Narrative:

I was pilot flying going into lga on the korry 4 arrival landing runway 31. The last ATIS in lga advertised the expressway visual to runway 31. We had set up to cross dials at 2;500 feet per the visual approach. We briefed the visual to 31. During arrival the new ATIS came out. We did receive it but both myself and the first officer failed to notice that they changed the approach to the localizer 31. Last clearance we received with approach was direct lga and to descend and maintain 4;000 feet. We were currently at 250 kts. As we approached lga; I had assumed we were going to get a very late approach clearance to cross dials at 2;500 feet and cleared the expressway visual. Not wanting to be unstable I started slowing the aircraft to 210 kts assuming approach would be giving us the clearance. Lga approach then asked why we were slowing and what airspeed we were at? We notified them that we were at 200 kts. The controller told us that we must ask to slow in ny and that we have traffic behind us. I told them I was expecting dials at 2;500 feet. They said that they were doing the localizer 31 and they take us over lga. At this point we realized what had happened. Approach did ask us if we had the current ATIS information when we checked in. We quickly switched approaches and continued the flight with no further incidents. This all could have been avoided had we read the new ATIS more carefully. I should have questioned if approach was going to give us dials at 2;500 feet. And lastly; I should have asked before slowing down on my own. I believe fatigue and expectation bias played major roles in this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported slowing from assigned speed in anticipation of clearance for the wrong approach into LGA airport.

Narrative: I was Pilot Flying going into LGA on the KORRY 4 arrival landing Runway 31. The last ATIS in LGA advertised the Expressway Visual to Runway 31. We had set up to cross DIALS at 2;500 feet per the visual approach. We briefed the visual to 31. During arrival the new ATIS came out. We did receive it but both myself and the First Officer failed to notice that they changed the approach to the LOC 31. Last clearance we received with approach was direct LGA and to descend and maintain 4;000 feet. We were currently at 250 kts. As we approached LGA; I had assumed we were going to get a very late approach clearance to cross DIALS at 2;500 feet and cleared the Expressway Visual. Not wanting to be unstable I started slowing the aircraft to 210 kts assuming Approach would be giving us the clearance. LGA Approach then asked why we were slowing and what airspeed we were at? We notified them that we were at 200 kts. The Controller told us that we must ask to slow in NY and that we have traffic behind us. I told them I was expecting DIALS at 2;500 feet. They said that they were doing the LOC 31 and they take us over LGA. At this point we realized what had happened. Approach did ask us if we had the current ATIS information when we checked in. We quickly switched approaches and continued the flight with no further incidents. This all could have been avoided had we read the new ATIS more carefully. I should have questioned if approach was going to give us DIALS at 2;500 feet. And lastly; I should have asked before slowing down on my own. I believe fatigue and expectation bias played major roles in this incident.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.