Narrative:

During descent to initial approach I became saturated and descended below approach minimum altitudes by 400 ft. Near the final approach fix for runway 7R and was unable to capture the localizer.I discovered the descent below minimums and began corrections just before ATC provided an altitude alert.ATC's prompts and cross checks of my GPS position helped me recognize that I was not capturing the localizer.contributing factors to this issue were:1. Steep / rushed decent due to communication loss with center just prior to top of descent. Communication loss was due to being at min IFR (instrument flight rules) alt over terrain. Also believe the radio/antenna were weak. This distraction delayed the top of descent and caused extra work load at a time I should have been setting up for the approach. 2. Early base turn vectors while at high rate of speed and still descending. Presumably to squeeze me in front of traffic; I was vectored a tight turn from downwind to 30 degree intercept while descending at greater than 200 kts and 1;000 fpm.3. ATC controller requested for weather report/cloud tops during descent and turn to intercept the localizer.4. Issues with erratic CDI/GS (course deviation indicator/ground speed) readings from nav radio. While trying to establish on the localizer I saw erratic CDI needle swings that caused me to cross check with other instruments.5. Self-induced stress due to ceilings near minimums and knowing that actual conditions on earlier approach that day were worse than reported on ATIS (automated terminal information service) earlier that day on approach to the same runway; I experienced conditions near the missed approach point that were worse than the advertised ATIS.6. GPS/navigation/comm not standard (different than the rest of the fleet). The aircraft I was flying was equipped with a CNX80; while all other company aircraft are equipped with a GNS430/530. Compounding the issue the plane had been down for maintenance for the prior 3-4 months; so I had not used the odd equipment for approximately 4months.7. VFR on top caused me to use visual references instead of using instruments during descent and turn. My head was outside the windows instead of in the gauges because I could see. This may not have happened if we had a normal descent or had been given a descent clearance before entering the area of poor/loss comms and the next controller's frequency. I should have requested a longer down wind and more gradual descent. Reporting cloud tops should not have been on my mind during descent to approach and turns. ATC (air traffic control) could have asked after establishing or asked a 2 pilot crew for the information. They could have also asked for the information differently.. They asked ' let me know when you descend into the clouds.' that is a bad time to key the mic and talk to ATC. They could have asked me to estimate the cloud tops if I had time.a more extensive check out flight had been completed after adsb (automatic dependent surveillance broadcast) installation. It had not flown ILS approaches to my knowledge since the install.the weather was at my personal limits. I could have declined the flight. It is also important to know that the weather was worse than forecast.I could have refused the flight in the plane with nonstandard GPS/navigation/com equipment due to the weather conditions and re-familiarized myself with the equipment on a VFR (visual flight rules) flight. It should be trained (perhaps it is) that when descending VFR into IMC (instrument meteorological conditions) it is important to get on the gauges earlier to establish a good scan; rather than waiting until the last minute.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA-31 pilot reported that distraction and unfamiliarity with equipment resulted in a descent below the approach minimums.

Narrative: During descent to initial approach I became saturated and descended below approach minimum altitudes by 400 ft. near the final approach fix for Runway 7R and was unable to capture the localizer.I discovered the descent below minimums and began corrections just before ATC provided an altitude alert.ATC's prompts and cross checks of my GPS position helped me recognize that I was not capturing the localizer.Contributing factors to this issue were:1. Steep / rushed decent due to communication loss with center just prior to top of descent. Communication loss was due to being at min IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) alt over terrain. Also believe the radio/antenna were weak. This distraction delayed the top of descent and caused extra work load at a time I should have been setting up for the approach. 2. Early base turn vectors while at high rate of speed and still descending. Presumably to squeeze me in front of traffic; I was vectored a tight turn from downwind to 30 degree intercept while descending at greater than 200 kts and 1;000 fpm.3. ATC Controller requested for weather report/cloud tops during descent and turn to intercept the localizer.4. Issues with erratic CDI/GS (Course Deviation Indicator/Ground Speed) readings from Nav radio. While trying to establish on the localizer I saw erratic CDI needle swings that caused me to cross check with other instruments.5. Self-induced stress due to ceilings near minimums and knowing that actual conditions on earlier approach that day were worse than reported on ATIS (Automated Terminal Information Service) Earlier that day on approach to the same runway; I experienced conditions near the missed approach point that were worse than the advertised ATIS.6. GPS/NAV/Comm not standard (different than the rest of the fleet). The aircraft I was flying was equipped with a CNX80; while all other company aircraft are equipped with a GNS430/530. Compounding the issue the plane had been down for maintenance for the prior 3-4 months; so I had not used the odd equipment for approximately 4months.7. VFR on top caused me to use visual references instead of using instruments during descent and turn. My head was outside the windows instead of in the gauges because I could see. This may not have happened if we had a normal descent or had been given a descent clearance before entering the area of poor/loss comms and the next controller's frequency. I should have requested a longer down wind and more gradual descent. Reporting cloud tops should not have been on my mind during descent to approach and turns. ATC (air Traffic Control) could have asked after establishing or asked a 2 pilot crew for the information. They could have also asked for the information differently.. They asked ' let me know when you descend into the clouds.' That is a bad time to key the mic and talk to ATC. They could have asked me to estimate the cloud tops if I had time.A more extensive check out flight had been completed after ADSB (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) installation. It had not flown ILS approaches to my knowledge since the install.The weather was at my personal limits. I could have declined the flight. It is also important to know that the weather was worse than forecast.I could have refused the flight in the plane with nonstandard GPS/NAV/com equipment due to the weather conditions and re-familiarized myself with the equipment on a VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight. It should be trained (perhaps it is) that when descending VFR into IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) it is important to get on the gauges earlier to establish a good scan; rather than waiting until the last minute.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.