asked if we needed anymore assistance with 'fire rescue' and we replied; 'no just a tug to remove us from the runway'. I called for the QRH and before we could read the first line I realized the yaw damper failed and was the likely cause of the master caution light. The fire rescue showed up in a very short time and was asking if we needed assistance. I replied; 'yes; inspect the brakes for over temperatures. The first officer and I shutdown the engines and set the parking brake with rescue personnel walking around the aircraft. The fire rescue sprayed the brakes with water to cool them. After approximately 40 minutes the mechanics showed with a tug and hooked a toe bar onto the aircraft. They then attempted to move the aircraft to release the brakes and the toe bar was broken in the attempt. On the second attempt a mechanic yelled out that they blew a tire attempting to move and cool the brakes. At this point the first officer and I were observers of the cleanup.[the cause was] my indecision and failure to recognize the threat. I over reacted and did not need to reject the takeoff. [I will] be much more vigilant before taking the runway and concentrate on the reasons to reject a takeoff.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Flight crew reported they performed a rejected takeoff in response to a Master Caution light. The brakes locked up; requiring that the aircraft be towed from the runway.
Narrative: We were cleared to 'line up and wait' onto Runway XX at ZZZ. We completed all checklists and were 'cleared for takeoff'. At approximately 110 kts. the Master Caution illuminated amber with FLT CONTROL enunciated. The FO (First Officer) called; 'Master Caution' and I read FLT Control. I first said that; 'I'm continuing'. I then observed the airspeed at 110 kts. and that I had over 8000 ft. of usable runway. I thought of the Gulfstream crash with the gust lock engaged and opted to reject the takeoff. I initiated the reject procedures and told the FO to call the Control Tower and inform them of our reject. I let the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) auto brakes apply brakes while I steered the aircraft on the center line and applied full reverse thrust. I began decreasing reverse thrust at approximately 70 kts. I also applied the toe brakes at 60 kts. to take the aircraft out of RTO auto brakes mode. This did not work and I could feel the RTO auto brakes still applying maximum braking. I immediately retracted the spoilers to take the aircraft out of RTO. The brakes were still being applied at maximum so I reached for the auto brakes switch and turned it off. I observed the auto brakes disarm amber light illuminate however the brakes were locked up and the wheels were not turning. The aircraft came to a complete stop just past Taxiway X. The FO was talking to the Control Tower and informing them of our situation. I then tried to taxi the aircraft to clear the active runway. The brakes were locked and would not allow the aircraft to move. The FO informed the Tower that we need a tug to be removed from the runway. The Tower asked if we needed anymore assistance with 'fire rescue' and we replied; 'no just a tug to remove us from the runway'. I called for the QRH and before we could read the first line I realized the YAW Damper failed and was the likely cause of the Master Caution light. The fire rescue showed up in a very short time and was asking if we needed assistance. I replied; 'Yes; inspect the brakes for over temperatures. The FO and I shutdown the engines and set the parking brake with rescue personnel walking around the aircraft. The fire rescue sprayed the brakes with water to cool them. After approximately 40 minutes the mechanics showed with a tug and hooked a toe bar onto the aircraft. They then attempted to move the aircraft to release the brakes and the toe bar was broken in the attempt. On the second attempt a mechanic yelled out that they blew a tire attempting to move and cool the brakes. At this point the FO and I were observers of the cleanup.[The cause was] my indecision and failure to recognize the threat. I over reacted and did not need to reject the takeoff. [I will] be much more vigilant before taking the runway and concentrate on the reasons to reject a takeoff.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.