Narrative:

Washington national tower directed us 'to make ready for an immediate departure behind departing traffic, taxi up to but hold short runway 36, traffic to land, on 4 mi final.' we acknowledged and taxied up to hold short runway 36. As soon as the departing traffic was cleared for takeoff and began his takeoff roll the tower controller transmitted 'air carrier X, the landing traffic will land prior to your departure, hold short runway 36.' I (PNF/first officer) acknowledged but the captain had released the parking brake and the nose of the aircraft crossed the hold line. We advised tower we had crossed the hold line (the nose was approximately 3 ft across but the nosegear had not crossed). We attempted to advise tower we could make a 180 degree turn into the hold area but tower directed the landing aircraft to go around. Although we were 'spring loaded' to make an immediate takeoff, we did not have clearance to take the active runway. The situation could have been avoided if we had not been so 'spring loaded' and abided by our clearance. Also, the tower might have queried us about taxiing clear. Tower did ask air carrier landing traffic if they could circle to runway 33, but they were unable. Also, if an anticipatory clearance is given, possibly tower could have first stated the change, ie, 'air carrier X, hold short runway 36. Landing traffic will land prior to your departure.' supplemental information from acn 367579: tower advised us to be ready for an immediate takeoff behind the preceding aircraft as I approached the hold short line. The preceding aircraft was cleared for takeoff. ATC then began a transmission to our aircraft. Anticipating an immediate takeoff clearance, I did not stop at the hold short line. However, ATC's instructions were to hold short. I stopped the aircraft, but we were about 6 ft past the hold line. 2 major contributing factors: 1) I developed the mindset that we were going to be taking off, and that we were going to need to be prompt. Thus, when the controller began his transmission, I assumed that it would be a clearance across the hold short line. 2) the controller's 'insistence' that we be ready for an immediate takeoff, along with a pause in his transmission, 'airline XXX ... (5 second pause) hold short' contributed to the confusion. The responsibility for the incursion was mine alone, but the controller's insistence that we be ready contributed to the mindset and the confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR B727 CROSSES OVER THE HOLD LINE AT DCA IN ANTICIPATION OF A TKOF CLRNC. LNDG ACFT TOLD TO GAR.

Narrative: WASHINGTON NATIONAL TWR DIRECTED US 'TO MAKE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE DEP BEHIND DEPARTING TFC, TAXI UP TO BUT HOLD SHORT RWY 36, TFC TO LAND, ON 4 MI FINAL.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND TAXIED UP TO HOLD SHORT RWY 36. AS SOON AS THE DEPARTING TFC WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND BEGAN HIS TKOF ROLL THE TWR CTLR XMITTED 'ACR X, THE LNDG TFC WILL LAND PRIOR TO YOUR DEP, HOLD SHORT RWY 36.' I (PNF/FO) ACKNOWLEDGED BUT THE CAPT HAD RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT CROSSED THE HOLD LINE. WE ADVISED TWR WE HAD CROSSED THE HOLD LINE (THE NOSE WAS APPROX 3 FT ACROSS BUT THE NOSEGEAR HAD NOT CROSSED). WE ATTEMPTED TO ADVISE TWR WE COULD MAKE A 180 DEG TURN INTO THE HOLD AREA BUT TWR DIRECTED THE LNDG ACFT TO GAR. ALTHOUGH WE WERE 'SPRING LOADED' TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, WE DID NOT HAVE CLRNC TO TAKE THE ACTIVE RWY. THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE HAD NOT BEEN SO 'SPRING LOADED' AND ABIDED BY OUR CLRNC. ALSO, THE TWR MIGHT HAVE QUERIED US ABOUT TAXIING CLR. TWR DID ASK ACR LNDG TFC IF THEY COULD CIRCLE TO RWY 33, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE. ALSO, IF AN ANTICIPATORY CLRNC IS GIVEN, POSSIBLY TWR COULD HAVE FIRST STATED THE CHANGE, IE, 'ACR X, HOLD SHORT RWY 36. LNDG TFC WILL LAND PRIOR TO YOUR DEP.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 367579: TWR ADVISED US TO BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF BEHIND THE PRECEDING ACFT AS I APCHED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE PRECEDING ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. ATC THEN BEGAN A XMISSION TO OUR ACFT. ANTICIPATING AN IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC, I DID NOT STOP AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE. HOWEVER, ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO HOLD SHORT. I STOPPED THE ACFT, BUT WE WERE ABOUT 6 FT PAST THE HOLD LINE. 2 MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) I DEVELOPED THE MINDSET THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE TAKING OFF, AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO NEED TO BE PROMPT. THUS, WHEN THE CTLR BEGAN HIS XMISSION, I ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD BE A CLRNC ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE. 2) THE CTLR'S 'INSISTENCE' THAT WE BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, ALONG WITH A PAUSE IN HIS XMISSION, 'AIRLINE XXX ... (5 SECOND PAUSE) HOLD SHORT' CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONFUSION. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCURSION WAS MINE ALONE, BUT THE CTLR'S INSISTENCE THAT WE BE READY CONTRIBUTED TO THE MINDSET AND THE CONFUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.