Narrative:

We were taking off on runway xxr in ZZZ and rejected the takeoff at or approaching rotation speed due to a spoiler warning. The first officer was the pilot flying; and I took the controls; rejecting the takeoff. Rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) engaged and the aircraft came to a stop between taxiways Y and J. We completed the rejected takeoff checklist and notified the tower. The first officer told the passengers to remain seated. I did not set the parking brake; and chose to taxi off the runway onto taxiway J. We requested emergency equipment as a precaution in order to inspect the brakes; since we were displaying brake temperature with brake temp indications as high as 7 on both sides. We started the APU; and proceeded to shut down both engines. We communicated via a discreet frequency with the firefighter in command; they proceeded to chock the tires; and provided cooling to the brakes using fans. After the brakes were sufficiently cooled; we requested a tow back to the gate. During this time; we had also been communicating with the flight attendants and notifying the passengers as to what was happening and that we would be returning to the gate. After returning to the gate we completed maintenance write-ups on the spoiler warning; the rejected takeoff and the high brake temps.during preflight planning; the first officer and I had discussed an inbound write-up that read 'spoilers caution in flight.' after discussing the issue with maintenance; we felt as though the aircraft was safe to fly. They completed a series of tests and also determined that although there was a history; it was safe for us to proceed. Although there was a history of maintenance relating to the spoilers; we discussed that if the issue came up again in flight; it was something we could handle in a safe manner. We also noted in the log history that the previous issues had all occurred while airborne. Station maintenance ultimately signed off the aircraft.while taxiing for takeoff; we performed the before takeoff checklist; and when I initially performed the takeoff configuration check; we got the takeoff configuration warning and spoilers EICAS. I reseated the speed brake lever; and retested the system at least twice more. Both times; the check was good and we determined that the system was working. I was comfortable with proceeding with the takeoff; and the first officer agreed with that decision.the weather in ZZZ was not a factor; with winds 330/07; visibility 10 sm; temperature 14; dew point 9. We were taking off with flaps 5; packs on; and a takeoff gross weight of 199.5. We used reduced thrust with a V1 of 126; vr of 144 and V2 of 148.the first officer was just beginning to rotate when I took the aircraft and rejected the takeoff because of the spoiler warning; using my emergency authority. I knew that we were on a 12;000 feet runway; and I knew we had the distance to stop. Even though we were well beyond V1; I determined that it was safer to stop rather than risk attempting to fly with the unknown of what was happening with the spoilers at that moment. I believed that an uncommanded roll or significant drag could prevent us from safely flying.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew reported a spoiler warning that resulted in a rejected takeoff.

Narrative: We were taking off on Runway XXR in ZZZ and rejected the takeoff at or approaching rotation speed due to a spoiler warning. The First Officer was the pilot flying; and I took the controls; rejecting the takeoff. RTO (Rejected Takeoff) engaged and the aircraft came to a stop between Taxiways Y and J. We completed the Rejected Takeoff checklist and notified the Tower. The First Officer told the passengers to remain seated. I did not set the parking brake; and chose to taxi off the runway onto Taxiway J. We requested emergency equipment as a precaution in order to inspect the brakes; since we were displaying BRAKE TEMP with brake temp indications as high as 7 on both sides. We started the APU; and proceeded to shut down both engines. We communicated via a discreet frequency with the firefighter in command; they proceeded to chock the tires; and provided cooling to the brakes using fans. After the brakes were sufficiently cooled; we requested a tow back to the gate. During this time; we had also been communicating with the flight attendants and notifying the passengers as to what was happening and that we would be returning to the gate. After returning to the gate we completed maintenance write-ups on the SPOILER warning; the rejected takeoff and the high brake temps.During preflight planning; the First Officer and I had discussed an inbound write-up that read 'Spoilers caution in flight.' After discussing the issue with Maintenance; we felt as though the aircraft was safe to fly. They completed a series of tests and also determined that although there was a history; it was safe for us to proceed. Although there was a history of maintenance relating to the spoilers; we discussed that if the issue came up again in flight; it was something we could handle in a safe manner. We also noted in the log history that the previous issues had all occurred while airborne. Station Maintenance ultimately signed off the aircraft.While taxiing for takeoff; we performed the Before Takeoff Checklist; and when I initially performed the Takeoff Configuration check; we got the Takeoff Configuration warning and Spoilers EICAS. I reseated the speed brake lever; and retested the system at least twice more. Both times; the check was good and we determined that the system was working. I was comfortable with proceeding with the takeoff; and the First Officer agreed with that decision.The weather in ZZZ was not a factor; with winds 330/07; visibility 10 sm; temperature 14; dew point 9. We were taking off with flaps 5; packs on; and a takeoff gross weight of 199.5. We used reduced thrust with a V1 of 126; VR of 144 and V2 of 148.The First Officer was just beginning to rotate when I took the aircraft and rejected the takeoff because of the SPOILER warning; using my emergency authority. I knew that we were on a 12;000 feet runway; and I knew we had the distance to stop. Even though we were well beyond V1; I determined that it was safer to stop rather than risk attempting to fly with the unknown of what was happening with the spoilers at that moment. I believed that an uncommanded roll or significant drag could prevent us from safely flying.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.