Narrative:

On arrival ZZZ were cleared for a visual runway xx; first officer's (first officer's) leg. Initially at 4;000 ft. On a high wide right downwind he set and descended to 3;000 ft. For traffic pattern altitude. We did not receive a response to our in-range until moments before so with things well in hand I now selected the taxi page on my jeps (jeppesen) to briefly review the anticipated taxi as there were several notamed closures. Then thinking of the numerous towers in the area I decided I was premature and reselected the ILS xx plate which I fumbled some with. In the mean time I did not see my first officer select 2;000 feet (which was only 500 feet AGL) and begin a premature descent. I noticed as we were 1;000 feet; RA (radar altimeter) [a few] miles from the turn to final and told him to climb back to 2;500 feet.in retrospect; I should have immediate taken control of the aircraft; but he initially was responding although not as quickly as I would have liked. I thought he had inadvertently selected the altitude and that a correction at a position on a wide base and well before the turn to final was appropriate but did not know that he had lost sight of the airport and become disoriented. I did not call go-around as we were in a position that put us well outside of stabilized approach criteria and did not feel it was required under the circumstances and I felt a climb to 2;500 feet for an intercept of final at about 3 [and] 1/2 miles was more appropriate. About that time we got a 'too low gear' I again told him to climb which he did although slowly. I selected gear down to silence the warning in an attempt to unload my first officer and get him to again listen to me; as my first officer had by this point 'checked out' (his words from our debrief of the situation). He was now intermittently holding the side stick priority button and I did not want to initiate a struggle for control of the aircraft and essentially a single pilot go around so using captain's emergency authority I guided him through the approach and landing.I do want to state that on the previous trip this month and on the other occasions I have flown with this first officer he has always displayed fine airmanship and professionalism and this situation is completely out of character for him.in retrospect my reluctance to call for a go-around or take control at a point where I felt it was still possible aggravated the situation. I made assumptions about why the first officer had done what he had done; i.e.; an error; which turned out to not be correct. He had become disoriented; overwhelmed. I would have not considered before this incident telling someone to 'go around' while on downwind. In our position miles from joining final on a wide base I felt the same. In our debriefing I stated that one of my mistakes in the situation was to not have taken control early on. He indicated that he felt a 'go around' call may have brought him back into the situation. I actually tend to agree. I would not have hesitated in IMC to call 'go around 'if we were similarly out of sorts; why the hesitation in VMC.I want to focus on my misgiving and failings in this report; but do believe it is worth note that in our debrief of this incident we did discuss the use of the nd (navigation display) in helping to improve situational awareness. The ILS was briefed as a backup to the visual with the glide path intercept altitude being of note. Communicating his lack of situational awareness and disorientation. And following SOP regarding changes to altitude settings. These things in addition to those already mentioned that I feel I specifically could/should have done better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported First Officer lost sight of the airport and descended prematurely while on visual approach.

Narrative: On arrival ZZZ were cleared for a visual Runway XX; FO's (First Officer's) leg. Initially at 4;000 ft. on a high wide right downwind he set and descended to 3;000 ft. for traffic pattern altitude. We did not receive a response to our in-range until moments before so with things well in hand I now selected the taxi page on my Jeps (Jeppesen) to briefly review the anticipated taxi as there were several NOTAMed closures. Then thinking of the numerous towers in the area I decided I was premature and reselected the ILS XX plate which I fumbled some with. In the mean time I did not see my FO select 2;000 feet (which was only 500 feet AGL) and begin a premature descent. I noticed as we were 1;000 feet; RA (Radar Altimeter) [a few] miles from the turn to final and told him to climb back to 2;500 feet.In retrospect; I should have immediate taken control of the aircraft; but he initially was responding although not as quickly as I would have liked. I thought he had inadvertently selected the altitude and that a correction at a position on a wide base and well before the turn to final was appropriate but did not know that he had lost sight of the airport and become disoriented. I did not call go-around as we were in a position that put us well outside of stabilized approach criteria and did not feel it was required under the circumstances and I felt a climb to 2;500 feet for an intercept of final at about 3 [and] 1/2 miles was more appropriate. About that time we got a 'too low gear' I again told him to climb which he did although slowly. I selected gear down to silence the warning in an attempt to unload my FO and get him to again listen to me; as my FO had by this point 'checked out' (his words from our debrief of the situation). He was now intermittently holding the side stick priority button and I did not want to initiate a struggle for control of the aircraft and essentially a single pilot go around so using captain's emergency authority I guided him through the approach and landing.I do want to state that on the previous trip this month and on the other occasions I have flown with this First Officer he has always displayed fine airmanship and professionalism and this situation is completely out of character for him.In retrospect my reluctance to call for a go-around or take control at a point where I felt it was still possible aggravated the situation. I made assumptions about why the FO had done what he had done; i.e.; an error; which turned out to not be correct. He had become disoriented; overwhelmed. I would have not considered before this incident telling someone to 'go around' while on downwind. In our position miles from joining final on a wide base I felt the same. In our debriefing I stated that one of my mistakes in the situation was to not have taken control early on. He indicated that he felt a 'go around' call may have brought him back into the situation. I actually tend to agree. I would not have hesitated in IMC to call 'go around 'if we were similarly out of sorts; why the hesitation in VMC.I want to focus on my misgiving and failings in this report; but do believe it is worth note that in our debrief of this incident we did discuss the use of the ND (Navigation Display) in helping to improve situational awareness. The ILS was briefed as a backup to the visual with the glide path intercept altitude being of note. Communicating his lack of situational awareness and disorientation. And following SOP regarding changes to altitude settings. These things in addition to those already mentioned that I feel I specifically could/should have done better.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.